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Executive Director’s introduction 
This is ASPI’s twelfth annual Defence Budget Brief. Our aim remains to inform discussion and 
scrutiny of the Defence budget and the policy choices it entails.   
As has been the custom in the past, we explore new areas in this year’s Brief. The new 
entrant from last year, Australian Defence Industry, has been expanded to include an 
examination of the Future Submarine Industry Skills Plan released coincident with the 2013 
Defence White Paper.  
Finally, some acknowledgements are due. The not inconsiderable task of preparing the 
document for publication has been ably taken care of by Janice Johnson. Many others have 
helped by providing comments, offering advice, and checking facts. Our thanks go out to 
them all. Special recognition is due to Kristy Bryden who proof read every chapter.   
Also, Defence was kind enough to look over a preliminary draft of this Brief and provide 
valuable comments. This helped clarify some important points and resulted in improved 
accuracy in many areas. Of course this does not in any way imply that Defence endorses this 
document or even supports its conclusions.  
My colleague Mark Thomson, who is ASPI’s Senior Analyst for Defence Economics, has once 
again pulled together the brief in the short time available. For this I extend my sincere 
thanks. As always, responsibility for the judgements contained herein lie with Mark and me 
alone. 
Lastly we should acknowledge that we at ASPI are not disinterested observers of the 
Defence budget. Our funding from government is provided through Defence at the rate of 
eight thousand, three hundred and fifty-eight dollars and ninety cents ($8,358.90) per day. 
Details can be found in our 2011-12 Annual Report. 
 
Peter Jennings 
Executive Director  
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Executive summary 
What a difference a year can make. Twelve 
months ago, it looked like the government 
had all but abandoned the ambitious plans set 
out for the ADF in the 2009 Defence White 
Paper. More than $20 billion of promised 
defence funding had been cut or deferred 
over the preceding three years. Last year, 
funding fell in real terms by more than 10% 
pushing the defence share of GDP to 1.6%—
the lowest level since 1938.   
This year things look very different. Defence 
spending is again on the rise, and the 
government has released a new Defence 
White Paper essentially recommitting itself to 
the capability goals of 2009 and then some. On current plans, the defence budget will 
increase in real terms by 2.3% next year to reach $25.4 billion, and then continue to grow for 
another three years to $28.6 billion (all measured in today’s dollars) to deliver an average of 
3.6% real growth over four years.  
But that’s only the start. If the government makes good on the $220 billion of financial 
guidance for the six years that follow, there’s enough money available to grow the defence 
budget to $33.2 billion by 2022 at an annual real rate of growth of 2.5% per annum.   
But don’t pop the champagne corks just yet. The seemingly impressive growth is coming 
from a low base. In the 48 months between the release of the 2009 and 2013 Defence White 
Papers, around $20 billion of promised funding was lost in the headlong rush to get the 
Commonwealth’s books out of the red. As things stand, it will be two more years before 
defence spending rises out of the hole that was dug in search of a surplus.  
Is there enough money? 
Because of the secrecy surrounding the actual funding promised back in 2009, it’s hard to 
say precisely how much less money there is today compared with back then. But taking the 
2009 funding commitment at face value, the shortfall is in the vicinity of $30 billion for the 
period 2009 to 2022. Consistent with this, the share of GDP will remain below 1.7% for the 
next decade.  
Of course, GDP share is a poor measure of the adequacy of defence spending; it’s been 
trending down since the end of our involvement in Vietnam as the economy grew. What 
really matters is whether the government has committed enough money to deliver the 
defence force it says we need. The short answer is that it has not. 
Here’s how things stand. The planned scale and sophistication of the ADF has not been 
reduced appreciably since the 2009 White Paper. In fact, it’s grown in some key areas. Not 
only did the new White Paper announce the purchase of 12 previously-unplanned Growler 
configured Super Hornet aircraft, but we’re now planning to keep the Super Hornets in 
service concurrent with the yet-to-be-acquired F-35 Joint Strike Fighter out to at least 2030. 
As a result, the prudent strategy of consolidating the RAAF’s fast jet fleets has been 
abandoned at the cost of much higher personnel and operating expenses in the years ahead. 
Similarly, the government’s decision to suspend consideration the off-the-shelf options for 
the Collins submarine replacement only leaves the two most expensive and risky options on 
the table.  
Defence Budget 2013 
Defence funding 2013-14:   $25.4 billion 
Share of GDP:   1.59% 
Share of Commonwealth spend: 6.50% 
Real growth on prior year:  2.3% 
 
Expenditure shares 
Investment:   $5.7 billion   (22.4%) 
Personnel:  $10.7 billion (42.2%) 
Operating:  $9.0 billion   (35.4%) 
 
Cost of deployments 
Afghanistan:    $885 billion   ($8.3b since 2001) 
Solomon Islands:  $11 million    ($353m since 2003) 
 
Key budget measures (4 years) 
$200 million provided for Growler purchase 
$3.0 billion brought forward into next 3 years 
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So even if the 2009 Defence White Paper was affordable—and it probably wasn’t in the long 
term—it follows that with more capability and less money the 2013 Defence White paper is 
not.  
The same conclusion can be reached by looking at the cost of maintaining a state-of-the-art 
military force. US data going back to the 1950s shows that the unit cost of acquiring and 
operating ships, planes and troops has grown on average at around 3% per annum above 
inflation. With only 2.5% growth on the horizon, we’ll be lucky to maintain the force we 
have, let alone expand it.  
To the extent that there’s been a political debate over defence spending, it’s been cautious 
and low key. Both sides ‘aspire’ to grow defence spending to 2% of GDP when circumstances 
allow, without explaining the merits of that symbolic figure. More critically; neither side of 
politics is willing to say where they would cut the ADF to close the gap between means and 
ends, nor are they willing to head off such cuts by making a firm commitment on defence 
spending. So we have bipartisan make-believe.  
Future prospects 
Things could get worse. This year’s boost to defence spending was a direct consequence of 
the government’s failure to achieve a surplus. Had a surplus been within reach, the defence 
budget would have undoubtedly come under renewed pressure. It’s clear that the 
$21 billion fiscal blow out created room for the additional defence funding granted this year. 
There’s a binary calculus at play. Because the Australian Government’s net debt is small in 
absolute terms, the further accumulation of debt is of political concern only if it prevents a 
surplus. With a surplus beyond reach for the moment, the impediments to spending were 
weakened. The Treasurer’s loss became the Defence Minister’s gain. 
But we’re not in surplus yet. Whoever comes to government in September will want to get 
out of deficit before they face the electorate again. And at some point we’ll be back where 
we were last year, with defence spending being squeezed to help get the budget over the 
line—just as occurred following the recessions of the 1980s and 1990s.  
One of the reasons that both sides of politics are reticent to commit to a long-term figure for 
defence spending is the substantial uncertainty over future tax revenues. Economists all 
around town are busying themselves trying to understand the extent of our ‘structural 
deficit’, a malady we picked up in 2007 but nobody bothered telling us about until now.  
This much appears clear: the surplus promised for this year became a deficit due to several 
factors, the most important of which was the deterioration in our terms of trade. That is, the 
rate at which our exports generate revenue in our own currency. Between its peak in late 
2011 and the end of 2012, Australia’s terms of trade fell by 17%.  
The government’s current fiscal projections are based on our terms of trade only declining 
by a further 2.5% between now and 2015. If it falls further, revenues will decline and the 
government’s fiscal situation will worsen. We are not out of the woods yet. If events over 
the past few years have taught us anything, it’s that defence spending is at the mercy of the 
uncertain health of the government’s finances. 
What’s going on? 
Notwithstanding the fiscal breathing space created by the failure to achieve a surplus, this 
year’s boost to Defence was not pain free for the government. While Defence got more 
money in this budget, other areas were being cut. Consider this: the full cost of the Growler 
acquisition ($3 billion) is higher than the savings from scrapping the Baby Bonus 
($2.5 billion), and there’s no question about the relative political worth of the two items. 
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Defence rated one mention in one sentence in the Treasurer’s budget speech. For better or 
worse, there are no votes in defence at this time.  
Why then has the government renewed its commitment to defence at some political cost, 
yet presented a manifestly underfunded plan? The most positive interpretation is that they 
are hedging against adverse strategic developments; on the one hand retaining the 
ambitious plans of 2009, while on the other providing only enough money to keep things 
ticking over.  
The new White Paper provides surprisingly few hints at what’s behind the government’s 
thinking. Carefully drafted to avoid giving alarm to anyone, it almost begs the question of 
why we need to spend so much on cutting-edge military equipment. China was left 
unperturbed and we were left scratching our heads.  
As always, actions speak louder than words. Let the academics squabble over whether the 
Indo-Pacific is in fact a ‘system’ as learnedly asserted in the White Paper; if you want to 
know what’s going on, follow the money.  
Two developments are noteworthy. In the maritime domain the additional cost and risk of a 
bespoke submarine project has all but been accepted. Rather than live with the limitations 
of a short-range off-the-shelf submarine, we are going to pursue boats capable of operating 
far into North Asia. In the air domain, we are going to have a mixed fleet of the best combat 
aircraft we can buy, aircraft of sophistication beyond anything likely to emerge in Southeast 
Asia (apart from our close friend Singapore).  
On both counts, the implication is the same. The government is hedging against a serious 
disruption in the broader strategic environment—a disruption of the sort only conceivable if 
the US–China relationship confounds the White Paper’s optimistic outlook.   
Reality bites 
The description of the present situation as a hedging strategy is probably more charitable 
than accurate. In reality, it looks more like a case of doublethink. We want a strong defence 
force, but we don’t want to pay for a strong defence force. So full steam ahead, we’ll plan 
for what we want and hang the consequences.   
Of course there’s nothing new in any of this. The same thing happened in the 1987 White 
Paper and again in 2000. In each case, reality soon asserted itself over wishful thinking. The 
reckoning for the 1987 White Paper was the 1991 Force Structure Review, which cut 
personnel numbers to free up money for investment in high-end equipment. In 2003 the 
opposite happened when the Defence Capability Review cut existing air and maritime 
platforms but preserved plans to expand the land force. 
The outcomes in 1991 (at the end of the Cold War) and 2003 (at the start of the War of 
Terror) were products of their time. What they had in common was that they adjusted the 
force structure to meet the demands of the present and the perceived challenges of the 
future. Each tried to manage strategic risk in light of limited resources.  
So what will the reckoning for the 2013 White Paper look like? One thing is sure; it will have 
to face up to the perennial question of Australian defence planning: the balance between 
the Army and the capacity to transport it, and high-tech air and maritime platforms. With 
the Army returning home to barracks, the natural tendency will be to repeat 1991 and shift 
resources to investment for the Navy and Air Force. But our experience in East Timor and 
Solomon Islands should temper that impulse.  
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Another serve of Magic Pudding 
The other thing that will certainly emerge in the years ahead is a renewed push for efficiency 
within Defence. Although worthwhile reform continues on several fronts, the savings targets 
of the Strategic Reform Program have been set aside. Given that the scale of claimed savings 
was surely exaggerated, this is no great loss.  
On the surface, the prospects for further real savings look promising. It’s clear that the 
organisation grew top heavy and bloated in the good times of the 2000s when executive and 
middle management positions exploded in the civilian and military workforces. But it’s 
unlikely that savings on a sufficient scale to make current plans affordable will be found by 
trimming the upper ranks, and equally so for the decision to reduce civilian numbers by 
1,000 over the next 4 years. 
The prospects for savings from another round of outsourcing aren’t great either. Apart from 
having only a limited number of functions left to be privatised, replacing public servants and 
military personnel by contractors at best yields a savings equal to the difference between 
two large numbers. And the durability of such savings depends on the relative business 
acumen of Defence and its commercial counterparties. Nothing is assured.  
So, by all means, let’s produce as lean and efficient an organisation as possible—but don’t 
pretend that it will be enough to balance the books. Greater efficiency will not remove the 
need to make hard decisions.  
Getting on with the job 
In the meantime, Defence needs to get on with the job of delivering. In a sense, this budget 
has given them a second chance. Performance over the next few years will be critical to the 
confidence that the government and public has in Defence. Two areas are likely to present 
particular challenges: personnel and procurement.  
As things stand, the uniformed strength of the ADF is fully 1,900 positions below what was 
budgeted for. A number of factors are probably behind the shortfall. Some people have 
probably been attracted away to better paying jobs. It’s no surprise that highly trained 
military tradespeople are valued by civil employers. At the same time, the drawdown from 
operations will make military service less attractive to many people. Whatever the reason, it 
will be hard to argue that the ADF should have a strength of 59,000 if Defence can’t recruit 
and retain that number of people.  
On the procurement side, there has been some encouraging progress. The rate of project 
approvals has increased compared to past years (though it still remains well below planned 
levels), and DMO reports improvements in delivering projects on time and within budget. 
This is all good. The problem ahead is that the rapid increase in acquisition spending planned 
over the next few years greatly exceeds anything that’s been achieved over the past fifteen 
years. Just as with personnel, if DMO starts to hand money back unspent the temptation will 
be to give it less money to spend.  
In the longer term, the biggest procurement challenge will be the raft of domestic maritime 
projects reconfirmed in the new White Paper. On the positive side, the government is 
moving things along in several areas, including by spending real money to make a start on 
what will be the most expensive defence project in Australian history, the Future Submarine. 
Less encouraging is Defence’s shipbuilding plan released alongside the White Paper. 
Developed in consultation with local industry, the new plan touts potential savings in the 
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‘tens of billions of dollars’. Yet on close examination, its concrete proposals appear more 
likely to add to the cost that the taxpayer will have to shoulder out to mid-century.  
With shipyards lobbying on the front page of newspapers, and unions threatening to strike if 
orders for more vessels aren’t forthcoming, we urgently need a rational approach to 
shipbuilding that puts efficiency above vested interests. 
Conclusion 
After four years of cuts, defence spending is on the rise again. But the growth is occurring 
from a low base, and in absolute terms funding remains well below what was promised back 
in 2009. Yet plans for the ADF remain as ambitious as ever.  
There’s a Groundhog Day feel about this year’s budget and the broader plans for the ADF 
now on the table. As always seems to be the case, there is a gap between means and ends 
that needs to be closed. While this might be explained as a hedging strategy, we risk wasting 
money in areas that will eventually have to be cut if additional funding is not forthcoming.  
In the meantime, it’s up to Defence to get on with the job. Challenges in the areas of 
personnel and procurement are certain to arise in the years ahead, and the government’s 
willingness to deliver more money will be tempered by how well Defence delivers on both 
counts.  
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Chapter 1 – Background  
1.1 Strategic Context  
Over the past year, low-level but concerning 
brinkmanship has continued in the Asia–Pacific with 
China maintaining the pattern of provocation that 
emerged following the 2008 global financial crisis. 
As Ross Terrill, one of Australia's leading experts on 
China, said recently, ‘China is probing on multiple 
fronts for more space and clout, sustaining quarrels 
with numerous neighbours who are Australia’s 
friends’.  
Oh wait, that doesn’t sound right. What does the 
new Defence White Paper says about all this? Let 
me see. Okay, I think I understand. Let me try again. 
Over the past year, competing territorial claims in maritime Asia have remained unresolved. 
This is concerning because these flashpoints increase the risk of both ‘destabilising strategic 
competition’ and ‘miscalculation’. ‘Australia has interests in the peaceful resolution of 
territorial and maritime disputes including in the South China Sea in accordance with 
international law… .͛͚ǀĞŶƚƐŝŶƚŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂŵĂǇǁĞůůƌĞŇĞĐƚŚŽǁĂƌŝƐŝŶŐŚŝŶĂĂŶĚ
its neighbours manage their relationships.’ 
That’s much better. Everything is 100% accurate, yet no one’s feelings are hurt. Bad things 
might happen, but it will be no one’s fault. Better still, we’ve assigned ourselves the role of a 
concerned but seemingly uncommitted observer. It’s as if we’re having a strategic out-of-
body experience. That’s the genius of the 2013 Defence White Paper.  
Nowhere is this truer than in its repeated focus on the ‘US–China relationship’ rather than 
on the more usual preoccupation with ‘the rise of China’. Indeed, the chapter on Australia’s 
strategic environment has a section called ‘The United States and China’ which discusses the 
two countries jointly rather than separately. In comparison, the 2009 effort was so crass as 
to have separate sections entitled ‘US Strategic Primacy’ and ‘The Strategic Implications of 
the Rise of China’.  
Apart from a couple of dissenting voices who see the changed tone as kowtowing to Beijing, 
the new approach has been broadly heralded as more nuanced and sophisticated than its 
predecessor. That might be true, and it might even be more self-consistent, but there’s no 
denying that it’s also less frank and less complete. The fact is that no matter how the 
document was drafted, it was always going to be a compromise between incompatible 
outcomes.  
In a sense, it probably doesn’t matter. Just as the Indo-Pacific versus Asia–Pacific debate is of 
little consequence beyond academic circles. A generation of students will be subjected to 
‘compare and contrast’ questions on the matter, but little of substance will change. The 
Key Points 
A new Defence White Paper has been 
released by the government 
confirming the basic tenants of 
Australian strategic policy established 
in the 1970s and 80s. 
The government has embraced the 
concept of the Indo-Pacific in the new 
White Paper and carefully avoided 
offending China. 
Plans for the ADF remain largely 
unchanged from what they were in the 
2009 Defence White Paper. 
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observed reality is that government’s plans for the ADF remain largely unchanged from what 
they were in 2009.  
To the extent there’s a causal link between the strategic theology of the initial chapters of 
the 2013 White Paper and the wish list of equipment projects further in, the changed 
description of our strategic landscape has not made one iota of difference. Of course, that 
could be explained by duplicity on our part; we tell China what they want to hear, while we 
quietly draw closer to the United States. And make no mistake; we have drawn closer to the 
United States in the four years since the 2009 White Paper.  
Of course, the Chinese aren’t falling for any of this. They know that we are welded to the 
United States through the alliance, and that our history, values and interests will keep it that 
way. They also know that we are hedging—along with others in the region—against the 
possibility that they will use their growing power at the expense others. They even have a 
word for this; they call it containment. They also know that our newly found love of regional 
engagement is all about winning over the half billion souls that live between us and them to 
our way of thinking. But the 2013 White Paper leaves sufficient room between what they 
know, and what we say, to avoid offending them. Face has been saved.  
Duplicity is nothing new in the world of diplomacy. Since at least the 1970s there’s been a 
streak of disingenuousness in Australian defence rhetoric. The Defence of Australia doctrine 
was conceived as a replacement to ‘forward defence’ in the bitter years after Vietnam. Not 
surprisingly, it was a policy that justified retaining a moderate sized defence force while 
limiting our liability to be drawn into future US follies. Up to a point, it was our get-out-of-
jail-free card for the Cold War. By focusing on the defence of our continent, notwithstanding 
the absence of any plausible threat, we could limit expectations of what we were prepared 
to do elsewhere.  
Yet at the same time, apart from downsizing the army, we simply rolled on with the force 
structure from the days of forward defence. We even retained an aircraft carrier until it 
became too expensive. And just as we do today, we worked hard to maintain 
interoperability with the United States and pursued cooperation with them at multiple 
levels. Critically, we did so not just because we wanted to be able to call on US assistance if 
something went wrong—though that has always been important—but rather because we 
knew that the United States underpins the geopolitical strata upon which our security 
depends. In reality, irrespective of the careful wording of our policy, there was never much 
doubt that we would ‘act to meet the common danger’ as required in Article IV of the 
ANZUS treaty if the strategic balance in the Pacific was threatened. 
Much has changed between the first codification of the Defence of Australia doctrine in 
1976 and today. Yet even though the policy has evolved to be more outward looking in 
response to changing circumstances (though mostly as a result of lessons learnt than 
foresight), the core priority of our own defence remains intact. And what a useful thing it is 
to have.  
To start with, it allows us to set the upper limit of the scale of our defence effort at a 
relatively low level given the continuing absence of a plausible threat to our sovereignty. At 
Embargoed from publication/broadcast until release 30 May 2013, 2pm.
 3 
 
the same time, it positions us well to determine the scale of what we contribute to coalition 
missions such as arose in Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, because the wording used to 
describe the self-reliant Defence of Australia was largely plagiarised from Nixon’s late-1960 
Guam doctrine, it’s hard for the United States to object. For these reasons, Defence of 
Australia remains the policy of choice for free riding. 
Perhaps more important for us today, Defence of Australia allows us to adopt the sort of 
third party once removed rhetorical position employed so cleverly in the 2013 Defence 
White Paper. Imagine how the White Paper would have read if it had begun with the 
recognition—brutal yet surely accurate—that our security ultimately depends on the 
geopolitical balance in our part of the world rather than on our ability to defend the 
continent against attack.  
Duplicity requires careful handling. Not because we might be found out, we are so far down 
the ‘they know that we know that they know’ route that there’s nothing to hide. Rather we 
need to be careful not to delude ourselves. It would be alarming if our response to the Asia–
Pacific century (oops Indo-Pacific Asian century) was to refocus our limited resources on 
operating aircraft out of bare bases and conducting Kangaroo exercises to hunt for raiding 
parties in our remote north. God help us if we start to believe our own rhetoric. 
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1.2 Political Context  
With an election looming and a new Defence White 
Paper on the table, one would expect to see an active 
political debate over defence issues. That hasn’t 
really been the case. At best we’ve had some half-
hearted shadow boxing without much passion on 
either side.  
In part, the absence of a debate reflects substantial 
bi-partisan agreement on many matters. Over the 
past 35 years, the underlying concepts laid out in the 
Fraser government’s 1976 Defence White Paper have been echoed in every subsequent 
document. Where changes have occurred, they’ve been evolutionary adaptations to our 
changing circumstances. And while some changes have given rise to political debate at the 
time—such as the priority to be accorded to ‘expeditionary’ operations—bipartisan support 
has eventually been found.  
But even if both sides of politics agree on the underlying principles of our strategic and 
defence policy, there is always the critical question of ‘how much is enough?’. Yet here again 
there appears to be a sort of bipartisan agreement; in so far as neither side is willing to 
answer the question in the long term beyond stating aspirations contingent on economic 
circumstances.  
What this amounts to is that Australia no longer has a funded long-term plan for developing 
its defence force. At best, we have an aspiration to be fulfilled if and when we can find the 
money. At worst, we have an unaffordable charade that serves no purpose other than to 
avoid having to make hard decisions.   
Politics and money 
From 2009 until 2012, the government’s commitment to defence funding was all but totally 
eclipsed by the political imperative to deliver a fiscal surplus—a goal embraced equally by 
the opposition. The funding promised in the 2009 White Paper evaporated as soon as the ink 
dried on the document. By May last year, an accumulated $20 billion of promised defence 
funding had been lost in the headlong rush to deliver a surplus in 2012-13.  
Why the rush last year to get out the red? 2012-13 was special in two respects. First, upon 
assuming leadership, the Prime Minister recommitted to her predecessor’s promise of a 
surplus in that year. Second, 2012-13 was the last opportunity that the government had to 
demonstrate (not just promise) a surplus before the federal election scheduled for 
September 2013. And how important was that? As Figure 1.2.1 shows with alarming clarity, 
it was very important; the last federal Labor treasurer to deliver a surplus was Paul Keating 
in 1989-90. Given the context, a surplus in 2012-13 was the political equivalent of a holy grail 
worth seeking at just about any cost. 
But it was all for naught. In late 2012 the Treasurer conceded that a surplus was beyond 
reach due to a downturn in revenues. As a result, the government seems destined to go to 
the next election with the roads clogged by the Coalition’s ‘debt trucks’. 
Key Points 
Only 2% of Australians think security 
is the most important problem facing 
Australia. 
People are more confident in 
Australia’s defences now than at any 
time in the past 15 years. 
44% of Australians support higher 
defence spending. 
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Figure 1.2.1: Underlying cash balance 1984 to 2017  
Source: Treasury Papers 
With the epic quest for a surplus behind them, the way was clear for the government to 
restore some of the money taken from Defence. And they did. Not all that was taken away in 
recent years has been returned, and not enough to deliver all that’s planned in the 2013 
White Paper in the long term is there, but certainly more than most people expected. The 
pundits were confounded.  
Last year I said that the two sides of politics were caught in a prisoners’ dilemma whereby 
neither would be the first to admit that a surplus was anything less than absolutely 
necessary. This year, they are caught in a different sort of trap. Neither is willing to admit 
that current defence plans are going to cost a lot more money than has so far been 
committed. Everyone wants to have everything on the wish list, but no one is willing to find 
the money. So we pretend.  
A possible reason for what might be described as bi-partisan cognitive dissonance is the 
significant uncertainty over the medium- to long-term state of the federal government’s 
finances. This year’s deficit was caused by a rapid deterioration in tax revenues due to an 
unexpected fall in the terms of trade. Economists far and wide are scurrying to estimate the 
likely extent and future trajectory of something called a ‘structural deficit’—a malady we 
acquired in 2007 but no one bothered to tell us about until now. Without greater clarity on 
the government’s long-term fiscal situation, it’s unlikely that Defence will do any better than 
it did this year at budget time. In the current environment, this is as good as it gets. 
Ultimately, future defence funding will depend on events in the intervening time. If the 
economy doesn’t perform well, funding will be hard to find. But if we are startled by a new 
threat or reminded again of an old one, the public may be willing to sacrifice greater private 
consumption (pay higher taxes) and forego alternative public services (accept lesser 
standards of education and health care) in exchange for stronger defence.  
At the moment, Australians place a relatively low priority on security. Figure 1.2.2 shows the 
percentage of respondents who identified particular issues as the most important problem 
facing either the world or Australia in January 2013.  
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Figure 1.2.2: What do people worry about?
Source: Ray Morgan Research, Finding No. 4863, January 2013. 
The relatively low priority currently given to defence is the result of the deterioration in 
public perception of the seriousness of defence-related matters over the period November 
2005 to January 2013, see Figure 1.2.3.  
Figure 1.2.3: Less important than it used to be 
Source: Ray Morgan Research, Finding No. 4863, January 2013. 
The seemingly dramatic change in public sentiment in Figure 1.2.3 is at least partially an 
artifact of respondants being asked to identify a single ‘most important’ issue. It’s entirely 
possible for defence to still be important in its own right, even if it’s not the most important 
issue of the day. With this in mind, we turn now to examine a more graduated measure of 
the perceived priority of defence-related issues over time.  
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Figure 1.2.4 plots the percentage of Australians polled who rated ‘national security’ and/or 
‘the economy’ as very important in the context of the question: Would you say each of the 
following issues is very important, fairly important or not important on how you personally 
will vote in the federal election? As expected, the falling priority for national security is less 
dramatic in a survey where respondents can choose more than one item from a list of 
possiblilities. Nonetheless, it’s still clear from the data that the GFC heralded a higher 
priority for the economy, partially at the expense of national security. It’s interesting to note 
that after a pronounced swing in favour of the economy around the time of the GFC, 
sentiment subsequently plateaued at new levels more favourable to economic issues and 
less favourable to national security.  
Figure 1.2.4: Guns versus butter 
 Source: Newspoll for The Australian newspaper, June 2004 to February 2013. 
And it’s not simply that other problems (such as the fragility of the economy) have taken 
greater prominence in people’s assessment. Australians actually feel much more confident 
that our defence arrangements are effective, see Table 1.2.1. As might be expected, the 
combination of falling fears and growing confidence translates into reduced support for 
increasing the amount of money going to defence, see Figure 1.2.5.  
Table 1.2.1: Confidence in Australia’s defences  
Would Australia would be able to defend itself successfully if it were ever attacked? 
 1996 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 
Agree or strongly agree  14.8 19.7 15.7 19.2 22.9 30.5 
Neither agree nor disagree 20.3 20.2 22.2 24.5 28.9 30.1 
Disagree or strongly disagree 64.9 60.2 62.1 56.3 48.2 39.4 
Source: McAllister et al: Trends in Australian political opinion: results from the Australian election study, 1987-2010. 
As shown in Figure 1.2.5, the proportion of Australians willing to spend more on defence has 
fallen from a high of 60% in 2001 down to 45% in 2010. More granular results from the same 
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survey can be found in Table 1.2.2. Note that while there is very little support (10%) for 
reducing defence expenditure, only 15% of people support spending ‘much more’. Most 
people either believe that things are right as they are (45%) or that ‘some more’ should be 
spent (29%).  
Figure 1.2.5: How much is enough? 
Source: McAllister et al: Trends in Australian political opinion: results from the Australian election study, 1987-2010. 
Table 1.2.2: How much is enough? 
Do you think that the government should spend more or spend less on defence?’ (%) 
 1987 1993 1996 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 
Spend much more on defence  14.1 10.2 18.5 20.6 15.5 14.9 15.1 
Spend some more on defence 48.9 27.5 28.8 33.6 39.7 36.4 31.9 29.4 
About right at present* 24.5 43.3 45.7 38.4 33.2 37.7 41.2 45.3 
Spend less on defence 26.6 11.3 11.2 7.5 4.7 8 8.4 7.7 
Spend a lot less on defence  3.8 4.1 1.9 1.7 2.4 3.6 2.4 
* 'Doesn't matter' 1987.  
Source: McAllister et al: Trends in Australian political opinion: results from the Australian election study, 1987-2010. 
Consistent with the long-term trend in public sentiment, the dramatic cuts to the defence 
budget last year were approved by a greater share of respondents (48%) than those that 
disapproved (43%) according to the Essential Report poll of May 14, 2012.  
But perhaps the limit has been reached on how far defence spending can be cut before 
public opinion turns. Figure 1.2.6 shows the result of a poll taken two weeks prior to this 
year’s budget regarding possible savings measures. It not only shows that opposition to 
cutting defence spending (48%) outweighed support (35%), but that cuts to defence 
spending were viewed similarly by respondents to cuts to ‘middle class’ welfare and 
postponing the National Broadband Network.  
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Here, however, context is all-important. While a substantial proportion of respondents want 
to quarantine defence spending from further cuts, that might only be because they are 
willing to shift the cost of balancing the books onto corporations and high income earners, 
which were both popular sources of revenue in the survey. Things look different when 
people are asked whether they would implement various proposals ‘if it means higher taxes 
(including corporate and mining taxes) and cuts in other areas,’ see Figure 1.2.7. On this 
basis, public sentiment seems to favour butter over guns (or at least over submarines). 
Figure 1.2.6: Who pays the bill? 
Source: Essential Media, Essential Report, 29 April 2013. 
Figure 1.2.7: What are you willing to pay for? 
Source: Essential Media, Essential Report, 2 October 2012. 
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Finally, polling over the past 13 years on who is best able to handle defence/national 
security is plotted in Figure 1.2.8.  
Figure 1.2.8: Who is best able to handle defence/national security? 
 
Source: Newspoll for The Australian newspaper, January 2001 to February 2013.   
(Defence pre June 2004, National Security post June 2004) 
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1.3 Economic Context  
From the early 1990s until late 2008, Australia enjoyed relatively favourable economic 
conditions, see Figure 1.3.1. Three things stood out: 
x In the 1990s, inflation fell to effectively half of what it was in the 1970s and 1980s, 
notwithstanding a short-lived spike in 2008.   
x Economic growth was healthy, averaging 3.4% during the 1990s and 3.2% from 2000 to 
2007, despite a fall in labour productivity growth.  
x Unemployment fell from a peak of 10.8% in late 1992 to a thirty-four year low of 4% in 
early 2008 (at the same time as workforce participation edged up from 62.7% to 65.2%).   
 Figure 1.3.1: Australian economic performance 1980 to 2013  
Source: Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and Treasury statistics.  
Strong economic growth allowed the previous government to simultaneously increase 
spending and cut taxes in its later years. It was a happy time all around. Few areas were 
happier than Defence, which saw its funding grow more or less in tandem with GDP from 
1999 onwards. But from around 2004, when unemployment fell below 5%, capacity 
constraints started to be felt in the economy and in 2008 inflation began to rise quickly.  
Then, in late 2008, the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) hit and it looked like a substantial 
recession was on the cards. But Australia weathered the economic storm better than 
expected and only experienced a limited slowdown. The timing of the recent events is 
reflected in the changes to the RBA target cash rate set out in Figure 1.3.2. From late 2009 
until late 2010, rising inflation and restored growth saw the official interest rate rise 
progressively by 1.75%. Over the same period, unemployment fell to around 5.2% where it 
has remained since. In late 2011, however, the RBA changed tack and cut rates by 1% in 
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three steps over a six month period to an expansionary 3.75% as inflation moderated. (The 
average cash rate since 1990 has been 5.8%.) 
 Figure 1.3.2: RBA target cash rate 2001 to 2013 
 Source: RBA  
The onset of the GFC was accompanied by a deterioration of the government’s fiscal 
outlook. Figure 1.3.3 graphs the dramatic changes to the fiscal outlook in successive official 
estimates in recent years.  
Figure 1.3.3: The changing outlook—fiscal balance per cent GDP 
Source: 2009-10 to 2013-14 Budget Papers 
Table 1.3.1 compares the outlook in May 2012 with that of May 2013. Note the severe 
deterioration in the government’s fiscal position over that twelve-month period. Roughly 
speaking, the planned surplus for 2012-13 blew out by around $21 billion to deterioration in 
the government revenues caused by among other things a fall in Australia’s terms of trade. 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
ta
rg
et
 ca
sh
 ra
te
 - 
pe
rc
en
t 
Rates rise to combat inflation 
Rates cut in respond to GFC 
Rates rise with recovery  
Low inflation, high dollar  
 and uneven growth prompts cuts 
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
May-09 May-10
May-11 May-12
May-13
2014-15 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2015-16 2016-17 
Embargoed from publication/broadcast until release 30 May 2013, 2pm.
 13 
 
The budget assumes that the terms of trade will decline a further 0.75% in 2013-14 and 
another 1.75% in 2014-15. In comparison, between its peak towards the end of 2010 and the 
December 2012, the terms of trade fell by 17%.  
Table 1.3.1: Budget aggregates 2012-13 and 2013-14 Budgets (nominal billion dollars)  
 Historical Figures Budget Estimates 
07-08 08-09 09-10 10-11 11-12 12-13 13-14 14-15 15-16 16-17 
Bu
dg
et
  
20
12
-1
3 
Underlying cash  
Per cent of GDP 
19.7 
1.7 
-27.1 
-2.2 
-54.8 
-4.3 
-47.7 
-3.4 
-44.4  
-3.0  
1.5  
0.1  
2.0  
0.1  
5.3  
0.3  
7.5  
0.4 
 
Fiscal balance  
Per cent of GDP 
21.0 
1.9 
-29.7 
-2.4 
-52.9 
-4.1 
-42.0 
-2.8 
-42.0  
-2.8  
2.5  
0.2  
2.6  
0.2  
7.0  
0.4  
9.5  
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dg
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20
13
-1
4 
Underlying cash  
Per cent of GDP 
19.7 
1.7 
-27.1 
-2.2 
-54.8 
-4.3 
-47.7 
-3.4 
-43.4  
-2.9  
-19.4 
-1.3  
-18.0 
-1.1  
-10.9 
-0.6  
0.8 
0.0 
6.6 
0.4 
Fiscal balance  
Per cent of GDP 
21.0 
1.9 
-29.7 
-2.4 
-52.9 
-4.1 
-42.0 
-2.8 
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-3.0  
-20.3 
-1.3  
-13.5 
-0.8  
-6.3 
-0.4  
6.0 
0.3 
10.8 
0.6 
Source: Budget Papers No. 1 for 2013–14 and beyond, 2007-08 to 2011-12 are ‘actual’ figures.  
Defence spends something like $5 billion a year offshore (no official figure is available) 
mostly in contracts written in US dollars. And while Defence is insulated from fluctuations on 
a no-win, no-loss basis, so that the government, and ultimately the taxpayer, feels the pain 
or gain. In recent years, the USD–AUD exchange rate has fluctuated substantially as Figure 
1.3.4 shows. At the time of writing, the exchange rate was around US$1.04 having reached a 
post-float high of $1.10 against the US dollar. The budget assumes a rate of $1.03.  
 Figure 1.3.4: Foreign exchange  
 Source: RBA  
Since 2009-10, the Defence budget has received fixed 2.5% annual indexation, calculated 
from 2009-10 but only applied from 2013-14. (This is separate from and in addition to the 
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CPI and ‘core’ inflation is calculated in Table 1.3.2, including historical figures for 
comparison.   
Table 1.3.2: CPI inflation, ‘core’ inflation and 2.5% indexation  
 
03
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-0
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09
-1
0 
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-1
1 
11
-1
2 
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14
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5 
15
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6 
Fixed 2.5% 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
CPI 2.4 2.4 3.2 2.9 3.4 3.1 2.4 3.1  2.4 2.5 2.25 2.25  2.5 
Difference 0.1 0.1 -0.7 -0.4 -0.9 -0.6 0.1 -0.6  0.1         
Fixed 2.5% 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
‘core’ inflation* 2.7 2.7 2.9 2.9 3.9 4.4 3.3 2.6 2.5     
Difference -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 -1.4 -1.9 -0.8 -0.1 0.0     
Source: APH Library, RBA, ABS and Budget Papers.* Average of the RBA weighted median and trimmed mean measures.  
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1.4 Defence Organisation and Management 
The Outcomes and Program Framework 
Since 2009-10, the Defence budget has been set out according to a framework of ‘outcomes’ 
and ‘programs’. This replaces the ‘outcomes’ and ‘outputs’ framework that was established 
in 1999. 
Outcomes are the results or benefits that the Commonwealth aims to deliver to the 
community through the work of its agencies. They are specified for each agency, and are 
meant to express the purpose or goal of each agency’s activities. 
Programs are activities that agencies undertake in pursuit of the outcomes they are 
expected to deliver. 
Under the framework, the performance of agencies is measured. This is done through 
specific targets (like flying hours for Air Force) and, ultimately, the extent to which their 
programs actually deliver the outcomes intended. So the aim is to show not only how much 
an agency is doing, but how much it is actually achieving.  
The Defence Outcomes 
Since 2009-10, the Defence Outcomes have been: 
Outcome 1: The protection and advancement of Australia’s national interests through the 
provision of military capabilities and the promotion of security and stability.  
Outcome 2: The advancement of Australia’s strategic interests through the conduct of 
military operations and other tasks as directed by Government.  
Outcome 3: Support for the Australian community and civilian authorities as requested by 
Government.  
The programs that contribute to these three outcomes are set out in Figure 1.4.1. Note that 
the programs are closely aligned with the actual organisational structure of Defence, as can 
be seen by comparison with the Defence ‘wiring diagram’ in Figure 1.4.2.  
This framework provides greater visibility of resources consumption within the organisation 
than the output-based approach that was in place up to 2007-08. But this comes at the loss 
of knowing what it costs to deliver military capability, which is what the old framework 
attempted to do. Ultimately, what really matters is how much it costs to deliver ships, planes 
and battalions ready for deployment, not how much money is spent on health services, legal 
advice or personnel management. Of course, in a perfect world we would be told both.  
Curiously, at the same time as Defence’s formal budget framework abandoned the concept 
of outputs in favour of an organisation-based program approach, the 2009 White Paper said 
that Defence will move to an output-driven internal budgeting model. Forty-eight months 
on, and we still do not know what this will entail or the extent—if any—to which it will be 
visible to the public. It would be ironic if Defence finally moved to an internal output-based 
budget after abandoning output-based external budgeting and reporting.  It may be that the 
whole idea has been abandoned.
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ADF command structure 
It is important not to confuse the day-to-day management of the Department of Defence 
with the command of military operations. The former occurs through the diarchy of the CDF 
and Secretary and group/program arrangements outlined above. The latter is exercised 
through a formal command chain and dedicated headquarters structure.  
On a day-to-day basis, the three Services (Navy, Army, and Air Force) are responsible for 
raising, training and sustaining their forces. When forces are deployed on operations or 
major exercises, the designated force elements are assigned to Headquarters Joint 
Operations Command (HQJOC) for that purpose. Since late 2008, HQJOC has been housed at 
a purpose-built facility near Bungendore in rural NSW and is staffed by around 750 
personnel.  
A more detailed outline of ADF command and HQJOC appears in Chapter 2.6 of this brief 
under Program 1.11.  
Figure 1.4.3: ADF command structure 
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1.5 National Security Spending 
The events of 9/11 prompted the recognition that no single agency has the capacity, or 
range of capabilities, necessary to ensure our security. The threat of terrorism within 
Australia, and to Australians abroad, has forced a whole-of-government approach to 
national security at the federal level. Even beyond the threat of terrorism, it is increasingly 
recognised that our national security interests are best served by a coordinated approach 
that uses all of the levers available to government. 
It’s beyond the scope of this Defence Budget Brief to analyse and explain the budgets of all 
the agencies that contribute to national security. Instead, we’ll content ourselves with a 
broad-brush description of how much is spent in key agencies. If nothing else, it provides a 
useful yardstick against which we can measure what’s spent on defence. Unfortunately, 
because of the difficulty in finding data, our discussion excludes spending at the state and 
local levels.  
In late 2008 the government foreshadowed the introduction of a ‘national security budget’. 
Nothing appeared in the 2009 Budget and the closest that last year’s budget came to it was 
a graph in the Budget Overview of Defence, non-Defence and Defence Operational spending.  
This reflects the high-level outcome of the government’s coordinated national security 
budget process. A similar graph appeared in 2011 but was omitted in 2012 and this year. 
Given the absence of any further detail, we have updated our usual assessment of national 
security spending. 
A number of federal agencies can make a credible claim to delivering some part of our 
national security. In selecting agencies, we have taken a liberal view of what constitutes 
national security, although we have excluded funding for outcomes within agencies that are 
clearly unrelated. Here’s our list, which cannot claim to be exhaustive, in alphabetical order: 
x Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) 
x Australian Federal Police (AFP) 
x Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) 
x Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) 
x Department of Defence (DOD) 
x Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Outcome 1: Australia’s national interests 
protected and advanced through contributions to international security, national 
economic and trade performance and global co-operation.) (DFAT-1) 
x Office of National Assessments (ONA). 
Clearly, some of the activities of the listed agencies (even with the restriction to specific 
outcomes) go beyond national security. Conversely, other agencies that have been left out, 
like the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, make a significant contribution to 
national security within their broader range of responsibilities. Such is the challenge of 
dealing with the aggregated data available in the budget papers.  Figure 1.5.1 compares the 
appropriations allocated to each of the aforementioned agencies in 2013-14.  
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 Figure 1.5.1: Federal national security spending  
  
Source: 2013-14 Budget Paper No. 4 and ASPI calculation of Net Defence Funding   
Figure 1.5.2 shows the real growth in spending by various national security agencies since 
2000-01. Because changes in outputs and the presentation of budget figures make it difficult 
to extract precisely comparable figures from year to year, the numbers should be used with 
caution—though the broad trends are clear.  
Figure 1.5.2: Federal national security appropriations 2001-02 to 2013-14 
Source: 2002-03 to 2013-14 Budget Paper No. 4 and ASPI calculation of Net Defence Funding. [All growth rates compounding.] 
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1.6 Measuring Defence Spending 
The amount a country spends on defence is a direct measure of its commitment to protect 
itself. Accordingly, a lot of attention is placed on comparing levels of defence spending 
between countries and on tracking the rates at which those levels are increasing or 
decreasing. For example, here in Australia a lot of attention has been placed on the 
promised 3% real growth in the Defence budget in recent years. It is important, therefore, 
that reporting of defence spending captures what’s actually going on. 
Table 1.6.1 sets out the presentation in the 2013-14 PBS [Table 1, p.24] excluding the 
administered appropriations. (We ignore the administered appropriations for 
superannuation and housing because they are not controlled by Defence and are 
appropriated through the organisation for convenience.) The bottom line is Total Defence 
Funding which, in the past, has been presented in the PBS as ‘the most common way of 
presenting the Defence budget’ [2008-09 PBS, p.119].  
Table 1.6.1 Total Defence funding FY 2013-14 
 2013-14  $’000 
Departmental  
1. Output Appropriation  23,796,086 
2. Equity Injection  683,005 
3. Prior Year Appropriation   
4. Current year’s appropriation (1+2+3) 24,479,091 
5. Drawdown of appropriations carried forward  
6 Other appropriation receivable movements  
7. Returns to Official Public Account (OPA) -48,771 
8 Funding to/from OPA (5+6+7) -48,771 
9. Funding from Government (4+8) 24,430,320 
9. Capital Receipts  101,666 
10. Own-source Revenue 901,937 
11. Funding from other sources (9+10) 1,003,603 
12. Total Defence Funding (9+11) 25,433,923 
Source: 2013-14 PBS  
The easiest way to explore what a better approach might be is to examine each of the 
elements appearing in Table 1.6.1.   
Current year’s appropriations: This is the least ambiguous part of the problem. Each year 
the government formally appropriates money to Defence. The breakdown of the 
appropriation in terms of outputs and equity is an artefact of accrual accounting that need 
not concern us. What matters is that this is the quantum of cold hard cash that the 
government plans to make available to Defence for the financial year. As such, any credible 
measure of Defence funding must include this money.  
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Drawdown of appropriations carried forward: Because funding may either be spent or 
received in a year other than the appropriation year, an Appropriation Receivable account is 
utilised. This recognises that departmental Appropriations do not lapse unless specifically 
extinguished by the Minister for Finance and shifts to this account represent either the 
expenditure of additional public funds by Defence or the return of unspent funds. To 
properly track the funding employed by Defence, it makes good sense to take account of 
increases and decreases to the Appropriation Receivable account. However, if this is 
accepted, it follows that changes to Defence’s cash holdings must also be accounted for 
(since that’s where the money in the appropriation receivable came from originally).  
Capital Receipts: As custodian of more than $50 billion of public assets including land, 
buildings and military equipment, Defence inevitably receives cash from the disposal of 
items that are no longer needed. Some of this money is returned to government via a Return 
to the OPA. The remainder is retained by Defence and is called Net Capital Receipts. Given 
that Net Capital Receipts are generated from the sales of public assets, it is correct to count 
this income as part of Defence funding.  
Own-source Revenues: Defence receives revenue from a number of sources. These include 
the supply of goods and services to third parties such as Defence personnel, who pay a share 
of the cost of their food and lodging provided by Defence, and foreign governments that 
purchase items like fuel. It makes little sense to include this as part of Defence funding. 
While it is perhaps reasonable to include revenue raised by using public assets (like Defence 
accommodation), the vast bulk of Own-source Revenue reflects Defence acting as an 
intermediary that transfers goods between 3rd party providers and 3rd party customers.  
For example, the sale of fuel to a foreign government or rations to personnel delivers no 
revenue to Defence that is not at least equal to the cost of doing so. Or to put it another 
way, no one could seriously contend that Defence funding has risen by $50 million simply 
because, for example, an extra $50 million of fuel was purchased and sold on to the United 
States.  
Own-source Revenues also includes transfers from the Defence Materiel Organisation 
(DMO) to Defence. For example, DMO will pay Defence $318 million in 2013-14 [PBS page 
141] for the cost of the military personnel provided by Defence to DMO. The DMO is 
appropriated for civilian and military personnel as it requires the expertise of military 
personnel within its project delivery and equipment sustainment functions. The DMO then 
pays Defence to offset Defence’s cost of providing the military expertise. This works in a 
similar fashion to fuel sales where Defence “sells” goods and services to DMO to offset the 
cost of providing those goods and services. This is not double counted in Table 1 (page 24) of 
the PBS as these figures are only those of Defence.   
There are a number of tables which consolidate the Defence and DMO picture but another 
way of doing this is to combine Table 7 with DMO’s direct appropriations and any revenue 
received by DMO from sources other than Defence. Figure 1.6.1 is our best attempt to 
depict the situation graphically, though some simplification has been necessary.  
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The estimated actual figure for the current financial year in Table 7 includes payments to 
DMO that may eventually remain unspent (noting that some underspends have been dealt 
with by extinguishing appropriations). Indeed, over a four-year period last decade, more 
than $927 million accumulated in the DMO Special Account, including $414 million from 
2007-08. In some years, the Special Account is drawn down while in others it grows.  
Figure 1.6.1: Defence Cash and Resource Flows 
 
From a strict accounting perspective, no rules have been broken. Defence reports its funding 
accurately, and DMO reports its cash flow properly. Yet there is something surreal about 
failing to reconcile the net impact of the two things to show what’s actually going on, 
especially given the high prominence of Defence funding in recent years.  
So what is the ‘Defence budget’?  
While there is an accounting distinction between Defence and DMO, any sensible calculation 
of the ‘Defence budget’ must reflect the total impost on the taxpayer in delivering defence 
capability. This is easily achieved by adding DMO funding to the calculation and ignoring the 
transfer back and forth of money in between. Once again, the PBS contains a consolidation 
of the Defence and DMO budgets but it is not especially illuminating.  
In light of the foregoing discussion, it seems sensible to include Funding from Government, 
Net Capital Receipts (= Capital Receipts – Return to OPA), Net Bank Balance Shifts, 
Appropriation Receivable and Special Account Shifts, but to exclude Own-source Revenue. 
And then to do the same for DMO and then add the results together, safe in the knowledge 
that the accounting transfers between the two entities have been excluded, Table 1.6.2. The 
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addition of DMO appropriations is especially important because under new arrangements, 
DMO directly receives around $928 million that used to be provided by Defence.  
Table 1.6.2: Total Defence resourcing FY 2013-14 
 Total  
Defence 
Funding 
ASPI Net 
Defence 
Spending 
Departmental   
1. Output Appropriation  23,796,086 23,796,086 
2. Equity Injection  683,005 683,005  
3. Prior Year Appropriation     
4. Current year’s appropriation 24,479,091 24,479,091 
5. Drawdown of appropriations carried   
6 Other appropriation receivable movements   
7. Returns to OPA -48,771 -48,771 
8. Funding from Government  24,430,320 24,430,320 
7. Capital Receipts  101,666 101,666 
8. Own-source Revenue 901,937   
9. Funding from other sources 1,003,603 101,666 
10. DMO Appropriation     907,791 
11. DMO drawdown of Special Account   -3,067 
12. Total Defence Funding 25,433,923  
13. ASPI Net Defence Funding  24,436,710 
 
The difference is not large. Our calculation of Net Defence Funding yields a figure only 0.01% 
below that of Total Defence Funding. The difference would be larger if not for the almost 
complete (but entirely coincidental) cancellation of Own-source Revenues and direct 
appropriation to DMO. Nonetheless, we believe that ASPI Net Defence Funding is a better 
measure of the ‘Defence budget’ than Total Defence Funding.  
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Chapter 2 – Defence Budget 2013-14 PBS Explained 
 
The 230 pages of the 2013–14 Defence Portfolio Budget Statements (PBS) set out the 
government’s plan for the expenditure of around $25.4 billion by Defence in the coming 
financial year.  
This guide explains and where possible analyses the information in the PBS. In doing so, we 
skim over those parts of the PBS that are relatively clear, and focus on those areas where 
explanation might be useful.  
Some of the material that follows is unavoidably technical due to the disciplines and 
complexities of accounting. However, it is not necessary to read this chapter as a whole, or 
in sequence, to gain insight. Every attempt has been made to enable the reader to jump in 
and look at those items of most interest.  
This Brief does not cover in any detail the funds administered by Defence on behalf of the 
government for superannuation and housing support services for current and retired 
Defence personnel. 
Most parts of the guide are best read with the PBS at hand. Copies can be downloaded from 
the web at <http://www.defence.gov.au/budget/>. 
The PBS begins with something akin to an executive summary [PBS p. 1–10] that provides a 
useful snapshot of governance arrangements, resources and portfolio structure for Defence 
plus DMO. Rather than recount this material, we turn now to examine the main body of the 
document.   
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2.1: Strategic direction [PBS Section 1.1] 
The overview chapter of the PBS begins with a discussion of Defence’s role; ‘to protect and 
advance Australia's strategic interests by providing military forces and supporting those 
forces in the defence of Australia and its strategic interests’. It goes on to discuss the 
recently announced 2013 Defence White Paper and details key elements of the defence 
funding arrangements including aggregate for the six-year period 2017-18 to 2022-23. There 
is also a confusing table that purports to show where money will be ‘invested on key capital 
investment and sustainment programs’. Given that the figures given only represent around 
half of the defence budget, it’s unclear what the point is. 
2.2: Resourcing [PBS Section 1.2 & 1.3] 
The ‘rubber hits the road’ in Sections 1.2 and 1.3 of the PBS, in terms of allocating money to 
get things done. It contains the resource statements, new budget measures and the funding 
bottom line. 
How much money will Defence get?   
On page 14 of the PBS, we get to the heart of the issue. Table 1 gives three key figures for 
the Defence budget: 
x Funding from Government, being those funds formally appropriated to Defence by the 
government for departmental purposes along with shifts in appropriations receivable 
(unspent money from previous years). In 2013-14 this will amount to $24,430,320,000. 
x Total Defence Funding, being those funds actually available to Defence including 
appropriations and revenue from other sources. In 2013-14 this will amount to 
$25,433,923,000. 
x Total Defence Resourcing, being Total Defence Funding plus those funds appropriated 
administratively through Defence for superannuation and defence housing subsidies. In 
2013-14 this will amount to $29,820,500,000. 
Of these three figures, Total Defence Funding is the one most usually quoted as the Defence 
budget. It represents the funds expended by Defence to deliver the departmental outcomes 
and maintain the ongoing program of investment in new equipment and facilities. Note, 
Total Defence Funding does not include administered funds for superannuation and defence 
housing subsidies.  
However, as explained in the last chapter, Total Defence Funding is inflated by a churning of 
money (including in past years between DMO and Defence) that delivers no military 
capability or outcome. What’s more, Total Departmental Funding ignores the money which 
has at times accumulated or been drawn out of the DMO Special Account—in effect 
transferring money from one year to another. We believe that the ASPI Net Defence 
Spending figure accounts for these issues properly and therefore gives a more accurate 
picture of how much is being spent on delivering defence capability and outcomes. 
Henceforth, we will only present the ASPI Net Defence Funding figure. Fortuitously, it does 
not make a lot of difference; the inclusion of churned money in Total Defence Funding more 
or less compensates for omitting the money appropriated to DMO—about $900 million in 
each case. 
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How much money will Defence receive? 
Table 2.2.1 displays Defence funding for the past nine, and next four, financial years. Also 
shown are both the nominal and real year-to-year percentage growth rates.  
Table 2.2.1: ASPI Net Defence Funding – real (2013-14$) and nominal (nom) 
 
Funds 
(nominal) 
Growth 
(nominal) 
Funds 
(real) 
Growth 
(real) 
01-02 13,191 7.08% 18,258 4.11% 
02-03 14,216 7.78% 19,104 4.63% 
03-04 15,439 8.60% 20,259 6.05% 
04-05 16,224 5.09% 20,788 2.61% 
05-06 17,547 8.15% 21,784 4.79% 
06-07 19,140 9.08% 23,078 5.94% 
07-08 20,038 4.69% 23,375 1.28% 
08-09 22,933 14.45% 25,943 10.99% 
09-10 25,104 9.46% 27,754 6.98% 
10-11 24,403 -2.79% 26,165 -5.73% 
11-12 26,381 8.10% 27,649 5.67% 
12-13 24,329 -7.78% 24,876 -10.03% 
13-14 25,437 4.55% 25,437 2.25% 
14-15 27,874 9.58% 27,260 7.17% 
15-16 29,431 5.59% 28,081 3.01% 
16-17 30,719 4.38% 28,595 1.83% 
Source: 2013-14 PBS, 2012-13 PAES and earlier Defence Annual Reports (DAR).  
When calculating the real growth rate, the nominal dollar values of the individual years have 
been converted to a single base year using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) so as to reflect 
the opportunity cost incurred by the taxpayer. Note that this is not the deflator used within 
government to adjust the defence budget from year to year. From 2001-02 until 2009-10 
this was the implicit Non-Farm GDP Deflator (NFGDPD) and from 2009-10 onwards it has 
been fixed at 2.5% in accord with the funding model used in the 2009 Defence White Paper.  
Those who believe that 3% is somehow a magic benchmark of merit for defence spending 
should be. The average arithmetic annual rate of real growth in the budget since 2000-01 
(the last year prior to the 2000 White Paper) to 2013-14 is 3.0%. Over the same period, the 
effective compounding annual rate of real growth is 2.9%.  
Looking forward, things look even better. Over the four years covered by the budget and 
estimates, the average arithmetic annual rate of real growth in the budget from 2012-13 to 
2016-17 comes out to be 3.6%. Over the same period, the effective compounding annual 
rate of real growth is 3.5%.  
These calculated growth figures should be viewed with some caution due to the perturbing 
effect of operational supplementation, see Figure 2.2.1. A fuller analysis of trends in defence 
spending appears in Chapter 3 of this brief, including the $220 billion in ‘funding guidance’ 
for the period 2017-18 to 2022-23 disclosed in the budget.  
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Figure 2.2.1: Real Net Defence Funding – 2000 to 2016  
 Source: 2013-14 PBS, 2012-13 PAES and earlier DAR. 2005 = 2005-06 etc. 
What is the Defence share of GDP? 
Table 2.2.2 gives Net Defence Funding as a percentage of GDP for recent and future years. In 
2013-14, the share of GDP will fall from 1.60% in 2011-12 to 1.59% in 2013-14, the lowest 
share of GDP since prior to the WWII in 1938-39. (Last year’s estimate has gone up due to 
shifts in both spending and GDP.) Over the following three years, sluggish real spending and 
a rising economy will continue to hold down the GDP share. Note that, current and recent 
spending is boosted by high levels of operational supplementation that are not reflected in 
the latter years of the forward estimates.  
Table 2.2.2: ASPI Net Defence Funding as a percentage of GDP 
00-01 01-02 02-03 03-04 04-05 05-06 06-07 07-08 08-09 09-10 10-11 11-12 12-13 13-14 14-15 15-16 16-17 
1.74 1.75 1.77 1.79 1.76 1.76 1.77 1.70 1.83 1.94 1.74 1.79 1.60 1.59 1.66 1.66 1.65 
Source: 2013-14 Budget Overview, 2013-14 PBS and earlier DAR  
What is the Defence share of Commonwealth payments? 
Defence spending as a percentage of total Commonwealth payments is shown in Table 2.2.3. 
On current plans, Defence’s share of payments will rise slowly over the forward estimates 
period. Figure 2.2.2 graphs the percentage GDP and share of Commonwealth payments from 
1997 to 2015. 
Table 2.2.3: ASPI Net Defence Funding as a percentage of Commonwealth payments 
00-01 01-02 02-03 03-04 04-05 05-06 06-07 07-08 08-09 09-10 10-11 11-12 12-13 13-14 14-15 15-16 16-17 
6.96 6.99 7.21 7.36 7.29 7.31 7.56 7.37 7.26 7.45 7.05 7.11 6.62 6.50 6.81 6.93 6.92 
Source: 2013-14 Budget Overview, 2013-14 PBS and earlier DAR 
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Figure 2.2.2: Net Defence Funding as a Percentage of payments and GDP 
 
Budget Overview, 2013-14 PBS and earlier DAR 
Changes since the last budget  
Since the last budget, measure and adjustments have been undertaken that provide context 
for this year’s budget. Table 2.2.4 shows the key items from the 2012-13 Portfolio Additional 
Estimates Statement (PAES) [Table 13, p.36].  
Table 2.2.4: Key measures and adjustments from the 2012-13 PAES (million $) 
 12-13 13-14 14-15 15-16 4 year 
total 
10 year 
total 
Operational supplementation 30.4  3.0 76.4 77.5 190.9 268.4 
Bushmaster vehicle acquisition       
Growler EA weapons system       
Living Away From Home Allowance 4.3 13.7 19.1 19.1 56.3 75.4 
Fire Services Levy -18.8 -19.6 -20.5 -20.5 -79.5 -202.8 
Foreign exchange movements 65.4 92.6 83.7 96.1 337.8 1,598.1 
Property Disposals 76.2 19.6 -25.8 -32.4 37.7 37.7 
DMO appropriation  adjustment 17.4 51.8 58.2 60.6 188.0 576.2 
DFAT transfers  0.6 0.6 0.6 1.8 5.8 
TOTAL 178.5 161.6 191.8 201.0 732.9 2,358.0 
Source: 2012-13 PAES.  
 
Operational supplementation 
Defence is funded on a no-loss/no-win basis for the net additional cost of operational 
deployments. Additional funding of $190.9 million over four years and $268.4 over ten was 
provided to fund defence operations and related matters, including the transition of 
Australia’s security commitment to Timor-Leste (East Timor) and future Defence 
engagement in that country, and Australia's contribution to the sustainment of the Afghan 
National Security Forces from 2014-15.  
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Bushmaster vehicles – acquisition 
Up to 214 additional Bushmaster Protected Mobility Vehicles will be acquired over five years 
at a cost of $205.7 million. Bushmaster vehicles provide mobility and protection for ground 
forces on operations. Costs will be absorbed from the existing resources of Defence. 
Growler electronic warfare system – acquisition 
$1,458 million was to be spent on the conversion of twelve F/A-18F Super Hornet aircraft 
into Growler configuration and for associated equipment, training and spares. This measure 
has since been overtaken by the decisions to acquire twelve Growler aircraft.  The Growlers 
will be equipped with jam electronic systems and an enhanced capacity to undertake 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions. Costs will be absorbed from the 
existing resources of Defence. 
Living Away From Home Allowance 
Supplementation was provided for the additional Fringe Benefits Tax liability for overseas 
postings due to changes in the tax treatment of the Living Away From Home Allowance. 
Fire Services Levy 
Defence’s annual appropriation was reduced by $18.8m in 2012-13 and $79.5m across the 
Budget and Forward Estimates with a commensurate reduction in Defence's annual 
insurance premium. This followed a review of Commonwealth fire services arrangements 
with the states and territories. 
Foreign Exchange Movements  
Defence is funded on a no-win/no-loss basis for foreign exchange movements. Depending on 
how the Australian dollar moves relative to currencies that Defence plans to make purchases 
in, adjustments are made to maintain the buying power of the Defence budget. As a result of 
depreciation in the value of the Australian dollar in 2012-13, Defence received $65.4 million 
in 2012-13, $337.8 million over the budget and forward estimates, and $1,598.1 million over 
the decade.  
Property Disposals 
These adjustments relate to the retention and payment to government of revenues from 
property disposals.   
DMO appropriation adjustment 
Due to functions and staff movements between Defence and DMO, DMO returned 
$17.4 million in the budget year, with a net result of DMO transferring $188.0 million to 
Defence across the Budget and Forward Estimates. 
2.3: Funding from Government [PBS Section 1.3]   
The 2013-14 Budget Measures and Adjustments [PBS p. 28 – 31] 
Each year, changes to the Defence budget are set out in the PBS. What makes this year 
somewhat different is that funding has been ‘reprofiled’ as a result of the new White Paper. 
Or to put it another way, it’s been rebaselined though as series of undisclosed adjustments 
that transfer funding between years. We speculate on what those adjustments might have 
been in Chapter 3. Independent of this, there is a number of disclosed changes in this year’s 
budget. 
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Usually the changes fall into three categories: budget measures, savings measures and 
budget adjustments. The distinction between the three is variable, with identical items 
classified differently from one year to the next. There are also so-called ‘absorbed 
measures’, these are unfunded initiatives that must be funded from within existing Defence 
resources. Inevitably, this means that either other activities have to be foregone or 
efficiency savings created. This year, there are measures but no (disclosed) adjustments. For 
ease of reference, the individual measures and adjustments have been detailed in 
Table 2.3.1.  
The budget initiatives in detail  
In the past, the PBS contained detailed explanations of the various measures. However, the 
PBS is silent about most of the measures this year.  
Fortunately, further information is available in Treasury’s Budget Paper Number 2 regarding 
the Defence measures. See Chapter 6 of this Brief for more on the cost and composition of 
ADF deployments. This information is reproduced below—often verbatim—along with 
supporting data where available. The inclusion of the Growler acquisition and future 
sustainment (NPOC) is debatable since it will likely result in an offsetting reduction in the 
number of F-35 JSF to be acquired. But even excluding the Growler, there are $388 million 
worth of absorbed measures. In a retrograde step, the impact of measures and adjustments 
beyond the forward estimates is no longer disclosed.  
Table 2.3.1: 2013-14 Budget Measures and Adjustments (million $)  
  2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 Total 
Funded Measures        
Middle East Area of Operations   523.5 9.2 32.6 9.7 575.0 
Growler acquisition    200.0   200.0 
Reclassification of ADF Service  -0.4     -0.4 
Solomon Islands Transition  9.7 -1.0    8.7 
Variation to Defence funding  532.8 208.2 32.6 9.6 783.2 
Absorbed measures        
Growler acquisition*  ? ? ? ? 2,774.4 
Growler NPOC**  ? ? ? ? 3,143.8 
Australian Cyber Security Centre  ? ? ? ? ? 
Defence Abuse Response Taskforce  ? ? ? ? 37.1 
Defence Abuse Reparation Payment 
Scheme 
 ? ? ? ? 83.9 
Coastal Surveillance  9.9    9.9 
G20 Support  7.1    7.1 
Timor-Leste - transition  5.4    5.4 
Contribution to UN Trust Fund Mali 5     5.0 
Joint C-band space radar 0.5     0.5 
Absorbed measures PAES           
Bushmaster acquisition  ? ? ? ? 205.7 
Total absorbed measures        6,272.8 
Source: 2012-13 PBS and Budget Paper #2. Numbers may not add up due to rounding. *total over 9 years, **total over 17 years 
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Funded Measures:  
Middle East Area of Operations — continuation  
An additional $585.7 million over four years to fully cover the net additional cost of 
continuing Operation Slipper, Australia's contribution to international stabilisation and 
counter-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan and the Middle East Area of Operations. This 
funding covers the extension of Australia's operations to June 2014. The cost will be reduced 
by the recovery of $10.7 million from other Coalition Forces for logistic support provided by 
the Australian Defence Force (ADF). 
Growler electronic warfare system — acquisition 
$2,974.4 million over nine years from 2013-14 to 2021-22 to acquire 12 EA-18G (Super 
Hornet) Growler aircraft, weapons and associated support systems. First pass approval has 
been given for personnel and operating costs of $3,143.8 million to support this capability 
until 2029-30. The majority of the costs of this measure will be met from within the existing 
resources of the Defence, with an additional $200 million provided in 2014-15. 
Solomon Islands — transition 
$8.7 million to funds the continuation of the deployment of Australian Defence Force (ADF) 
personnel to the Solomon Islands. The ADF component of the mission is expected to 
withdraw in the second half of 2013. 
Absorbed Measures:  
Growler electronic warfare system — acquisition & NPOC 
See above. 
Establishment of Australian Cyber Security Centre 
The Government will establish a multi-agency Australian Cyber Security Centre (the Centre). 
The Centre will co-locate existing capabilities for cyber defence and facilitate improved 
industry access to Australia's cyber security practitioners. The Centre will bring together 
capabilities from across the Department of Defence, Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation, the Australian Federal Police, the Attorney-General's Department and the 
Australian Crime Commission. 
Defence Abuse Response Taskforce 
$37.1 million over two years to fund an independent Taskforce as part of the government’s 
response to the DLA Piper Report of the Review of allegations of sexual and other abuse in 
Defence. The independent Taskforce will assess the allegations of abuse made to DLA Piper 
and investigate new allegations that occurred prior to 11 April 2011. The Taskforce will be 
based in the Attorney-General's Department and is expected to complete its work by 31 May 
2014. 
Defence Abuse Reparation Payment Scheme 
$83.9 million over two years for reparation payments and related expenses as part of the 
government’s response to the DLA Piper Report of the Review of allegations of sexual and 
other abuse in Defence. Payments to individuals under the Scheme will be capped at 
$50,000, with the amount provided to each complainant determined on a case-by-case basis 
taking into account their individual circumstances. 
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Coastal Surveillance — continuation of Operation Resolute 
The Government will provide $9.9 million in 2013-14 for the net additional cost of continuing 
Operation Resolute, the military contribution to Border Protection Command led 
surveillance activities to protect Australia's offshore resources and deter people smuggling. 
Australia to host the Group of 20 in 2014 — Australian Defence Force support 
$7.1 million in 2013-14 for the net additional cost of a range of security capabilities provided 
by the Australian Defence Force in support of the Group of 20 (G-20) Leaders' Summit, to be 
held in Brisbane on 15 and 16 November 2014, and two G-20 Finance Ministers and Central 
Bank Governors' meetings, to be held in Sydney and Cairns earlier in the year. 
Timor-Leste — transition and future Defence engagement 
$34.0 million in 2012-13 and $5.4 million in 2013-14 for the net additional cost of the 
security transition of Operation Astute, Australia's military contribution to maintaining 
stability in Timor-Leste through the International Stabilisation Force (ISF). The Government 
will support an ongoing Defence engagement with the Government of Timor-Leste through 
the Defence Cooperation program, including training and exercises. 
Australia's contribution to the United Nations Trust Fund for the African-led 
International Support Mission in Mali 
$5.0 million in 2012-13 to the United Nations (UN) Trust Fund supporting the African-led 
International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). The UN Trust Fund will help fund AFISMA's 
operational costs such as military staffing, logistics requirements and acquisition of 
equipment to support the AFISMA mission. 
Relocation and establishment of a jointly-operated United States C-band space 
surveillance radar  
$0.5 million in 2012-13 for the development of a detailed project plan for the relocation and 
establishment of a jointly-operated United States (US) C-band space surveillance radar at the 
Harold E. Holt Naval Communication Station in Western Australia. 
The relocation of the radar will strengthen the ability of the US Global Space Surveillance 
Network to track space assets and debris, and will provide satellite operators around the 
world with warnings of possible collisions between space objects, thereby reducing the 
danger posed by space debris. 
So what happened? 
This year’s Defence budget is easy to understand. Three things have happened: 
x The pre-2013 White Paper funding envelope has been rebaselined by shifting money 
from one year to another. As discussed in Chapter 3 of this Brief, it appears as 
though around $3 billion has been brought forward from 2016-17 into the next 
three years.  
x $783 million in new funding has been provided by the government, including 
$584 million for military deployments and $200 million as partial payment for the 
acquisition of 12 Growler configured Super Hornet aircraft. 
x Excluding the cost of the Growler acquisition and NPOC (which are likely to be offset 
by a smaller F-35 JSF acquisition in the long term), $355 million of new measures will 
be absorbed by Defence over the next four years.  
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2.4: Capital Investment Program [PBS Section 1.4]   
Information on the Capital Budget is spread across several areas of the PBS. The Capital 
Budget represents Defence’s plans for capital investment in new equipment, upgrades, 
facilities and other non-military capital items. It’s formally described in accounting terms in 
the Capital Budget Statement in Table 55 on page 98 of the PBS, although that is not very 
revealing.  
Capital Investment Program [PBS p.32]  
The Capital Investment Program is detailed in Table 5 page 17 of the PBS, which we have 
reproduced in part in Table 2.4.1. Unfortunately, the projected result for 2012-13 has not 
been included in this year’s PBS so we have been forced to use the revised estimate from the 
2012-13 PAES.  
Table 2.4.1: The Capital Investment Program (million $)  
 06-07 
actual  
07-08 
actual  
08-09 
actual  
09-10 
actual  
10-11 
actual 
11-12 
actual 
12-13 
proj. 
13-14 
budget 
14-15 
est.  
15-16 
est.  
16-17 
est.  
Unapproved 
Major Capital 
Investment 
(DCP) 
-  -  -  - - - 30 343 1,527 2,916 3,523 
Approved 
Major Capital 
Investment 
4,019 4,030 3,943 5,150 4,838 4,208 3,327 3,269 3,769 3,225 2,928 
Subtotal 4,019 4,030 3,943 5,150 4,838 4,208 3,357 3,612 5,296 6,141 6,451 
Capital 
Facilities 
Approved & 
Unapproved 
653 570 963 1,504 1,211 997 1,019 1,150 978 518 674 
Other  
Capital 
925 829 742 626 883 739 276 940 847 795 1,049 
Total Capital 
Investment 
Program 
5,598 5,429 5,648 7,280 6,932 5,944 4,652 5,702 7,121 7,455 8,174 
Source: 2012-13 PAES, 2013-14 PBS and various DAR. The AMCIP figure for 2011-12 does not take into account the additional 
$825 million booked in 2010-11 by DMO and paid for by Defence in 2011-12. Where possible, large shifts due to accumulation 
and drawdown of the DMO special account have been accounted for. 
There are four components to the Capital Investment Program:  
Unapproved Major Capital Investment Program or Defence Capability Plan (DCP): This 
represents Major Capital Investment projects that have not yet received second pass 
approval from government. Major Capital Investment projects are generally of more than 
$20 million value and predominantly involve the purchase of military equipment, (previously 
called ‘Pink Book’ projects). The preparation of these projects for approval is the 
responsibility of the Chief of the Capability Development Group. Once approved, projects 
generally pass to the DMO for delivery.  
Approved Major Capital Investment Program: Projects already approved by government 
and under way, previously called the ‘White Book’. Once approved, projects generally pass 
to the DMO for delivery.  
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Capital Facilities: Approved and Unapproved Capital Facilities Projects, including everything 
from new barracks to upgrades of existing facilities. These projects are the responsibility of 
the Infrastructure Division in the Defence Support Group. 
Other Capital: including Minor Capital Investment (projects costing less than $20 million), 
repairable items, non-capital facilities, plant and equipment, and software and intangibles.  
What are the trends in the Capital Investment Program? 
Recent actual and projected real spending in the Capital Investment Program is shown in 
Figure 2.4.1 in terms of 2013-14 dollars. Note that the figures for 2012-13 are uncertain 
because no official figures have been released for the anticipated outcome for that year. The 
reduction in funding this year and last is a hangover from the attempt to get back to surplus 
in 2012-13. Further discussion of the capital investment program appears in Chapter 3.  
Figure 2.4.1: Recent and planned trends in the Capital Investment Program  
Source: 2013-14 PBS and various DAR. The AMCIP figure for 2011-12 does not take account of an additional $825 million booked 
in 2010-11 by DMO and paid for by Defence in 2011-12. Where possible, large shifts due to accumulation and drawdown of the 
DMO special account have been accounted for. 
Unapproved Major Capital Investment Program [PBS page 118]  
The PBS again contains a list of DCP projects planned for first (12) and second pass (17) 
approval in the forthcoming year [Tables 73 and 74, p. 118-119].  
Approved Major Capital Investment Program [PBS page 149] 
The approved Capital Investment Program is mainly, but not exclusively, the responsibility of 
DMO. As a result, most of the information on approved projects can be found in the DMO 
section of the PBS, including details of the top 30 projects. We examine the Capital 
Investment Program more closely in Chapter 2.7 of this Brief.  
Major Capital Facilities Program [PBS pp.121–132] 
The PBS lists 68 approved Major Capital Facilities projects (worth $15 million each or more) 
at various locations with a total value $4.7 billion. In the past medium projects of between 
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$25,000 and $15 million were also listed but have been omitted this year. In the 2013-14 
Budget the government has foreshadowed 7 new major capital works projects for 
parliamentary consideration and 15 medium capital works projects. These are listed in 
Table 78 of the PBS. Expenditure on facilities projects in 2013-14 is planned to be 
$1.15 billion.  
Table 76 of the PBS lists the approved major facilities projects. The largest such projects are 
the Enhanced Land Force Phase 2 facilities at various locations ($1,458 million), Enhanced 
Land Force Phase 1 facilities at various locations ($793 million), Defence Logistics 
Transformation Program ($753 million), Moorebank Units Relocation ($353 million), RAAF 
Amberley Redevelopment Stage 3 ($332 million), Albatross Redevelopment Stage 3 
($192 million), and the redevelopment of East Sale ($186 million). Table 77 on page 128 of 
the PBS lists 11 future possible private financing projects that are under development as part 
of the Single LEAP initiative.  
Other Capital Purchases  
Other capital purchases include Minor Capital Investment, Repairable Items and Other Plant 
and Equipment. Defence plans to spend $940 million on other capital purchases in 2013-14.  
Retained Capital Receipts [PBS page 18] 
The Capital Budget is funded in part through the proceeds from sales of property, plant and 
equipment and other capital receipts (see Table 7 on page 18 of the PBS). On a year by year 
basis some or all of this money is returned to the government through a capital withdrawal. 
This is taken into account in determining the appropriations to Defence. Table 2.4.2 shows 
recently planned and achieved assets sales (including both property and other assets) within 
the Defence Capital Budget.  
Table 2.4.2: Proceeds from the sale of assets ($ million) 
 Budgeted Achieved Shortfall 
DRP to June 2000 – 77 – 
2000–01 820 87 733 
2001–02 1023 199 824 
2002–03  700 632 68 
2003–04 306 184 122 
2004-05 231 143 88 
2005-06 95  108   -13  
2006-07 38  134 -96 
2007-08 99 65 -34 
2008-09 285 5 280 
2009-10 287 61 226  
2010-11 156 138 18 
2011-12 118 134 -16 
2012-13 127  undisclosed  
2013-14 102    
2014-15 98    
2015-16 174    
2016-17 123   
Source: DAR, 2013-14 PBS and 2012-13 PAES 
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2.5: People  
Overview  
Since 2000 there have been a range of initiatives to improve the management of personnel 
from a business and planning perspective, and to enhance the development, care, 
recruitment and retention of personnel. Many of these initiatives began in 2001-02, when 
$500 million was allocated over five years to deal with high priority personnel issues. Then, 
in 2006-07, $182 million was provided over four years for enhanced Reserve remuneration 
and $194 million was allocated to improve recruitment and retention.  
Subsequently, in late 2006, the then-government allocated another $1 billion for 
recruitment and retention over ten years, and in the 2007 budget a further $2.1 billion was 
made available. The 2009 budget contained three personnel-related measures amounting to 
$480 million over four years.  
In 2009-10, the situation changed dramatically. Military recruitment and retention exceeded 
expectations and produced dramatic growth in full-time ADF numbers over a two-year 
period. During 2011-12, action was taken to get military numbers back to planned levels 
with more success than planned. The trend continued in 2012-13 with permanent ADF 
numbers ending the year fully 1,900 below planned levels. 
In recent years Reserve numbers have also fallen below planned levels. In 2012-13 for 
example the expected outcome is around 20,000 compared with a budgeted level of 21,650. 
At the same time, this budget saw the long-term goal of just under 23,000 Reserve 
personnel downgraded by 1,700 to 21,300. 
The story with civilian numbers is somewhat different, in 2009-10 and 2010-11 civilian 
numbers failed to grow to planned levels, presumably because the personnel were not 
needed. Accordingly, budgeted civilian workforce numbers was cut by 1,000 in the 2011-12 
budget. Then, in last year’s budget, civilian numbers were cut by another 1,000 (phased over 
two years) to assist with the government’s fiscal strategy. As a result, the civilian workforce 
will actually get smaller. This year, it was announced that civilian numbers would decline by 
1,000 positions. 
How big is the workforce? 
According to the PBS, in 2013–14 Defence will be funded to maintain an average of: 
x 58,235 full-time military personnel  
 
x 21,217 APS civilians (including 5,670 in DMO)  
 
x 20,450 Reservists 
In addition, there will be 445 Professional Service Providers or ‘contractors’, including 48 in 
DMO.  
Over the next four years, military numbers are planned to rise to around 58,650, beginning 
with an additional 1,524 people next year. Reserve numbers are planned to fall to around 
21,300 over four years. Civilian personnel numbers will fall by around 1,000 between now 
and 2015-16. Historical and planned workforce numbers are detail in Table 2.5.1
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How did we get to this point? 
During the 1990s ADF numbers dropped from around 70,000 to 50,000 permanent 
personnel, as shown in Figure 2.5.1.  
Figure 2.5.1 Historical and Planned Defence Workforce  
Source: Various DAR, 2001-02 Defence Budget Brief and 2013-14 PBS 
The bulk of these reductions were due to outsourcing under the Commercial Support and 
Defence Reform programs (although around 5,600 permanent ADF positions had already 
been transferred to the Reserves by the 1991 Force Structure Review). In fact, the initial goal 
of the Defence Reform Program (DRP) was to reduce the strength of the ADF to 43,500 but 
this was soon revised up to 50,000, thereby arresting the decline. This was done by 
re-directing DRP savings to buy-back the ADF positions, the goal being to redirect personnel 
from support areas to the combat force—though there is little evidence of this occurring.  
The 2000 White Paper then set permanent ADF numbers on a growth path. Until 2003, the 
target was to build a force of ‘around 54,000’ permanent ADF personnel by 2010. However, 
the government accepted the recommendations of the 2003 Defence Capability Review, 
which saw some capabilities withdrawn from service in the next decade. As a result, the 
2004-05 PBS [p.5] referred to ‘continued growth of the ADF towards 53,000’. However, 
subsequent budgets added additional personnel for a range of initiatives including, most 
especially, the expansion of the Army.  
Prior to the 2009 White Paper, the target strengths for the permanent ADF were 57,500 by 
2011-12 and ‘to more than 57,000 over the decade’. The 2009 Defence White Paper revised 
the full-time ADF target up to approximately 57,800 and the civilian workforce up to 21,900 
over the decade. Subsequent reductions in planned savings under the Strategic Reform 
Program saw the targets grow to around 59,000 and 23,000 for the military and civilian 
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workforces respectively. The 2013 Defence White Paper says that permanent ADF will be 
maintained at around 59,000 and that civilian number will fall by 1,000 to around 20,500, 
effectively the targets existing prior at that time.  
What are the recent trends? 
Permanent ADF Numbers 
The changing size of the permanent ADF is captured in Figure 2.5.2. In the initial years 
following the 2000 White Paper, permanent ADF numbers grew steadily until 2003-04 when 
poor recruiting outcomes saw numbers fall for three years in a row—notwithstanding 
budgeting for growth in each instance. Then, in 2006-07, numbers began to rise to the 
extent that budget estimates were exceeded three years in a row. All signs being that the 
revamp of recruiting and retention policy (and a lot of extra money) slowly but steadily 
turned around the personnel situation.  
Then, for two years commencing in 2009-10 military numbers grew much more quickly than 
planned as a result of better than expected recruitment and retention. In 2009-10 military 
personnel exceeded planned levels by 1,372. To redress this unplanned growth, the 
permanent ADF was supposed to decrease by around 400 people in 2010-11. Instead, the 
ADF grew by a further 1,387 positions, exceeding planned levels by 1,808. In 2011-12 
effective action was taken to bringing military numbers down—but by substantially more 
than planned. Then in 2012-13, the situation continued with an anticipated end-of-year 
result 1,900 below what was budgeted for. 
Figure 2.5.2 Permanent ADF personnel: 1996-97 to 2016-17 (average funded strength) 
Source: DAR, 2001-02 Defence Budget Brief, 2013-14 PBS  
Recruitment and retention 
The annual change in ADF strength is the difference between the numbers of people 
recruited into and separated from the force (historically around 5,000 in each case). Since 
the planned change in strength is usually no more than 1,000, the outcome is finely 
balanced. With this in mind, we turn now to examine ADF recruitment and separations.  
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Recruitment  
Table 2.5.2 shows the percentages of recruitment targets that have been met over the last 
fifteen years. Following solid improvements earlier this decade, which saw the rate grow 
from 76% to 93% in 2001-02, performance dropped back to the mid-80% in 2002-03 and 
2003-04 before deteriorating to 80% in 2004-05 and then recovering to 84% for the next two 
years. In 2007-08 and 2008-09 the result fell to around a 15-year low before recovering 
strongly in 2009-10 and 2010-11. The result for 2011-12 is good by historical precedents.  
Table 2.5.2: Percentage of recruitment targets met (per cent) 
 1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
2008-09 
2009-10 
2010-11 
2011-12 
Navy 98 92 98 76 57 74 85 84 86 73 72 78 73 72 91 87  88 
Army 99 98 94 78.5 83 79 100 79 84 81 98 86 76 76 90 90  87 
Air Force 86 93 101 90.5 83 88 87 94 90 91 88 86 85 86 92 93  86 
ADF 96 94 97 80 76 80 93 84 86 80 84 84 77 76 91 89  87 
Source: Various DAR and Defence submission to the FAD&T Committee inquiry into ADF recruitment and retention, May 2001 
It is important to note that recruitment results vary from Service to Service, and that within 
each Service skilled personnel (like technicians and trades people) are particularly hard to 
recruit. In recent times, this has no doubt reflected the buoyant labour market and the 
national skilled labour shortage that Australia has experienced. As the data shows, Navy has 
until recently tended to have the most trouble.  
Retention  
Table 2.5.3 shows the percentages of ADF personnel who separated from full-time military 
service over the last fifteen years. Some care must be taken with this data because figures 
for earlier years were impacted by the deliberate reduction in the size of the ADF between 
1997 and 2001 under the Defence Reform Program. Still, separation rates from 2001-02 to 
2004-05 were better than in 1995-96 before the cuts to personnel commenced. Note that 
the separation rates for 2009-10 and 2010-11 are the lowest of all the years examined by a 
fair margin. Unfortunately, this favourable trend did not continue into 2011-12. 
Table 2.5.3: ADF separation rates % 
 1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
2008-09 
2009-10 
2010-11 
2011-12 
Navy 13.0 11.5 11.1 12.6 13.3 13.2 11.5 11.6 10.1 12.2 11.3 12.2 10.9 10.5 8.1 7.7 9.2  
Army 12.5 10.4 10.9 12.9 13.0 13.2 11.5 9.8 11.0 12.7 12.4 11.6 10.3 9.9 7.2 8.7 11.8  
Air Force 9.0 9.0 10.0 11.9 11.6 15.6 10.4 8.1 7.4 8.4 8.5 9.0 7.2 6.3 5.2 6.4 7.1  
ADF 11.6 10.3 10.7 12.6 12. 13.8 11.2 9.8 9.9 11.5 10.7 11.1 9.7 9.2 6.9 7.9 10.0  
Source: DAR and Defence submission to the FAD&T Committee inquiry into ADF recruitment and retention, May 2001  
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To put recent ADF separation rates in context, Figure 2.5.3 plots the separation rate over the 
past thirty years. The key point to notice is that recent separation rates are commensurate 
with or better than rates achieved over the past three decades—the last year being an 
exception. Given that a number of factors have arisen in that time to make long-term ADF 
service more difficult—growing numbers of employed spouses, greater geographical 
dispersal of the ADF and the trend in society to shorter-term employment—the fact that the 
ADF had been able (at least until last year) to keep people on average for longer than in the 
1970s is a real achievement.  
Figure 2.5.3: Permanent ADF separation rate: 1974-75 to 2011-12
Source: DAR 1974-75 to 2011-12 
Figure 2.5.4: Employment and ADF separation rates: 1974-75 to 2011-12 
Source: DAR 1974-75 to 2011-12 
While it’s highly likely that the Global Financial Crisis contributed to low separation rates in 
recent years, the impact of recent retention initiatives has undoubtedly also been an 
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important factor. Indeed, not only did the ADF separation rate fall strongly in 2007-08 (prior 
to any increase in unemployment) but the correlation between unemployment and 
separations has been less than clear in recent years—as shown in Figure 2.5.4.  
Civilian Numbers 
The situation with civilian numbers is captured in Figure 2.5.5 which plots budgeted and 
actual civilian numbers from 1996-07 onwards. Although civilian numbers fell quickly under 
the Defence Reform Program, they grew back very rapidly in the first two years of the 2000 
White Paper implementation—three times more quickly than military numbers grew. What 
is more, the growth was largely unplanned, with the size of the civilian workforce in 2001-02 
exceeding budget estimates by 5.8% and similarly in 2002-03 (6.1% in excess). However, in 
January 2003 a civilian hiring freeze was imposed within Defence after it became clear that 
the projected number of civilian personnel would exceed the revised estimate given less 
than two months earlier. In April 2003, the freeze was lifted but direction was given to 
maintain civilian numbers at current levels. In the 2003-04 Budget, a programmed reduction 
plan was set in place to reduce civilian numbers by 1,008, from 18,385 to 17,377.  
Figure 2.5.5: Civilian personnel: 1996-97 to 2016-17 
Source: Defence Annual Reports, 2001-02 Defence Budget Brief and 2013-14 PBS  
However, the actual result for 2003-04 (18,303) was only 82 positions below the previous 
year’s figure due, mainly, to a series of government initiatives but also because of an extra 
unplanned 349 new civilian positions. 
For a while, in 2004-05 and 2005-06, personnel numbers were largely under control resulting 
in a close alignment of budgeted and actual figures. In 2006-07, civilian personnel numbers 
were set to rise by 950. Most, but not all, of these positions were related directly to either 
new government initiatives or the creation of a more efficient workforce. However, the 
actual result for 2006-07 was an increase of 1,388 personnel, more than 450 above the 
estimate. Then, in 2007-08, civilian numbers grew by another 1,468, fully 155 above the 
initial budget estimate. Clearly, whatever constraints were imposed in 2004-05 and 2005-06 
were no longer effective.  
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The plan for 2008-09 was for civilian numbers to fall to around 20,000 and then remain 
largely static across the forward estimates. However, following the 2009 White Paper civilian 
personnel numbers were set a target of around 21,900 which was subsequently revised 
upwards to around 23,000 after Defence abandoned many of the efficiency savings originally 
planned from the civilian workforce.  
However, in 2009-10 the number of civilians grew by only 17, fully 645 below the updated 
budget estimate. Attempts to regain lost progress in 2010-11 largely failed with civilian 
numbers falling 1,213 below target (though still 590 above the level for the previous year).  
In the context of the 2011-12 budget, the government announced that civilian numbers 
would be 1,000 less than initially planned across four years as part of further efficiencies. 
Then a further 1,000 positions were cut in the 2012-13 budget, but mostly relative to 
prospective growth rather than actual positions. This year in the new White Paper, it was 
announced that civilian numbers, including contractors, will fall from around 21,700 to 
20,000 over the next decade. Clearly, there is a degree of overlap between the most recent 
announcement and the cut announced in 2012. 
Reserve numbers  
Reserve numbers have fallen short for two years in a row, most especially in 2012-13. 
Consistent with this, and perhaps as a consequence, the long-term target for the size of the 
Reserve has been reduced from 23,000 to 21,300. 
 Figure 2.5.6 Active Reserve personnel: 2000-01 to 2016-17 
Source: Defence Annual Reports and 2012-13 PBS 
What are the long-term targets for the Defence workforce? 
In past years, we have included a detailed analysis of how personnel targets have evolved 
since the 2000 and 2009 Defence White Papers. Now that the 2013 White Paper has 
effectively ‘reset the clock’, we will instead focus on the evolution of planned personnel 
numbers from 2009 onwards and only provide a truncated picture of earlier changes. Table 
2.5.4 shows what we know about the long-term target strength for the ADF.   
The story for numbers is shown in Table 2.5.5 where it is assumed that the recent cuts to 
civilian numbers in 2011-12 (1,000 positions) and 2012-13 (1,000 positions) will flow forward 
into a reduction in the long-term target strength for the civilian (APS plus contractor) 
workforce.  
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Table 2.5.4: Long-term target (circa 2018) for the permanent ADF 
 Navy Army Air Force Total 
Post-Defence Reform Program Baseline  13,800 23,000 13,000 50,000 
East Timor Boost 1999  +3,000 +555 +3,555 
2000 White Paper Target 13,800 26,000 13,555 53,555 
Changes made 2000 to 2009 -311 +4,538 +500 +4,721 
Estimated pre-2009 White Paper Target 13,689 30,538 14,055 58,282 
Baseline (May 2009)    58,648 
Extra White Paper Positions      1,979 
SRP impact    -2,813 
2018-19 target strength  (May 2009)    57,812 
Baseline (April 2010)    58,276 
Extra White Paper Positions      1,979 
SRP impact     -1,376 
2018-19 target strength  (April 2010)    58,879 
Baseline (July 2011)    58,277 
Extra White Paper Positions      1,979 
SRP impact     -1,629 
2018-19 target strength (July 2011)    58,627 
2013 Defence White Paper    59,000 
Source: 2010-11 DAR, Budget Papers and the May 2009 and April 2010 SRP Booklets 
Table 2.5.5: Long-term target (circa 2018) for the Defence civilians & contractors  
 Civilian  Contractors Total 
Estimated pre-2009 White Paper Target  20,000 - - 
Baseline (May 2009)   21,672 
Extra White Paper Positions     2,290 
SRP impact   -2,015 
2018-19 target strength  (May 2009)   21,937 
Baseline (April 2010)   21,620 
Extra White Paper Positions     2,290 
SRP impact    -1,191 
2018-19 target strength  (April 2010)   22,719 
Baseline (April 2011)*   22,397 
Reduction of 1,000 positions    -1,000 
2018-19 target strength (May 2011)   21,397 
Baseline (July 2011)   21,397 
Reduction of 1,000 positions   -1,000 
2018-19 target strength (May 2012)   20,397 
2013 Defence White Paper    
Baseline (April 2013)    21,700 
Reduction of around 1,000 positions    -700 
Target strength (May 2013)    20,000 
Source: Budget Papers and the May 2009 and April 2010 SRP Booklets. *Advice from Defence May 2011. 
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How much do personnel cost? 
Personnel costs for Defence including DMO in 2013-14 will be around $10.7 billion rising to 
$12.2 billion in 2016-17. The recent and prospective per-capita cost of civilian and military 
personnel appears in Tables 2.5.6 to 2.5.8 where data is available. Unfortunately, figures for 
Defence were unavailable this year.  
Table 2.5.6: Per-capita permanent ADF personnel expenses  
 Military 
Numbers 
Expense 
$ 000’s 
Per Capita Nominal Growth 
00-01 50,355 4,047,121 $80,372  
01-02 50,932 4,273,863 $83,913 4.4% 
02-03 52,080 4,458,208 $85,603 2.0% 
03-04 52,034 4,890,100 $93,979 9.8% 
04-05 51,813 4,757,900 $91,828 -2.3% 
05-06 51,151 5,093,100 $99,570 8.4% 
06-07 51,504 5,515,651 $107,092 7.6% 
07-08 53,109 6,062,882 $114,159 6.6% 
08-09 54,748 6,764,100 $123,550 8.2% 
09-10 57,697 7,456,595 $129,237 4.6% 
10-11 59,084 7,834,679 $132,602 2.6% 
Average 5.2% 
Source: Defence Annual Reports, 2012-13 PAES and 2013-14 PBS, expenses adjusted to take account of Reserve component.  
Table 2.5.7: Per-capita DMO civilian personnel expenses  
 
DMO 
Civilians 
DMO Expenses 
‘000s 
DMO Per Capita Nominal Growth 
05-06 4502 $353,892 $78,608  
06-07 4951 $409,262 $82,662 5.2% 
07-08 5304 $458,992 $86,537 4.7% 
08-09 5552 $493,611 $88,908 2.7% 
09-10 5526 $507,900 $91,914 3.4% 
10-11 5533 $531,619 $98,216 4.5% 
11-12 5989 $588,610 $98,282 2.3% 
12-13 5750 $602,885 $104,850 6.7% 
13-14 5307 $560,998 $105,709 0.8% 
14-15 5529 $611,882 $110,668 4.7% 
15-16 5548 $639,916 $115,342 4.2% 
16-17 5583 $671,230 $120,227 4.2% 
Average 3.9% 
Source: Defence Annual Reports, 2012-13 PAES and 2013-14 PBS.  
 
Note that figure for 2012-13 is overinflated due to redundancies paid and timing of DECA payments in 2012-13, DMO backfill 
positions are not counted because they result in a suppliers rather than personnel expense.  
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Table 2.5.8: Per-capita Defence civilian personnel expenses  
 
Civilian 
Numbers 
Expense 
$ 000’s 
Per Capita Nominal Growth 
00-01 16,292 $956,661 $58,720  
01-02 16,819 $1,086,116 $64,577 10.0% 
02-03 18,385 $1,235,752 $67,215 4.1% 
03-04 18,303 $1,363,205 $74,480 10.8% 
04-05 17,753 $1,293,100 $72,838 -2.2% 
05-06 13,577 $1,084,382 $79,869 9.7% 
06-07 14,516 $1,212,393 $83,521 4.6% 
07-08 15,087 $1,271,223 $84,259 0.9% 
08-09 14,815 $1,308,445 $88,319 4.8% 
09-10 14,532 $1,373,377 $94,507 7.0% 
10-11 15,115 $1,457,279 $96,413 2.0% 
Average 5.2% 
Source: Defence Annual Reports, 2012-13 PAES and 2013-14 PBS.  Note: excludes DMO past 2005-06.  
The per-capita expenses include salaries, allowances, superannuation, health, redundancies, 
housing and fringe benefits tax. We’ve done our best (on the basis of incomplete 
information) to account for the cost of Reserve personnel in the estimate for the permanent 
ADF. In addition, the transfer of military compensation to Veterans Affairs in 2004-05 has 
been adjusted for. 
Given the unavailability of data for Defence military and civilian personnel expenses this 
year, what follows reproduced the situation as it looked in May last year.  
The average rates of growth for per-capita employee expenses in Table 2.5.6 to 2.5.8 do not 
account for inflation. Once inflation is taken into account, the calculated average annual 
(compounding) rates of growth for the three groups are as follows: permanent military 
personnel 1.7 %, Defence civilians 2.3% and DMO civilians 1%. Past and future trends in per 
capita expenses are shown in Table 2.5.9. 
Table 2.5.9: Past and projected average annual real growth in per-capita costs (May 2012) 
 Military Defence APS DMO APS 
2000-01 to 2012-13 1.8% 1.9% - 
2012-13 to 2015-16 1.5% 3.5% 1.4% 
 
Finally, a caution is in order when looking at the data in the last three tables; the ongoing 
impact of accrual (non-cash) shifts can make very significant differences. This has probably 
contributed to some of the big year-on-year variations in growth in both civilian and military 
per-capita expenses.  
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Figure 2.5.7: Past and projected per-capita personnel costs (as at May 2012) 
Source: Defence Annual Reports, 2011-12 PAES, 2012-13 PBS.  
 
Personnel structures  
To facilitate understanding of the structure of the Defence workforce, it is useful to 
understand the nominal equivalence between different levels in the APS and ADF and 
between the three Services. For a comparison of relative ranks/levels, see Table 2.5.10. 
Table 2.5.10: Rank/level comparison: 
Civilian Navy Army Air Force  
APS-4 Sub-Lieutenant Lieutenant  Flying Officer 
Officers APS-5 Lieutenant Captain Flight Lieutenant 
APS-6 Lt-Commander Major Squadron Leader 
EL-1 Commander Lt-Colonel Wing Commander 
Senior Officers 
EL-2 Captain Colonel Group Captain 
SES-1 Commodore Brigadier Air Commodore 
Star-ranked and 
Senior Executive 
Service 
SES-2 Rear Admiral Major General Air Vice-Marshal 
SES-3 Vice Admiral Lt General Air Marshal 
 
The breakdown of ADF personnel by rank, and civilians by level, appears in Table 21 on page 
37 of the PBS. As the ADF contracted during the 1990s, the number of officers remained 
more or less constant. Then, as the size as the ADF grew over the past few years, the 
number of officers grew more quickly (see Figure 2.5.8). As a result, the percentage of 
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officers in the ADF has grown from 17.2% in 1989 to 23.9% in 2010. This means that there 
are now around three enlisted men for every officer. To a large extent, the rising proportion 
of officers probably reflects the outsourcing of activities during the 1990s which saw more 
enlisted personnel than officers discharged. However, the recent expansion of the army has 
marginally reversed the trend.  
Figure 2.5.8: Permanent ADF Numbers 1989 – 2012 as at 30 June 
Source: Defence Annual Reports 1989-90 to 2011-12 
Generals and Mandarins 
The trends in star rank, senior executive, and senior officer numbers are shown in Table 
2.5.11; the most recent data is taken from the 2013-14 PBS. Changes in reporting account 
for the gaps and lack of earlier data.  
As can be seen, over the past fifteen years the number of civilian senior executives has 
increased by 68% and military star-rank officers by 73%. At the same time, the civilian 
workforce grew by only 27% and the military workforce by only 10%. Over a similar time 
frame, the numbers of civilian and military senior officers have grown by 101% and 50% 
respectively. Although the budget papers show a reduction in the number of civilian senior 
officers in Defence and DMO in 2012-13, such predictions have been made in the past and 
not occurred.  
Some care is needed looking at the apparent levelling off in the budget year in Table 2.5.11. 
In most years the plan is to slightly reduce the number of senior military and civilian 
managers in Defence, and in most years the opposite is found to have happened when the 
actual result is reported.   
At every senior level in the civilian and military workforce the number of managers and 
executives has increased at a rate well in excess of the growth in the size of the overall 
workforce. However, as might be expected, the fastest rate of increase has occurred at the 
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level of Deputy Secretary and 3-star military officer (Table 2.5.12) where much of the growth 
is very recent, including as a result of the 2007 Defence Management Review.  
Table 2.5.11: Numbers of Senior Ranks and Executive Levels; average funded strength 
 Civilian Military 
 
Defence 
Executives 
DMO 
Executives 
Total 
Executives 
Defence 
Senior 
Officers 
DMO Senior 
Officers 
Total 
Senior 
Officers 
Star 
Rank 
Officers 
Senior 
Military 
Officers 
1998-99 100 100 0 0 0 110 1,360 
1999-00 106 106 0 0 0 0 0 
2000-01 103 103 3,317 0 3,317 120 1,415 
2001-02 117 117 3,844 0 3,844 119 1,467 
2002-03 130 130 3,824 0 3,824 120 1,507 
2003-04 123 123 3,889 0 3,889 119 1,528 
2004-05 96 30 126 3,081 995 4,076 125 1,551 
2005-06 102 29 131 3,385 1064 4,449 135 1,594 
2006-07 108 29 137 3,656 1225 4,881 149 1,684 
2007-08 121 32 153 3,911 1388 5,299 176 1,768 
2008-09 126 35 161 3,970 1502 5,472 169 1,852 
2009-10 128 36 164 4,192 1579 5,771 173 1,937 
2010-11 undisclosed undisclosed 172 undisclosed undisclosed 6,250 181 1,941 
2011-12  undisclosed  undisclosed 175 undisclosed  undisclosed  6,796 184 1,850 
2012-13 133  35  168 5,010  1,757  6,767  188  1,983 
2013-14 133 35 168 4,957 1,713 6,670 190 2,042 
Growth - - 68%  -  - 101%  73%  50%  
Source: Defence Annual Reports, 2013-14 PBS and advice from Defence 
Table 2.5.12: Band 3 and 3-Star officers (equiv. Chief of Service - Deputy Secretary) 
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Professional Service Providers 
The Defence workforce includes a limited number of Professional Service Providers (PSP), 
sometimes called simply ‘contractors’ in line positions within the organisation. For most of 
the past decade, there was a concerted effort underway to reduce the number of PSP 
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employed by Defence and DMO. In fact, Defence has claimed successive reductions in the 
number of PSP as an internal efficiency and are doing so again within the SRP. Note the 
temporary increase in 2008-09 against which savings were calculated in 2009.   
Figure 2.5.9: Professional Service Providers  
 
Source: Defence Annual Reports and 2013-14 PBS. 
The number of contractors has fallen three years in a row and done so more quickly than 
budgeted for. However, these reduction need to be viewed with some caution. Over the 
past couple of years Defence has begun ‘capability partners’ to provide skills and expertise 
not available within their own workforce. Because of the contractual arrangements under 
which capability partnerships are managed, the personnel they supply are not technically 
counted as PSP or contractors under Defence’s definition. Nonetheless, people employed by 
the private sector are providing skills and capacity within Defence very much akin to that 
previously done by PSP/contractors. The Chief Financial Officer, Capability Development and 
Chief Information Officer Groups are believed to make extensive use of ‘capability partners’ 
and other external contractors to perform core roles.  
In an answer to a Question on Notice from the Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade Committee 
on 17 October 2012 regarding the use of office space (Q86) Defence advise that 2,720 
contractors were resident and working on Defence property. The largest concentration of 
contractors is in Canberra, including 547 on Russell Hill, 310 at Campbell Park, 303 at Deakin, 
280 at Anzac Park West, 269 at Brindabella Park, and 264 at Fairbairn. And yet we are told 
that there are only 377 contractors employed across the organisation as a whole. 
No doubt most of the people reported as contractors in the Defence response are external 
providers employed by firms contracted by Defence to perform a service such as facility 
security, IT delivery or administrative functions that has been outsourced. However, it’s the 
taxpayer that’s ultimately paying the bill for everyone in the building (and some beyond). 
Clearly, greater transparency of the effective workforce capacity delivered by collocated 
service providers (including capability partners) should be disclosed. Otherwise, we cannot 
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take seriously either the reported size of the Defence workforce or claims of savings due to 
the reduction in the size of the workforce.  
Defence Remuneration 
The PBS does not deal with Defence remuneration. But because the largest single slice of the 
Defence budget goes towards civilian and military salaries we have included a short 
summary of the key data. Figure 2.5.10 shows Defence military and civilian salaries circa late 
2010 benchmarked against the latest available Average Weekly Ordinary-Time Earnings for 
Full-Time Earning Adults (AWOFTEA) from December 2010. (SES civilian and military 
two/three-star data are for mid-2010.)  
Figure 2.5.10 Defence salaries, most recent data 
Source: ABS; Military pay rates as at January 2013, SES, Mag Gen, Lt Gen and Gen as at July 2012, other APS as at July 2013 
Note that the military figures in Figure 2.5.10 include both salary and the service allowance 
of $12,121 per annum received by all service personnel below the rank of Colonel. No 
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account has been taken of the ancillary benefits received by military personnel like housing, 
medical, rations and specific allowances for skill, hardships and deployments. Note that the 
three graphs do not use the same scale.  
The comparison of defence salaries with AWOFTE in Figure 2.5.10 represents only a 
snapshot in time. The relative dynamics of average earnings, defence salaries and the cost of 
living is quite another issue. Indeed, as Figure 2.5.11 shows, over the past decade and a half, 
defence salaries have consistently grown more slowly than average earnings but more 
quickly than the Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
Four points can be made about the relative growth in average earnings, defence salaries and 
consumer prices. First, because the salary increases for the (largely distinct) ADF and APS 
workforces are explicitly linked, any suggestion that they are driven by productivity is 
tenuous to say the least.   
Second, the fact that average earnings have outpaced defence salaries does not necessarily 
mean that defence remuneration has failed to keep pace with community standards. It’s 
likely that the stronger growth in average earnings actually reflects structural changes in the 
Australian workforce rather than a disparity in like-for-like remuneration.  
Figure 2.5.11: Defence civilian and military salaries – rate of increase 
Source: ABS weekly earnings data and Defence pay rates. 
Third, the actual remuneration of civilian personnel has increased much more quickly than 
for the military workforce, in part, through the ‘level enrichment’ shown in Table 2.5.13. 
(Civilian senior officers make up 28% of the civilian workforce while military senior officers 
only account for less than 3%, so that the former is much more sensitive to growth than the 
latter.) The effect is significant. Comparing per capita wages, salaries and leave expenses 
over the decade 1998-99 to 2008-09 reveals that average per-capita ADF costs grew by 43% 
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while civilian costs grew by 61%. Over the same period, average weekly earnings in the 
broader economy grew by 57%. 
Finally, it is important to note that Defence executive remuneration is not limited by the 
salary increases granted to the rank and file. Over the past six years, the Defence annual 
report disclosed salary ranges for various levels of employee. As Table 2.5.13 shows, it has 
been a particularly good time for senior executives and star-ranked officers (with the 
exception of 3-star military officers who only received almost the same as that granted to 
the lower echelons). The range of increases corresponds to changes to the upper and lower 
levels of the salary range in each case.  
Table 2.5.13: Senior executive salary increases 2006 to 2012 
 
Increase in  
minimum salary 
Increase in  
maximum salary 
Civilian level   
Secretary undisclosed 
undisclosed 
Deputy Secretary (SES-3) 27.6% 116.0% 
First Assistant Secretary (SES-2) 28.5% 42.1% 
Assistant Secretary (SES-1) 29.5% 29.9% 
Non-executive APS salary increase  28.1% 
Military level   
General (CDF) 53.8% 113.6% 
Lieutenant General (3-star) 25.3% 72.8% 
Major General (2-star) 49.9% 52.9% 
Brigadier (1-star) 25.1% 45.8% 
Non star rank military salary increase 25.1% 
Source: 2005-06 and 2011-12 DAR. Non-executive figures are ADF pay rates and civilian DECA from June 2006 to June 2012.  
Demographics of the ADF 
The defence force is disproportionately drawn from the Anglo-Celtic part of the Australian 
population. The extent of over-representation is difficult to fully assess because the only 
available data concerns country of birth and not family background. Even so, as Table 2.5.14 
shows, there are significant differences between the defence force and the community. The 
essential results are reproduced graphically in Figure 2.5.12. The figures are similar for the 
part-time Reserve force. Note that the over-representation of Anglo-Celtic born individuals 
extends to the civilian workforce of the Department of Defence. 
Table 2.5.14: Ethnic composition of the Australian Defence Force  
Place of Birth 
Defence 
Force 
2011 
Defence 
Civilians 
2011 
Australian 
Workforce 
2011 
Australia 86% 78%  71.9% 
UK and Ireland 5% 7%  6.4% 
New Zealand 1.8% 1.1% 3.1%  
Europe 1.1% 3.3% 2.6%  
Asia 1.9% 6.2% 8.5%  
Other 4.2% 4.4% 7.5%  
Sources: Defence military and civilian figures from the 2011 Defence Census;  
all other figures from Census 2011 conducted by the Australian Bureau of Statistics.  
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Figure 2.5.12: Composition of the ADF, Defence APS and Australian workforce by birth 
 
 
Sources: as per Table 2.5.1.4  
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It is regrettable that our defence force is unable to attract recruits equally from across the 
Australian community. Defence advises that programs are underway to redress the issue 
including the Multicultural Recruitment and Retention Strategy.  
The difference between the ADF/Defence and broader Australian society is not a new issue. 
As the results from the past four Defence census show in Figure 2.5.13 and Figure 2.5.14. 
And as Figure 2.2.15, the ADF and Defence APS have a smaller share of indigenous 
Australians than the population in general. 
Figure 2.5.13: Ethnic composition of the ADF by birth 1999-2011 
 
Sources: Defence Census 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 
Figure 2.5.14: Ethnic composition of the Defence APS by birth 2003-2011 
Sources: Defence Census 2003, 2007, 2011 
Figure 2.5.15: Percentage of indigenous persons in ADF, Defence APS and Australian population
Sources: Defence Census 199, 2003, 2007, 2011 
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Another area where the demographics of the Australian defence force and the society differ 
is gender. Table 2.5.15 shows the proportion of women and the share of jobs open to 
women across the permanent uniformed and civilian workforces. Similar results hold for the 
part-time Reserve force. In early 2011, the government announced that all positions will 
eventually be made open to women and a staged program has been set it train to make 
good on that goal. 
Table 2.5.15: Women in Defence (full time) 30 June 2012 
 Navy Army Air Force Total military 
Defence 
civilians 
% of positions open to 
women 
   93% 100% 
% of women in 
uniform 
18.5% 10.1% 19.9% 13.8% 40.6% 
Source: 2011-12 DAR and advice from Defence on positions open circa mid-2012 
It is not that the defence force has ignored the issue in the past. Over at least the past 
fifteen years a serious effort has been mounted to recruit and retain women in the force. A 
zero-tolerance policy towards sexual harassment is now in place across the entire force. 
Recruiting advertisements depict women as integral members of the defence force and 
highlight the opportunities available to them (and the same has more recently become true 
for persons from diverse ethnic backgrounds). The number of positions open to women has 
been expanded in all three Services and an increasing number of women are reaching the 
higher ranks. More flexible arrangements are now in place to help female members manage 
the dual demands of career and family, and childcare facilities have been established in and 
around most military bases.  
Yet, the proportion of women in the force has grown from only 12.8% to 13.8% over the 
decade, see Figure 2.5.16. Although the proportion of women in allied forces is similarly low 
that does not mean that the defence force should relax its effort to attract women to serve. 
The defence force needs the best people it can find and women represent the largest under-
utilised pool of potential recruits in the community.  
Figure 2.5.16: Women in the defence force 
Source: 1982-82 to 2011-12 DAR 
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2.6 Outcomes and planned performance  
The Cost of Outcomes and Programs 
Under the framework explained in Chapter 1.3 of this Brief, the government funds Defence 
to achieve designated outcomes via a series of programs. The core of the Defence Budget is 
a statement of the costs and planned performance of outcomes and programs on p.23–81 of 
the PBS. Unfortunately the 2009-10 transition from ‘output groups’ to ‘programs’ was 
accompanied by the abandonment of ‘outputs’ that contained a more granular explanation 
of capabilities held by the three Services. Specifically, twenty-two capability related outputs 
were coalesced into a mere three programs resulting in a seven-fold reduction. The net cost 
(revenues minus expenses) of outcomes and programs appear in Table 2.6.1. 
Table 2.6.1: Net outcome and program costs ($m) 
Outcome 1: The protection and 
advancement of Australia’s national 
interests through the provision of military 
capabilities and the promotion of security 
and stability 
Net Cost 
2008-09 
(actual) 
Net Cost 
2009-10 
(actual) 
Net Cost 
2010-11 
(actual) 
Net Cost 
2011-12 
(actual) 
Net Cost 
2012-13 
(expect) 
Net Cost 
2013-14 
(budget) 
Program 1.1:   Office of Sec/ CDF 207 196 146 180 143 164 
Program 1.2:    Navy Capabilities 3,979 3,745 4,045 3,991 4,185 4,333 
Program 1.3:    Army Capabilities 5,015 5,093 5,306 5,290 5,042 5,344 
Program 1.4:    Air Force Capabilities 3,906 3,699 3,908 4,223 4,113 4,165 
Program 1.5:    Intelligence Capabilities 501 562 572 544 507 525 
Program 1.6:    Defence Support 3,169 3,319 3,429 3,844 3,648 3,748 
Program 1.7:    Chief Information Officer 697 806 842 1,076 974 973 
Program 1.8:    People  257 286 269 305 355 453 
Program 1.9:    DSTO 375 403 418 450 441 427 
Program 1.10:   VCDF 1,318 1,012 1,103 1,383 1,163 1,251 
Program 1.11:   Joint Operations Comd. 95 103 37 38 46 51 
Program 1.12:   Capability Development 130 365 482 258 230 883 
Program 1.13:   Chief Finance Officer 819 317 402 465 536 560 
Outcome 1 20,468 19,906 20,959 22,047 21,383 22,878 
Outcome 2:  The advancement of 
Australia’s strategic interests through the 
conduct of military operations and other 
tasks as directed  
      
Program 2.1:  Immediate neighbourhood  173 161 182 176 165 17 
Program 2.2:  Wider interests 557 892 889 783 1,230 885 
Outcome 3:  Support for the Australian 
community and civilian authorities as 
requested by Government 
      
Program 3.1:  Defence Contribution to 
National Support Tasks in Australia 
15 11 11 118 10 17 
Total net cost (non-administered)  21,211 20,970 22,041 23,124 22,788 23,797 
Source: 2013-14 PBS and various DAR (Note: Programs were re-enumerated in the 2013-14 PBS) 
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Note that, in order to capture the overall cost of delivering programs, non-cash expenses 
due to the depreciation of equipment are included in the net cost in Table 2.6.1. Also funds 
appropriated for administered programs (which are not controlled by Defence) for 
home-loan assistance and military superannuation and retirement benefits have been 
omitted.  
While one might expect that Outcome 2 would include the net additional cost of operations 
undertaken by the ADF, the total figure is significantly below that given in Table 4, page 16 of 
the PBS. The difference relates to Enhanced Force Protection initiatives delivered through 
the DCP and Minor Programs aligned to Outcome 1.  
The outcome and programs for the DMO are listed in the PBS in Table 83 [p. 148], as 
reproduced in Table 2.6.2.  
Table 2.6.2: Total outcome and program expenses ($m) 
Outcome 1:  Contributing to the 
preparedness of the Australian Defence 
Organisation through acquisition and 
through-life support of military equipment 
and supplies 
Expense 
2008-09 
(actual) 
Expense 
2009-10 
(actual) 
Expense 
2010-11 
(actual) 
Expense 
2011-12 
(actual) 
Expense 
2012-13 
(expect) 
Expense 
2013-14 
(budget) 
Program 1.1  
Management of Capability Acquisition 
4,842 5,963 5,794 4,584 3,558 3,907 
Program 1.2  
Capability Sustainment 
4,772 4,624 4,754 5,389 5,095 5,640 
Program 1.3  
Policy Advice and Management Services 
75 92 86 109 111 113 
Total DMO Outcome 1 9,690 10,679 10,633 10,083 8,764 9,659 
Source: various DAR, 2013-14 PBS 
There is considerable overlap between the funds listed under the Defence 
outcomes/outputs and those for DMO. Around $5.0 billion worth of Defence’s program 
costs represent the purchase of sustainment services from DMO (Output 1.2). Put simply, 
around half of DMO’s programs are inputs to Defence’s programs. This is consistent with 
DMO being a separate financial entity. DMO’s other $3.9 billion program (Program 1.1) does 
not contribute to Defence’s outputs. Instead, it represents the purchase of new capital 
equipment that will be used to deliver Defence’s programs in the future.  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the new outcomes and programs are much more closely aligned 
with the actual organisation of Defence than were those employed from 1999-00 to 
2007-08. Nonetheless, there are significant linkages between certain elements. We have 
tried to capture the situation in Figure 2.6.1. The essential points are as follows. The 
programs under Outcome 2 and 3 do not align with any single organisational entity. Instead 
they capture the net additional cost of operations that is apportioned to those groups that 
actually support and deliver the operations including DMO. At the same time, the DMO 
sustainment budget is reflected in the costs attributed to the various output groups, 
principally Navy, Army and Air Force.  
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Program Statements 
For each of the programs, the PBS contains an entry detailing the key performance 
indicators and a cost summary. In many cases, the key performance indicators read like the 
entries in a corporate plan. For example, the Office of the Secretary and CDF has fifteen 
deliverables including;  
Enhance Defence's governance framework, through clearer authority and accountability and 
more rigorous performance management, risk management, assurance and audit processes. 
and three performance indicators, including;  
Group-specific outcomes and programs are delivered within allocated resources and meet 
directed efficiency, economy measures, and economy and cultural measures. 
Little would be gained by repeating the very large number of equally sensible (and largely 
anodyne) key performance indicators that appear in the PBS. The interested reader can 
pursue them at leisure. Of more interest are the concrete performance measures set out for 
the military capability outputs. 
Capability Performance  
There are three key performance measures for the capability related programs; 
preparedness, core skills and quantity. These same performance measures have been 
employed in Defence Annual Reports and PBS in one way or another since 1999. We explore 
these three measures below. In doing so, it’s important to remember that many capability 
programs have additional specific performance measures.  
Preparedness refers to the readiness and sustainability of the ADF to undertake operations, 
be it national support tasks, peacekeeping or war. The process by which preparedness 
targets are set is worth recounting.    
To begin with, the government’s White Paper sets out the broad strategic tasks that the ADF 
needs to be prepared to undertake—for example ‘contributing to the security of our 
immediate neighbourhood’. Using this as a basis, Defence develops what is called Australia’s 
Military Strategy which includes for each strategic task a series of Military Response Options 
which define the broad operational objectives without specifying how they are to be 
accomplished—for example ‘maintain sea lines of communication to the north of Australia’. 
These Military Response Options then form the basis of the annual Chief of the Defence 
Force’s Preparedness Directive.  
The final result is a series of specific targets for each output. They are classified. But, for 
example, the light infantry output might be required to ‘be prepared to deploy a battalion at 
90 days’ notice to assist in a regional peacekeeping operation and to maintain the 
deployment for 12 months’ (this example is purely illustrative). 
Core Skills: Preparedness targets are driven by Military Response Options with an 
anticipated warning time of less than 12 months. To take account of possible longer-term 
tasks and the requirement to retain broad expertise in the three Services, an enduring 
performance target for the capability programs is to ‘achieve a level of training that 
maintains core skills and professional standards across all warfare areas’. The assessment of 
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what is to be achieved, and whether it has been achieved, is ultimately based on the 
professional military judgement of the Service Chiefs.  
Quantity: All of the capability programs include one or more ‘quantity’ measures that try to 
capture some aspect of how much capability will be delivered.  Each of the three Services 
uses a different type of measure. 
Army: With the exception of Army Aviation, the quantity measure used by Army is the 
presence of adequate quantities of trained personnel and equipment within an Output. No 
quantified targets are released publicly.  
Navy: The basic measure of quantity used by Navy relates in some sense to the availability of 
ships and their crew to undertake a mission. Since 2005-06, the measure used has been the 
planned number of Unit Ready Days (URD), defined as follows: Unit Ready Days are the 
number of days that a force element is available for tasking, by the Maritime Commander, 
within planned readiness requirements. Unfortunately, over the past three years, Navy has 
aggregated its URD targets across fleets thereby obscuring the performance of troubled 
assets such as the submarines and amphibious vessels. 
Air Force: The quantity measure used by Air Force and Naval and Army Aviation is the 
number of flying hours undertaken by the Program. These measures have been applied 
consistently for over a decade and constitute a useful diagnostic tool given the established 
baseline. (It would be useful if Navy’s steaming-days and Army’s track-miles were disclosed 
as they were in the past). Short- and long-term trends in ADF flying hours can be found in 
Table 2.6.3 and Figure 2.6.2. 
Table 2.6.3:  Planned ADF flying hours 2012-13 and 2013-14 
Platform 2012-13 2013-14 Change Remarks 
F/A-18 fighter 13,000  13,000  0   
F/A-18 Super Hornet 4,800  4,800  0   
C-130 transport 7,350  7,350  0   
AP-3C Orion 7,900  7,900  0   
C-17 transport 4,800  5,200  8%  Fleet entering service 
Hawk Lead-in fighter 7,500  7,500  0    
AEW&C 2,800  3,600  29% Fleet entering service 
Chinook helicopter 2,000  1,850  -7%   
Black Hawk helicopter 7,500  6,200  -17% Transitioning out of service 
Kiowa helicopter 6,000  6,000  0    
Armed recon helicopter 7,147  3,360  -53%  Troubles continue with ARH 
MRH-90 helicopter 3,020  4,000  32%  Transitioning into of service 
Seahawk helicopter 4,200  3,600  -14%  Transitioning out of service  
Source: 2012-13 and 2013-14 PBS 
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Figure 2.6.2: Long-term trends in ADF flying hours
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Recent Performance 
Table 2.6.4 summarises the non-quantity key performance indicators from the 2011-12 
Annual Report. Defence uses a four-point performance scale of zero, one, two or three ticks 
(9). This replaces the earlier system of ‘not achieved’, partially achieved’, ‘substantially 
achieved’ and ‘fully achieved’. The ‘overall’ assessment in Table 2.6.4 is the percentage of 
ticks received out of those possible for all performance indicators and deliverables. The 
arrows indicate movement relative to previous year result. 
Table 2.6.4: Output Performance/Deliverables from the 2011-12 Defence Annual 
Report 
Output Advice Preparedness Core Skills Overall 
1.1 CDF Secretary 999    93% ј 
1.2 Navy 999 ј 99 99 74%   
1.3 Army 99 љ 999 99 73%   
1.4 Air Force 999 99 љ 99 83% ј 
1.5 Intelligence 999   93% љ 
COO 999   90% 
1.6 Defence Support 999   92% ј 
1.7 Science & Technology 999    92% ј 
1.8 Chief Information Officer    82% љ 
1.9 VCDF 999   90% љ 
1.10 Joint Operations Command    100% 
1.11 Capability Development 99   81% ј 
1.12 CFO 999   100% ј 
1.13 People 999   78% ј 
2.1 Operations - neighbourhood    100% 
2.2 Operations - wider interests    78% љ 
3.0 National Tasks    100% 
Source: 2011-12 DAR  
Table 2.6.5 shows the planned and actual key performance indicators for quantity (URD and 
flying hours) for the major platforms operated by the three services. The results have been 
rated on the four-level scheme as follows; above 95% =999, 95% to 75% =99, below 75% 
=9. Note that Navy drastically reduced the information it discloses in 2009-10.  
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Table 2.6.5: Capability quantity planned (PBS) and delivered (Annual Report) 2011-12 
Output Planned Reported Percentage Assessment 
Navy fleets     
Frigates (FFG) 
3,771 days  3,231days  86% 99 Frigates (FFH) 
Submarines 
Oil Tanker 
2,908 days  2,142 days 74% 99 
Replenishment Ship 
Amphibious Ships 
Heavy Landing Ship 
Landing Craft Heavy 
Coastal Mine Hunters 
 5,696 days 5,415 days 95% 999 Auxiliary Mine Sweepers 
Patrol Boats 
Clearance Diver Teams  
1,830 days  1,830 days 100% 999 Mobile Met Team 
Geospatial Team 
Hydrographic Ships 
3,054 days 3,095 days 100% 999 Survey Motor Launches 
Met Centre/Support 
Seahawks  4,200 hours 3,990 hours 95% 999 
Sea Kings 400 hours 398 hours 100% 999 
Army fleets     
Black Hawk 8,100 hours 7,187 hours 89% 99 
Chinook  1,570 hours 1,967 hours 125% 999 
Kiowa 9,360 hours 6,680 hours 71% 9 
Armed Recon 6,635 hours 2,449 hours 37% 9 
MH-90  3,000hours 1,571 hours 52% 9 
Air Force fleets     
F/A-18 Hornets 13,000 hours 11,395 hours 88% 99 
F/A-18 Super Hornet 4,800 hours 4,274 hours 89% 99 
Lead-in fighter 7,500 hours 6,683 hours 89% 9 
KC-30A (refuelling) 2,160 hours 641 hours  30% 9 
C-130 transports 10,550 hours 10,448 hours 99% 999 
AEW&C 2,600 hours  1,945 hours 75% 99 
C-17 Transports 4,500 hours 3,844hours 85% 99 
AP-3C Maritime Patrol 7,900 hours 8,128 hours 103% 999 
B737 BJ VIP Transport 1,600 hours 1,515hours 95% 999 
Source: 2011-12 PBS and Annual Report 
Figures 2.6.3 plots the delivery of Defence capability programs (previously outputs) as 
reported in the Defence annual reports between 2000-01 and 2010-11. Some care needs to 
be exercised in comparing the results from 2008-09 onwards with that from earlier years 
due to the substantial reduction in detail that arose in that year. The move from twenty-two 
Embargoed from publication/broadcast until release 30 May 2013, 2pm.
 66 
 
capability sub-programs to a mere three (one for each Service) inevitably results in a 
reporting regime constrained to a smaller number of possible outcomes for preparedness 
and core skills. Nonetheless, note the recent erosion in the maintenance of core skills.  
Figure 2.6.3: Output performance  
 
  
 Source: 2000-01 to 2010-11 DAR 
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paucity of information provided in the PBS on what is to be delivered at the sub-program 
level, only a limited picture is possible. Information has been drawn from a variety of 
sources, including the Defence website.  
Because the recently adopted program structure aligns closely with the actual organisational 
structure of Defence, we have taken the opportunity to sketch out the key elements in each 
of the programs. For those readers not familiar with the senior military and civilian levels, 
Table 2.6.6 details the correspondence of executive levels across the three services and 
civilian Senior Executive Service (SES).  
Table 2.6.6: Executive comparison: 
Civilian Navy Army Air Force 
Star 
Rank 
Assistant Secretary  
(SES-1) 
Commodore Brigadier Air Commodore * 
First Assistant Secretary  
(SES-2) 
Rear 
Admiral 
Major 
General 
Air Vice-Marshal ** 
Deputy Secretary  
(SES-3) 
Vice 
Admiral 
Lt General Air Marshall *** 
Secretary Admiral General Chief Air 
Marshal 
**** 
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Program 1.1 – Office of the Secretary and CDF 
Department outputs 2013-14: $164 million 
The Office of the Secretary and CDF was created as a result of the 2007 Defence 
Management Review. It combines the Deputy Secretary Strategy Group and the personal 
offices of the Secretary and CDF, the Audit and Fraud Control Division and a number of 
Military Justice agencies. 
Within the Defence portfolio there are a number of independent military justice statutory 
offices. The offices the Judge Advocate General, the Chief Judge Advocate, the Director of 
Military Prosecutions and the Registrar of Military Justice are created by the Defence Force 
Discipline Act 1982. Each of these statutory appointments reports directly to the Minister for 
Defence. The Inspector General of the ADF is a statutory appointment created by the 
Defence Act 1903 which reports directly to the CDF outside of the military chain of 
command.    
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Deputy Secretary Strategy manages two divisions. International Policy Division manages 
Defence’s day-to-day international relationships and provides policy advice in that area 
(including with regard to current operations). Responsibilities include the oversight of 
Defence’s overseas representatives in 31 countries around the world (mostly within 
Australian diplomatic missions). Strategic Policy Division provides advice on strategic plans 
and military strategy, while also managing Australia’s arms and export controls. The OSCDF 
Group Corporate Management Branch delivers advice and services to the whole of OSCDF 
Group to support Deputy Secretary Strategy’s role as the Administrative Head of OSCDF 
Group.  
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Program 1.2 – Navy Capabilities 
Department outputs 2013-14: $4,333 million 
The Navy’s organisational structure comprises Navy Strategic Command and the subordinate 
Fleet Command. To a good approximation, Strategic Command is responsible for capability 
plans, personnel, administration and technical regulation, while Fleet Command is 
responsible for the day-to-day operation of the fleet and ‘cradle to grave’ training for all RAN 
personnel.  
Structure and performance   
The structure and performance of the Navy is set out below and overleaf. Because of the 
reduction in disclosure, it has not been possible to provide as detailed information as in the 
past. 
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Major combatants 
Surface combatants 
Four 1980s Adelaide class (US Oliver Hazard Perry class) Guided missile frigates (FFG) plus 
eight newer German-designed and Australian-built Anzac class frigates (FFH). Both vessels 
carry Harpoon anti-shipping missiles, anti-submarine torpedoes and Evolved Sea Sparrow 
surface-to-air missiles. Only the FFG are equipped with the more capable Standard SM-2 
surface-to-air missile. In 2010-11, crew shortages reduced the availability of two Anzac ships. 
The Anzac class have a 5” gun useful for shore bombardment (as seen in the Gulf in 2003) 
while the FFG has a less capable 3” gun. Both classes of vessel can embark a Seahawk 
anti-submarine helicopter, although the recent availability and current capability of these 
aircraft is less than desired.  
Upgrades are underway on both fleets. The FFG is nearing completion of the long-delayed 
$1.4 billion FFG-upgrade project and the FFH are progressively being fitted with a range of 
new systems including an anti-ship missile defence (ASMD) suite. In addition, three new Air 
Warfare Destroyers are presently under construction.  
Submarines 
The RAN has six Collins Class submarines. Their primary roles are to attack enemy shipping 
and to counter the threat of adversary submarines. In addition, they can collect intelligence 
and insert and extract Special Forces. The Collins Class is equipped with Harpoon anti-ship 
missiles and the US Mk 48 heavyweight torpedo. 
The delay in the introduction of the Collins Class into service as the Oberon Class left service 
disrupted both submariner training and the retention of skilled personnel. This is now being 
corrected through a remediation program.  
A shortage of submariners has reduced the delivery of capability. Personnel shortages were 
so acute that submarines were tied up or put into maintenance early. Longer than expected 
maintenance periods coupled with mechanical problems further compromised the 
availability of boats. However, Navy has been successful in growing the numbers of trained 
submariners, and submarine platform availability is also improving.  
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Minor combatants  
Patrol boats 
All of Navy’s fleet of fifteen 1980s vintage Australian-built, UK-designed, Fremantle Class 
Patrol Boats (FCPB) have now been replaced by fourteen Armidale Class Patrol Boat (ACPB). 
These vessels are mainly tasked in support of the civil surveillance program through Border 
Protection Command. They can also be used for the insertion and extraction of army patrols 
on the coast, including Special Forces.  
Through an innovative program, the Navy multi-crews the Armidale Class vessels, thereby 
reducing the burden on sailors and their families while maintaining a high utilisation of the 
assets. At present there are 21 crews spread across 14 vessels. However, media reports in 
early 2012 said that fleet availability is expected to fall for the remainder of the year as a 
result of heavy maintenance and crew shortages. 
Mine warfare vessels 
6 Huon Class Coastal Mine Hunters (MHC) – 720 tonnes displacement, glass-reinforced 
plastic hulled, Italian-designed and built in Australia in the late 1990’s. The ships employ 
sonar to search for mines, which can then be destroyed using a remote controlled mine 
disposal vehicle or otherwise. There are also two auxiliary minesweepers, but according to 
the 2010-11 DAR, they were ‘placed on short-term reactive notice for sea from October 2010 
until procurement of a replacement capability is undertaken.’ There are also two Clearance 
Diving Teams, one on each coast at Sydney and Perth, capable of clearing mines and other 
ordinance, clandestine survey and obstacle clearance, and battle damage repairs. 
The health of the RAN minesweeping capability is under question. Training has been 
interrupted by the use of two of the Huon class vessels for border patrol duties, and in 
October 2011 two of the Huon class were placed into Reserve. It’s been estimated that it will 
take five years to get the full fleet operational again.  
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Amphibious and afloat support  
Amphibious lift  
Until 2012, the fleet included two Kanimbla Class Landing Platforms Amphibious (LPA), 
HMAS Manoora and HMAS Kanimbla, refurbished in the mid-to-late 1990’s from two 
second-hand 1970’s US Newport Class Landing Ship Tank vessels, and one Heavy Landing 
Ship (HLS), HMAS Tobruk, a 1980’s UK-designed and Australian-built vessel. Tobruk displaces 
5,800 tonnes and can operate any ADF helicopter from her deck and is capable of carrying 
315 soldiers, 18 tanks and 40 armoured personnel carriers. In February 2011 the amphibious 
fleet suffered a critical and unexpected failure of availability and HMAS Manoora and HMAS 
Kanimbla were subsequently decommissioned. Amphibious heavy lift capability will be 
maintained through the recently acquired second-hand vessel from the United Kingdom, 
HMAS Choules.  
Two new large amphibious (Landing Helicopter Dock) vessels are under construction and are 
due to enter service in the first half of the decade. These vessels will each displace around 
27,000 tonnes and carry 1,000 troops plus helicopters and vehicles. Navy also has three 
Landing Craft Heavy (LCH).   
Afloat support  
The afloat support force refuels and re-supplies Navy vessels and embarked helicopters at 
sea and provides logistics support to land operations. The fleet comprises two vessels: HMAS 
Sirius: a South Korean-built 46,017 tonne full displacement commercial vessel which was 
refitted to Navy specifications as an Auxiliary Tanker (AO) and HMAS Success: a 1980s 
French-designed, Australian-built 17,900 tonnes full displacement Auxiliary Replenishment 
Tanker (AOR). Amada Ship Cantabria commenced a year-long deployment with the RAN in 
2013. 
Although HMAS Sirius has been touted as an example of how commercial-off-the-shelf 
equipment can meet ADF requirements quickly and at reduced cost, the ship does not have 
the full range of capabilities and operational flexibility of a purpose build ship.  
 
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
Unit Ready Days: Amphibious and afloat support 
 
Target
Actual
Linear (Actual)
Declining at rate of  
137 days per year. 
Embargoed from publication/broadcast until release 30 May 2013, 2pm.
 74 
 
Naval aviation 
The RAN has sixteen 1980s US-designed Seahawk helicopters that can be embarked on the 
FFH and FFG class frigates. They are configured for anti-submarine and surface 
search/targeting. A project to deliver eleven Super-Seasprite helicopters for the Anzac 
frigates was cancelled in early 2008. New Seahawk MH-60R aircraft will replace both the 
Seahawk and the capability sought from the Super-Seasprite from 2014. Six MRH-90 aircraft 
began transitioning into service in late 2011 as a replacement for the now-retired UK-built 
Sea King helicopters. Thirteen Squirrel light helicopters are used for training and short-term 
operations at sea.  
Over the past decade, the performance of both the Sea King and Seahawk fleets was 
compromised by personnel shortages, maintenance issues and ongoing aircraft upgrades 
and modifications. Seahawk is now meeting its PBS targets but is being transitioned out in 
favour of a fleet of new MH-60R Seahawks beginning in 2014.   
 
Hydrographic, meteorological & oceanographic fleet 
The Navy produces maritime military geospatial information for the ADF and undertakes 
hydrographic surveying and charting for civil use. The hydrographic component is supported 
by the Australian Hydrographic Office in Wollongong, NSW, and also comprises the 
Hydrographic Office deployable survey unit. The fleet includes:  
2 Leeuwin Class Hydrographic Ships (AGHS): 2,250 tonne Australian-built hydrographic ships.  
4 Paluma Class Survey Motor Launches (SML): 320 tonne Australian-built survey launches.  
1 Laser Airborne Depth Sounder (LADS) aircraft: an airborne depth sounder capability used 
in shallow water. 
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Program 1.3 – Army Capabilities 
Department outputs 2013-14: $5,344 million   
In 2009, the Australian Army was restructured to ensure it is more effective and efficient in 
its conduct of force generation and force preparation—for current operations and potential 
operations of the future. The Army was structured around three functional commands. The 
three functional commands and their roles are as follows:  
Special Operations Command commanding Army’s Special Forces units.  
Forces Command is responsible for the force generation of Army individual and collective 
conventional capabilities based on Foundation Warfighting skills.  
1st Division focuses on the force preparation of conventional Army force elements for 
specified operations and contingencies. It also forms the basis of the Deployable Joint Force 
Headquarters, capable of providing Command and Control to Australian and coalition forces 
at short notice. 
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Headquarters 1st Division 
Headquarters 1st Division is based in Brisbane, and prepares and certifies Army conventional 
force elements, as assigned by Chief of Army, in order to meet the specific operational and 
contingency requirements directed by Chief Joint Operations.  
Special Operations Ccommand 
The Special Air Services Regiment (SASR) in Western Australia provides special recovery 
(including domestic and overseas counter terrorism by the west coast Tactical Assault Group 
(TAG)), long-range reconnaissance and offensive operations. The 2nd Commando Regiment 
(2 Cdo Regt) in Sydney (including east coast TAG) and the 1st Commando Regiment (a 
reserve unit split between Sydney and Melbourne) are the Army’s two commando 
regiments. Commando roles include special recovery and land, sea- and air-borne offensive 
raids. The 126 Signals Squadron in Sydney provides a Special Forces signals capability to 
2 Cdo Regt and 152 Signals Squadron in Perth provides a signals capability to the SASR. There 
is also an Incident Response Regiment based in Sydney that is capable of dealing with 
nuclear, chemical and biological incidents. In addition, there is a Special Forces Logistics 
Squadron in Sydney and a Special Forces Training Centre in Singleton. 
Forces Command 
1st Brigade  
The 1st Brigade is headquartered in Darwin and has units located in both Darwin and 
Adelaide. The 1st Armoured Regiment is equipped with reconditioned US-made M1A1 
Abrams tanks. The 2nd Cavalry Regiment is equipped with 1990s North American-designed 
but Australian modified ASLAV light armoured vehicles. The 5th and 7th Battalions Royal 
Australian Regiments are mechanised infantry battalions equipped with M113AS4 armoured 
personnel carriers and Australian-made Bushmaster infantry mobility vehicles. The 7th 
Battalion relocated to Adelaide in 2010. The 8th/12th Regiment (artillery) is equipped with 
US-made 155mm M198 Medium Howitzers. Additionally, the 1st Brigade includes extensive 
combat support and combat service support elements including 1st Combat Engineer 
Regiment, 1st Combat Service Support Battalion and the 1st Communications Support 
Regiment.  
3rd Brigade  
The 3rd Brigade headquartered in Townsville is based on three light infantry battalions: the 
1st Battalion Royal Australian Regiment, the 2nd Battalion Royal Australian Regiment and the 
3rd Battalion Royal Australian Regiment. The 3rd Battalion is a parachute battalion and is 
located in Sydney and plans to move to Townsville in late 2011. The 4th Regiment (artillery) 
is equipped with the 105mm L119 Hamel light gun. B Squadron 3rd/4th Cavalry Regiment is 
equipped with Bushmaster infantry mobility vehicles. The Brigade’s combat support and 
combat service support elements include the 3rd Combat Engineer Regiment, 3rd Combat 
Service Support Battalion and 3rd Communications Support Regiment. 
7th Brigade  
Motorised operations are based around the 7th Brigade headquartered in Brisbane. The 
brigade is an integrated-regular formation based in Brisbane. The brigade comprises of two 
motorised infantry battalions; 6th Battalion Royal Australian Regiment and 8/9th Battalion 
Royal Australian Regiment and both are equipped with Bushmaster infantry mobility 
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vehicles. The 2nd/14th Light Horse Regiment (Queensland Mounted Infantry) is a Cavalry 
unit and is equipped with 1990s North American-designed but Australian modified ASLAV 
light armoured vehicles. The 1st Regiment (artillery) is equipped with the 155mm M777 
howitzer. The Brigade’s combat support and combat service support elements include the 
7th Combat Engineer Regiment, 7th Combat Service Support Battalion and 7th 
Communications Support Regiment. 
6th Brigade  
Headquartered at Victoria Barracks in Sydney, the 6th Brigade commands a diverse 
collection of units including:  
x 1st Ground Liaison Group(Australia wide)  
x 1st Intelligence Battalion (Sydney)  
x 16th Air Defence Regiment (Woodside SA) equipped with the Swedish RBS 70 
shoulder launched, optically guided, surface-to-air missiles 
x 19th Chief Engineer Works (Sydney)  
x 20th Surveillance and Target Acquisition Regiment (Brisbane)  
x 7th Signals Regiment - Electronic Warfare (Carbalah, Queensland)  
x 6th Engineer Support Regiment (Brisbane) comprising: 
o 17th Construction Squadron (Sydney)  
o 21st Construction Squadron (Brisbane)  
o 1st Topographical Survey Squadron (Enoggera, Queensland).   
x 2/30th Training Group (Butterworth, Malaysia).  
The Brigade also includes three regional surveillance units predominately manned by reserve 
personnel. These are:  
x 51st Battalion Far North Queensland Regiment responsible for conducting 
reconnaissance and surveillance over 640,000 square km in Far North Queensland 
and the Gulf country. 
x Pilbara Regiment (Karratha, WA) with 1.3 million square km to cover from the 
Kimberley boundary in the north, to Shark Bay in the south, then east to the 
NT/SA/WA border. 
x North West Mobile Force (NORFORCE) which covers the Northern Territory and the 
Kimberly region of northern Western Australia, an area of operations covering 
nearly one quarter of Australia’s land mass—1.8 million square kilometres.   
17th Brigade  
The 17th Brigade, headquartered at Randwick Barracks in Sydney, is a brigade-sized 
grouping of reserve, integrated and permanent Army units which can sustain a brigade on 
operations for extended periods while concurrently maintaining a battalion group 
elsewhere. The Brigade provides supply, fuel, communications, transport (surface vehicle 
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and small watercraft), repair, and health and psychology capabilities. The Brigade is 
headquartered in Sydney and comprises of the following units: 
x 2nd Force Support Battalion (Glenorchy, Tasmania)  
x 9th Force Support Battalion (Amberley, Queensland) 
x 10th Force Support Battalion (Townsville)  
x 1st Health Support Battalion (Sydney) 
x 2nd Health Support Battalion (Brisbane) 
x 3rd Health Support Battalion (Adelaide)   
x 17th Signals Regiment (Sydney) 
x 1st Military Police Battalion (Sydney)  
x 1st Psychology Unit (Sydney). 
2nd Division  
The 2nd Division commands all those Reserve units not integrated into other formations.  It 
is structured around six infantry brigades, each of which has a HQ, two/three infantry 
battalions, a light cavalry unit in some cases, and combat and combat service support units. 
These brigades are: 
x 4th Brigade (Melbourne)  
x 5th Brigades (Sydney) 
x 8th Brigade (Sydney)  
x 9th Brigade (Adelaide and Hobart)  
x 11th Brigade (Townsville)  
x 13th Brigade (Perth). 
16th Brigade  
Army aviation is based around 16th Aviation Brigade that is headquartered in Brisbane. The 
Brigade commands the 1st, 5th and 6th Aviation Regiments, which have components in 
Oakey and Townsville in Queensland; Darwin in the Northern Territory; and Sydney in New 
South Wales. The force structure includes: 
x thirty-four 1970s-designed Black Hawk troop-lift helicopters  
x forty-one 1970s-designed Kiowa light observation & training helicopters 
x six 1960s-designed Chinook medium lift helicopters. All these helicopters are of US 
design 
x twenty-two of an eventual fleet of twenty-four European-designed Tiger Armed 
Reconnaissance Helicopters (ARH) are now flying 
x forty MRH-90 troop-lift helicopters. 
The now-retired Iroquois fleet and the Black Hawk aircraft are being replaced by forty MRH-
90 troop-lift helicopters (from 2011). 
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Defence Command Support Training Centre (DCSTC) 
The Defence Command Support Training Centre is headquartered at Simpson Barracks in 
Melbourne and it is a training formation within Army responsible for the conduct of 
Intelligence, Signals, Language, Police and Music training, training design and trade 
management for members of the Australian Defence Force. The training centre also provides 
training for selected members of the Australian Public Service and nominated students from 
Defence forces of other nations. DCSTC comprises the following Units: 
x Defence School of Languages (Laverton) 
x Defence Intelligence Training Centre (Canungra)  
x Defence Force School of Music (Melbourne) 
x Defence Force School of Signals (Melbourne)  
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x Defence Police Training Centre (Sydney).  
Royal Military College of Australia (RMC-A) 
The Royal Military College of Australia is headquartered in Canberra and is responsible for 
the delivery of individual foundation training for Officers and Soldiers, including the first 
Appointment Course, Recruit Training and Promotion courses. RMC-A consists of the 
following units: 
x Royal Military College – Duntroon (Canberra) 
x Army Recruit Training Centre (Wagga Wagga) 
x Land Warfare Centre (ACT, Nth QLD, NT, NSW, SA, Sth QLD). 
Army Logistic Training Centre (ALTC) 
The Army Logistic Training Centre (ALTC) is principally centred in Albury-Wodonga, however 
conducts training in Darwin, Townsville, Brisbane, Sydney and Puckapunyal through two 
training wings and four On-the-Job Training cells. ALTC delivers training in logistics, 
ordnance, road and maritime transport, medical, health and electrical and mechanical 
engineering. ALTC consists of the following schools: 
x Army School of Logistics Operations (Albury-Wodonga)  
x Army School of Ordnance (Albury-Wodonga) 
x Army School of Transport (Albury-Wodonga, Townsville and Puckapunyal) 
x Army School of Health (Albury-Wodonga) 
x Army School of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (Albury-Wodonga). 
Combined Arms Training Centre (CATC) 
The Combined Arms Training Centre is headquartered at Puckapunyal and is the Australian 
Army's centre of excellence for individual combined arms training. The force structure 
includes: 
x School of Armour (Puckapunyal) 
x School of Artillery (Puckapunyal) 
x School of Infantry (Singleton) 
x School of Military Engineering (Sydney). 
Army Aviation Training Centre (AAVNTC) 
The Army Aviation Training Centre is headquartered in Oakey and is responsible for the 
effective instruction of Pilot, Loadmaster and Groundcrewmen courses as well as the 
training of Aircraft Technicians for employment within Army Aviation. AAVNTC also 
contributes to the development of doctrine and materiel plans for Army Aviation. The 
training centre includes:  
x Army Helicopter School (Oakey) 
x RAEME Aircraft Maintenance School (Oakey) 
x School of Army Aviation (Oakey). 
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Program 1.4 – Air Force Capabilities 
Department outputs 2013-14: $4,165 million 
Of the three military services, the Air Force has the leanest and most streamlined 
organisational structure. The organisation is split into two parts. Corporate planning and 
administration occurs under the direction of the Deputy Chief of Air Force while Air 
Commander Australia takes care of six training, support and flying groups.   
At the present moment, Air Force is introducing or preparing to introduce several new fleets 
of aircraft into service. These include the six new Wedgetail Airborne Early Warning and 
Control Aircraft (AEW&C), five replacement Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR) aircraft and 
twenty-four F/A-18F Super Hornet. By the end of the decade, the Air Force hopes to be 
operating new F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter aircraft from the United States.  
The current Air Force inventory is detailed overleaf, including performance information 
where available.  
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Air Combat Group 
Air Combat Group comprises seventy-one F/A-18 A/B Hornet fighter aircraft and twenty-four 
F/A-18F Super Hornets with the remaining nine Super Hornets expected to be delivered by 
October 2011. In addition, thirty-three Hawk Lead-in Fighters (LIF) provide a training 
capability while four PC-9(F) forward air control aircraft are used to designate ground targets 
and train Joint Terminal Attack Controllers. Air Combat Group also supports and operates 
the leased Heron Remotely Piloted Aircraft which is deployed to Afghanistan.  
 
0
2,500
5,000
7,500
10,000
12,500
15,000 F/A-18 Fighter Flying Hours 
Target
Actual
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
Lead-in-Fighter Flying Hours 
Target
Actual
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17
Super Hornet Flying Hours 
Target
Actual
Embargoed from publication/broadcast until release 30 May 2013, 2pm.
 84 
 
Airlift Group 
The Air Force has twelve C-130J Hercules and twelve (four in preservation) C-130H Hercules 
transport aircraft which are capable of a wide range of strategic and tactical airborne roles. 
The recent acquisition of six Boeing C-17 Globemaster IIIs provides the capability to 
transport large and heavy loads over long ranges whilst retaining tactical capabilities. Two 
Boeing 737 BBJ and three CL604 Challenger aircraft provide VIP transport for the 
government. Sixteen B-300 King Air aircraft, replacing the venerable DHC-4 Caribou, provide 
a light air transport role as an interim capability prior to the introduction of the Battlefield 
Airlift (BFA) aircraft. Five KC-30A perform a duel tanker and transport role.     
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Surveillance and Response Group 
The Surveillance and Response Group comprises a diverse range of capabilities including:  
Eighteen 1970s vintage AP-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft which undertake maritime 
patrol, maritime surveillance, reconnaissance, offensive air support, surface & sub-surface 
strike, and search and survivor supply. All nineteen aircraft have been upgraded to AP-3C 
standard through an Australian-unique upgrade program.  
Ten Air Traffic Radars, including nine fixed radar and one mobile for the control of ADF air 
traffic. Four Tactical Air Defence Radars: ground based radar to detect hostile and own 
aircraft. The JORN Over-the-Horizon-Radar network, including radar sites in Laverton WA 
and Longreach Qld, and seventeen coastal beacons in the north of Australia and Christmas 
Island. The network is run from the Jindalee Operational Radar Network Correlation Centre 
in Edinburgh, SA, and can detect both sea and air-borne moving objects. The Jindalee facility 
Alice Springs serves a research and development function. JORN is operated by No. 1 Radar 
Surveillance Unit. 
Six Wedgetail AEW&C aircraft based on Boeing 737-700 platform whose entry into service 
was delayed by more than four years are now flying more regularly. 
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Aerospace Operational Support Group 
The Aerospace Operational Support Group provides a broad range of operational and 
technical support services to Defence in general and Air Force in particular. Key components 
of the Group include: 
Information Warfare Wing which provides electronic warfare, aeronautical information, 
intelligence and information operation products and services for Air Force air operations and 
the other Services. .  
Development and Test Wing which provides flight test, system engineering and aviation 
medicine products and services for extant and emerging ADF aviation capability.  
Woomera Test Range which provides an instrumented weapons test and evaluation range 
for Defence.  
 
Combat Support Group 
The Combat Support Group is the largest of the Air Forces force element groups. The role of 
Combat Support Group (CSG) is to provide combat support services to all Air Force 
operational formations and when applicable ADF and Coalition Aviation formations. CSG 
must be able to deploy a Main Operating Base and two Forward Operating Bases.  
  
The capability for combat support of air operations provides for deployable tactical air base 
support. It encompasses Bare Base activation including the provision of engineering 
infrastructure (facilities, water, power and sewerage systems), aircraft arrestor barriers and 
airfield services, navigation aid and tactical communications, air movement, airfield defence, 
health support including AME, combat logistics and personnel support capabilities. 
 
CSG provides deployed combat support, excluding aircraft technical maintenance, to ADF 
contingency air operations at main operating bases, forward operating bases and point of 
entry airfields in Areas of Operations (AO) either in Australia or overseas. It also provides 
command and cadre staff for RAAF fixed bases in northern Australia and management of the 
prepared Bare Bases at RAAF Learmonth (LMO), Curtin (CIN), and Scherger (SGR). The 
provision of secure airfields and combat support arrangements for the deployment of air 
assets will continue to be critical to the support of ADF operations. 
 
CSG comprises of a HQ, a Combat Support Coordination Centre, 395 and 396 Expeditionary 
Combat Support Wings and a Health Services Wing.   
 
Air Force Training Group 
The Air Force Training Group is made up of a headquarters and Air Training Wing, Ground 
Training Wing, RAAF College and Reserve Training Wing. The headquarters of the Air 
Training Group is located at RAAF Base Williams – Laverton, Victoria.  
 
Air Training Wing conducts basic and instructor air training for ADF personnel including 
pilots, air combat officers and air traffic controllers. Basic pilot training employs PC-9/A 
aircraft while aircraft and navigator training occurs on B350 aircraft. Air Training Wing also 
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includes the RAAF Roulettes, who provide fly pasts and displays, the RAAF Museum and the 
RAAF Balloon. The Air Training Wing is also responsible for air crew combat survival training.  
The RAAF College provides induction and professional military training for the Air Force. The 
RAAF College also maintains the RAAF Band.  
Ground Training Wing provides initial and ongoing training for non-aircrew personnel, 
including security, fire and ground defence, administration and logistics, technical trades, 
and explosive ordnance.  
Reserve Training Wing provides ground training to Air Force Reserve members at a number 
of locations around Australia.  
Program 1.5 – Intelligence Capabilities  
Department outputs 2013-14: $525 million  
Overview 
The Intelligence and Security (I&S) Group is comprised of the Defence Intelligence 
Organisation, Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation, Defence Signals Directorate and 
the Defence Security Authority. The I&S Group is responsible for the management and 
oversight of the collection and assessment of intelligence in support of Australia’s strategic 
and national interests, including support to ADF operations. The I&S Group also provides 
protective policy and security advice to Government, including security vetting functions for 
the whole-of-government. 
 
 
Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) collects and analyses foreign signals intelligence for the 
Australian Government and the ADF in support of military and strategic decision-making.  
DSD also provides information security advice and services, predominantly to 
Commonwealth and state government agencies, as well as working closely with industry to 
develop and deploy secure cryptographic products. The Cyber Security Operations Centre is 
also located within ASD headquarters in Canberra. 
Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation (DGO) includes HQ at Russell Offices in 
Canberra and the Geospatial Analysis Centre in Bendigo. DGO obtains and produces 
geospatial and imagery intelligence about the capabilities, intentions or activities of people 
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or organisations outside Australia. It supports ADF operations, targeting and training, as well 
as Commonwealth and State authorities in carrying out national security functions. DGO also 
sets technical standards for imagery and geospatial products, and provides Commonwealth 
and State authorities, and other bodies approved by the Minister, with non-intelligence 
products, technical assistance and support to carry out their emergency response functions.  
Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO) at Russell Offices in Canberra provides all-source 
intelligence assessments focusing on global security trends, foreign military capabilities, 
transnational terrorism, defence economics, and science and technologies with military 
applications. DIO produces timely assessments and advice on current and emerging threats 
to Australia’s security and strategic environment in support of Defence and whole-of-
government decision-making—including the planning and conduct of ADF operations. 
The Defence Security Authority (DSA) is responsible for the developing and promulgating 
security policy, providing security threat advice, conducting complex security investigations, 
monitoring Defence’s security performance and assisting the Secretary, Chief of Defence 
Force, Group Heads and Service Chiefs to manage security risks. The Australian Government 
Security Vetting Agency (AGSVA) is also located within DSA and is responsible for security 
vetting of personnel across government, except for a small number of exempt agencies, for 
access to classified information. DSA also manages the Defence Industry Security Program. 
Chief Operating Officer – Overview 
The Chief Operating Officer (COO) organisation was created as a result of the Black Review 
of the Defence Accountability Framework. The organisation came into effect on 17 February 
2012 and comprises Programs 1.6 Defence Support and Reform, 1.7 Chief Information 
Officer (CIO) and 1.8 People Strategies and Policy (PSP). The Strategic Reform Management 
Office (SRMO) and the Ministerial and Executive Coordination and Communication (MECC) 
Division have also transferred into COO from Program 1.1 Office of the Secretary and CDF, 
although they are still captured under Program 1.1 in the PBS. Defence Legal now reports 
directly to the COO rather than through Program 1.6 Defence Support and Reform.   
The SRMO is responsible for oversighting strategic reform in Defence.   
MECC is responsible for providing support to Ministers and senior Defence leaders in the 
areas of communication and media, strategic issues management, freedom of Information 
related matters and the full range of Ministerial support services.  
Defence Legal provides legal services and advice to Defence and Ministers in the Defence 
portfolio. 
The responsibilities for Defence Support and Reform, Chief Information Officer and People 
Strategies and Policy are outlined below. 
Better integration of these Group outputs will ensure that the development and delivery of 
corporate services best support Defence’s ability to affect the necessary reforms under the 
Strategic Reform Program. The COO will also be responsible for implementing key parts of 
the Shared Services Review and achieving cost efficiencies and cultural change that the 
Government is seeking. 
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Within the new COO structure, the Defence Support Group will continue to operate and 
perform its role as a key enabler of Defence’s mission and vision. The linkages within the 
COO organisation will develop the Defence Support Group as part of a single integrated 
support organisation, providing the backbone of Defence’s capability. This will emphasise 
accountability and responsibility while ensuring services are delivered to clients efficiently 
and cost-effectively. 
Work to integrate the programs of the new COO organisation is continuing.  
Program 1.6 – Defence Support and Reform  
Department outputs 2013-14: $3,748 million 
The Defence Support Group provides a range of administrative, garrison, personnel and 
estate services to Defence. The Group is divided into three divisions. Infrastructure Division 
plans, builds and upgrades the Defence estate. Defence Support Operations Division 
provides on-the-ground services and support to Defence personnel throughout Australia 
including facilities maintenance and garrison support, including grounds maintenance, 
hospitality, training area management, base security, transport, air support and fire-fighting 
and rescue services. The Reform and Corporate Services Division is responsible for managing 
a range of whole-of-Defence shared services including payroll, simple procurement, 
accounts processing and debt management along with business management, strategic 
planning and policy support services to the Group.  
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Program 1.7 – Chief Information Officer  
Department outputs 2013-14: $973 million  
The Chief Information Officer Group is responsible for providing Information and 
Communications Technology (ICT) to Defence. The bulk of the Group resides in four 
divisions.  
Chief Technology Officer Division develops and documents Defence’s ICT architecture, 
identifies relevant systems and defines ICT standards for Defence.   
Information and Communications Technology Development Division designs and develops 
Software Systems for the Defence information environment.  
Information and Communications Technology Operations Division delivers and supports the 
Defence Information and Communication infrastructure.  
Information and Communications Technology Reform Division delivers ICT reform and 
associated savings across the Defence Portfolio. 
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Program 1.8– Defence People  
Department outputs 2013-14: $453 million   
A new Defence People Group will be in operation in 2012-13 within the Chief Operating 
Officer Group structure to ensure the effective integration of People functions across the 
Defence organisation. The new structure is designed to better respond to key People 
priorities and service the needs of key stakeholders more effectively. The new Defence 
People Group will bring together the former People Strategies & Policy Group and elements 
of the Defence Support Group, including the Defence Community Organisation, People 
Services Division, Defence People Solutions and the Directorate of Honours & Awards. 
The Defence People Group's key role is the formulation of personnel policy for Defence's 
workforce. Key priorities for the Group will include the provision of a compelling 
employment offer to assist in attraction and retention, the implementation of Pathway to 
Change—Defence's response to the culture reviews conducted during 2011-12—through the 
establishment of an Organisational Development Unit, continuation of the human resources 
reforms identified as part of Defence's strategic reform and the development of tools to 
enable better decision-making through a better understanding of the Defence workforce 
and the implications of changes to key drivers of workforce cost.   
 
Note – this structure represents People Strategies and Policy Group prior to the re-structure 
to form the Defence People Group. 
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Program 1.9 – Defence Science & Technology  
Department outputs 2013-14: $427 million 
The Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) provides scientific and technical 
advice and support to Defence and National Security including support to operations, the 
force-in-being, the Defence Capability Plan and future proofing capabilities. From February 
2012, DSTO assumed a whole-of-government responsibility for coordinating scientific and 
technical support to national security. The organisation is led by the Chief Defence Scientist, 
who answers to the Secretary. The headquarters and one research division are located in 
Canberra. The bulk of the science and technology activity is carried out in Platform and 
Human Systems in Melbourne and Information and Weapons Systems in Adelaide, each 
under the leadership of a Deputy Chief Defence Scientist (DCDS). Under each of the DCDSs 
are a number of divisions each led by a Chief of Division. Below the level of Chief of Division, 
branch level entities in DSTO are led by Research Leaders.  
Scientific Advisers are out-posted from DSTO to the Navy, Army, Air Force, Capability 
Development Group, Defence Materiel Organisation, Vice Chief of the Defence Force, Joint 
Operations Command, Intelligence and Security Group and Chief Information Officer Group.  
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Program 1.10 – Vice Chief of the Defence Force  
Department outputs 2013-14: $1,251 million 
The Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF) is the military deputy to the CDF. In addition, the 
VCDF is the Joint Capability Authority as well as being responsible for the following:  
Military Strategic Commitments Division provides the strategic level advice and support in 
the planning and execution of ADF’s current operations and future commitments that 
enables the Government to continuously review its national strategic interests. These 
responsibilities encompass; the strategic coordination of current and future ADF 
commitments, development and synchronization of strategic communication, the 
development and review of the nature of service for ADF commitments, and the provision of 
an investigative service to support the CDF and Service Chiefs. 
Joint Logistics Command provides logistics support to raise, train and sustain the Australian 
Defence Force including, management of warehouses, maintenance, and distribution 
facilities. This does not include the extensive range of materiel maintenance provided by the 
DMO.   
Joint Health Command is responsible for the delivery of all garrison health care to the ADF 
and exercises technical control through the Surgeon General Australian Defence Force. 
Australian Defence College was established to develop the skills and knowledge of 
Defence’s future leaders with an emphasis on joint professional military education and the 
delivery of joint training programs. Learning if offered through several learning centres 
providing an education continuum from the Australian Defence Force Academy, to the 
Australian Command and Staff College and the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies. 
Through the Defence Learning Branch, the Australian Defence College also provides strategic 
direction and coordination for Defence’s joint, common and APS training and education.  
Joint Capability Coordination Division manages ADF preparedness and joint capability 
coordination. JCC was established to improve Defence's capacity to deliver joint force 
capability.   
Cadet, Reserve and Employer Support Division works to enhance the capacity of Reserves 
to support ADF capability and provides a governance and accountability framework for the 
ADF Cadet Scheme. 
Australian Civil-Military Centre is a whole-of-government initiative to improve Australia’s 
effectiveness in civil-military collaboration for conflict and disaster management overseas. 
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Program 1.11 – Joint Operations Command  
Department outputs 2013-14: $51 million 
Joint Operations Command (JOC) is responsible for the command of all ADF operations and 
joint exercises on behalf of the Chief of the Defence Force. Located in a purpose built 
command facility in Bungendore NSW, JOC is assigned forces for operations from the three 
Services. The total ADF command arrangement is outlined below. At present, there are 
approximately 3,300 ADF personnel deployed on operations and somewhere around 750 
personnel involved in planning, advising and commanding operations, of which around 750 
(including contractors) reside in JOC and SOCOMD.   
 
Headquarters Joint     
Operations Command 
Minister for Defence 
Chief Joint Operations 
*** 
Support  Intelligence  Operations Plans Communication Training 
HQ Special Operations  
**
Air & Space Operations 
*
HQ Northern Command 
*
Border Protection 
Command 
**
East Timor 
Afghanistan 
Assigned Forces 
Public Affairs, Coordination, 
Legal, Business and 
Information Management  
Iraq 
Solomon 
Islands 
Commander 
Middle East 
Task Force HQ 
**
Deputy 
Commander 
* 
Chief Defence Force 
*** 
Vice Chief Defence Force 
*** 
Military Strategic Commitments Branch 
*
Military Strategic 
Commitments Division 
**
Maritime/Submarine 
Operations  
*
Deputy Chief of Operations  
**
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Program 1.12 – Capability Development  
Department outputs 2013-14: $883 million  
The Capability Development Group develops and manages the Defence Capability Plan (DCP) 
and prepares Defence capability investment approval proposals for Government 
consideration. Two divisions, Capability Systems and Capability Investment and Resources, 
constitute the core of the Group 
Capability Systems Division is largely staffed by military personnel and manages the 
development of future capability options for Government consideration. It is divided into 
four branches; three environmentally-based (land, sea and air), and one dealing with 
integrated capabilities that cross environmental lines. Another element is the Rapid 
Prototyping and Development Organisation, which works with industry and academe to 
develop capability solutions for the ADF.  
Capability Investment and Resources Division is largely staffed by civilian personnel and 
provides independently analyses and reviews capability issues, including the overall balance 
of investment in current and future capability, major investment proposals and priorities. It 
is divided into two core branches; Investment Analysis and Cost Analysis.  
Three other elements within the Group are; the Capability and Plans Branch which ensures 
that Defence capabilities match the Government’s strategic objective, the Australian Test 
and Evaluation Office that provides T&E advice and guidance throughout the capability life 
cycle, and the embedded DSTO support cell. In 2010, the Head Future Submarine Program 
was also established as a separate entity in the Group. 
 
Chief of Capability 
Development 
***
Capability 
Systems  
Division 
** 
Capability, 
Investment and 
Resources 
Division  
**
Capability and 
Plans Branch 
*
Investment 
Analysis  
*
Cost Analysis 
*
Maritime 
Development  
*
Land 
Development  
* 
Aerospace 
Development  
* 
Integrated 
Capability 
Development  
*
DSTO  
Support 
Defence Test 
and Evaluation 
Office 
Rapid Prototyping and 
Development  
*
Land 400 
*
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Program 1.13 – Chief Finance Officer  
Department outputs 2013-14: $560 million   
The Chief Finance Officer Group is responsible for Defence’s financial planning, budgeting 
and reporting.  
 
 
 
  
Chief Finance 
Officer 
***
Financial Services  
Division 
**
Resource & Assurance 
Division  
**
Resource Assurance and 
Analysis Branch  
*
Financial Coordination 
Branch 
*
Financial Professionalization, 
Controls and Skilling Branch  
* 
Financial Business Information 
Branch  
*
Financial Services Branch  
*
Budget Management, 
Financial Reporting and 
Accounting Policy Branch 
*
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Program 2.1 – Ops in the immediate neighbourhood   
Department outputs 2013-14: $17 million 
x Op Gateway: Indian Ocean and South China Sea maritime patrols (since 1981) 
x Op Solania: Conduct South West Pacific maritime surveillance patrols (since 1988) 
x Op Anode: Support coalition police forces in Solomon Islands (since 2003)  
x Op Astute: support Government of Timor-Leste and the UN Mission (since 2006) 
Program 2.2 – Ops supporting wider interests   
Department outputs 2013-14: $885 million 
x Op Paladin: Contribute to the UN Truce Supervisory Mission in the Middle East (since 
1956) 
x Op Mazurka: Contribute to Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai (since 1982) 
x Op Slipper: Contribute to ISAF in Afghanistan (since 2001) 
x Op Palate II: Liaison Officer to UN Mission in Afghanistan (since 2005) 
x Op Aslan: Contribute to the United Nations mission to the South Sudan (since 2011) 
x Op Riverbank: Contribute to UN Mission in Iraq (since 2008) 
Program 3.1 – National support tasks  
Department outputs 2012-13: $17 million 
 
x Op Resolute: Contribute to whole-of-government maritime enforcement effort (since 
2006) 
Defence’s contribution to national support tasks ranges from the ongoing routine allocation 
of Patrol Boat and AP-3C Maritime Patrol Aircraft time, to the allocation of specific 
capabilities at short notice in a national support emergency. National support tasks include 
security, ceremonial, civil maritime surveillance, search and rescue, bush fire response and 
support to the Army / ATSIC community assistance program.  
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2.7: Budgeted Financial Statements  
[PBS Section 3: pp. 91 – 113] 
The budgeted financial statements for Defence appear in Section 3 of the PBS. Once again 
consolidated financial statements for Defence and DMO have been included. 
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2.8: Defence Materiel Organisation PBS  
[Defence Materiel Organisation PBS: pp. 134 – 204] 
On 1 July 2005 DMO became a prescribed agency under the Financial Management and 
Accountability Act 1997. Since then it has had its own independent part in the Defence 
portfolio PBS.  
Overview  
DMO acquires and supports equipment for Defence on a quasi-commercial basis. It is an 
independent entity from a financial perspective, but administratively is something of an 
agency within an agency (hence the PBS within a PBS).  
Organisational structure 
DMO contains sixteen divisions (or similar), each headed by a band-2 SES civilian or 2-star 
military officer, as shown in Figure 2.8.1. Four deputy-secretary level General Manager 
oversee the clusters of divisions. The divisions fall into three categories: 
Systems divisions are set up on the traditional environmental domains of land, sea, and air, 
plus divisions dealing with helicopters and electronics. They manage and deliver the vast 
bulk of the 180 major equipment acquisition projects (and more than 70 minor acquisition 
projects) that DMO is responsible for, and take care of the materiel support of existing 
capabilities—some 110 major fleet groupings—across all domains.  
Programs divisions acquire high profile capabilities of strategic significance. That is, if a 
project is big, important (and politically sensitive) enough it gets its own dedicated division. 
At the moment there are three such programs: Air Warfare Destroyer, Collins, New Air 
Combat Capability (Joint Strike Fighter) and Future Submarine project. There is also an 
Australian Shipbuilding Industry Planning division. 
Three ‘Commercial’ divisions provide enabling services and take care of specific areas. These 
are; Enabling Services, Special Counsel (legal) and Commercial and Industry Programs. There 
is also a DMO Reform division. One final division reports directly to the CEO; that of the 
Chief Finance Officer DMO. 
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Figure 2.8.1 DMO organisational structure 
 
 
Source: 2013-14 PBS  
A prescribed agency 
The September 2003 report from the Defence Procurement Review (known usually as the 
Kinnaird Review) recommended a number of changes to Defence and DMO. Key among 
them was to establish DMO as a separate executive agency. After consideration, the 
government decided to take the lesser step of making DMO a ‘prescribed agency’, which 
delivers a high degree of financial autonomy but does not provide the level of accountability 
or transparency intended by the Kinnaird or subsequent Mortimer reviews.   
 
As a prescribed agency, the CEO of DMO is accountable directly to the Minister for Defence 
for financial matters, hence the need for separate financial statements and budgets. On 
other matters, DMO still remains close to Defence from an administrative perspective; the 
Deputy CEO & 
General Manager 
Commercial 
*** 
General Manager  
Joint Systems and 
Air 
***
Aerospace 
Systems 
**
Helicopter Systems &  
Explosive Ordnance  
**
General Land 
and Maritime  
*** 
New Generation 
Submarines 
**
New Air 
Combat (JSF) 
**
Australian Shipbuilding 
** 
* *
*
*
Air Warfare Destroyer 
** 
* * * **
Maritime Systems 
** 
* * * 
  
* * **
Commercial and Industry Division 
** 
* * 
Special Counsel 
** 
General Manager 
Submarines 
*** 
Commercial Enabling Services  
** 
* 
* 
* 
*
Business operations 
** 
* *
Land Systems 
** 
* * * **
Collins Program Manager 
** 
Acquisition and Sustainment 
Reform 
**
* 
* * * 
Electronic 
Systems 
**
CFO 
** 
CEO 
****
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CEO being accountable to the Chief of the Defence Force through the Defence Act 1903 and 
to the Secretary through the Public Service Act 1999.  
Resources for 2013-14  
DMO will incur expenses of $9.7 billion in 2013-14. Sources of funding to cover these 
expenses include: 
Departmental Appropriation from government to pay for policy advice and management 
services. In 2013-14, this will be $908 million. 
Revenues from Defence in payment for acquisition and sustainment services from Defence. 
In 2013-14 this totals $8,708 million.  
Accumulation in special account: -$3million of unspent funds will accumulate in the DMO 
special account. 
Non-appropriation receipts including things such as payments from foreign forces for 
materiel services provided. In 2013-14 this will amount to $61 million, and this would be 
called own-source revenues in Defence. 
DMO presents its resourcing differently to Defence. Table 79 on page 140 of the PBS 
contains the essential information of the sources of funds used by DMO. Table 2.8.1 
summarises the situation taking account of movements in the DMO special account. The 
difference between funding and expenses comes from comparing cash funding with accrual 
expenses. 
Table 2.8.1: DMO funding 2013-14  
Funding available to be spent ($ ‘000s)    
Receipts from Department of Defence 8,708,445 Table 79, p. 140 
Departmental Appropriation 907,791 Table 79, p. 140 
Accumulation in special account  -3,067 Table 93, p. 191 
Non-appropriation receipts 60,569 Table 79, p. 140 
Total 9,673,738  
Total Price of DMO Outcome 9,658,982 Figure 5, p. 144 
Difference 14,756  
Expenses not requiring funding 40,297 Table 83, p. 148 
Funding surplus 55,053  
Source: 2013-14 PBS 
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DMO Special Account 
Unspent funds have both accumulated and have been paid out in subsequent years in the 
DMO Special Account. Table 2.8.2 calculates the net money deposited and withdrawn from 
the account since 2005-06. Note that on two occasions the closing balance for one year does 
not equal the opening balance for the subsequent year. Where possible, explanations are 
provided for the difference in the accompanying notes.  
With total cash flow anywhere in the order of $10 billion from year to year, an element of 
working capital would be expected to be seen in closing balances. Indeed a quick estimate of 
rule of thumb working capital in the order of 30 days cash flow could potentially see 
balances in the order of $830 million. Of course this level of working capital is not required 
as Defence prepay DMO up front at the start of each financial year for work to be delivered 
in that financial year. 
Any underspends in DMO activity for Defence may result in accumulated funding within the 
Special Account, along with the accumulation of prior year surpluses for workforce or 
Industry initiatives. An element of the Special Account balance will also represent cash 
required to meet invoices received by 30 June but not yet paid until the following financial 
year. Given that the DMO spends, on average around $40 million on any given working day, 
the scale of Special Account is unsurprising. 
The balance of the DMO Special Account remains with the overall Commonwealth Official 
Public Account. 
Table 2.8.2: DMO Special Account movements ($ ’000s)  
 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-101 2010-112 2011-123 2012-13 2013-14 
Opening 
balance 
0 190,785 564,819 987,862 320,135 288,091 436,932 326,647 320,000 
Closing Balance 190,785 564,819 987,862 269,296 501,559 436,932 326,647 320,000 323,067 
Represented 
by: 
         
Cash in OPA 167,205 542,852 955,743 223,484 409,120 507,424 301,925 270,000 273,067 
Cash held by 
DMO 
23,580 21,967 32,119 45,812 92,439 -70,492 24,722 50,000 50,000 
Total Closing 
Balance 
190,785 564,819 987,862 269,296 501,559 436,932 326,647 320,000 323,067 
Movement 190,785 374,034 423,043 -718,566 181,424 148,841 -110,285 -6,647 3,067 
Source: Financial Years 2005-06 to 2009-10 Annual Report, 2010-11 onwards PBS 
Notes: 
1. In 2009-10 DMO recognised overseas bank accounts as part of cash and cash equivalents. This increased the 
opening balance by $50.839m 
2. In the 2011-12 DMO Financial Statements, the 2010-11 Special Account balances have been restated. This is 
due to the following adjustments: 
a. an adjustment to remove GST that is recoverable from/payable to the ATO; and 
b. a reclassification of payment clearing accounts from Suppliers Payable to Cash and payments made to 
suppliers, which reduced the closing balance of the Special Account Cash by $213m. 
3.  Closing balance reduction in 2011-12 primarily relates to a non-current receivable from the Department of 
Defence $105m to be paid in later years.  
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Purchaser-provider arrangements 
Central to the resourcing framework for DMO are purchaser-provider arrangements with 
Defence for acquisition and sustainment services. In 2013-14, DMO will receive an estimated 
$3,632 million through Materiel Acquisition Agreements with Defence, and another 
estimated $5,111 million through Materiel Sustainment Agreements. In addition, there are 
several Shared Services Agreements (for which no payment is made) that cover such services 
as payroll, accommodation, and banking services provided by Defence, and contracting 
policy and advice provided by the DMO. A breakdown of the payments to DMO used to 
appear in the PBS (see page 142 of the 2012-13 PBS) but has been left out this year. It 
included the amount of money to be spent on various categories of acquisitions and 
sustainment support.  
In 2013-14, DMO will make use of 1,389 permanent and an unknown number of Reserve 
military personnel whose salaries and other personnel expenses are counted in Defence’s 
financial statements. DMO pays Defence for the services provided by these personnel, as a 
suppliers expense (rather like payments made to companies for contractor staff). In 2013-14 
DMO will pay $318 million to Defence for military personnel and other costs covered by the 
Defence-DMO Service Level Agreement.  
Outcomes and programs  
As a prescribed agency DMO has its own outcome/program structure as detailed in 
Figure 2.8.2.  
The first two programs are predominantly funded through the Materiel Acquisition and 
Sustainment Agreements with Defence, while the third is mainly funded through the 
Departmental Appropriation. Note that DMO refers to the ‘price’ of outputs rather than ‘net 
cost’ as in Defence. 
Figure 2.8.2 DMO Output prices 2012-13 
  Outcome 1:  
Contributing to the preparedness of 
the Australian Defence Organisation 
through acquisition and through-life 
support of military equipment and 
supplies.  
 
Appropriation:                     $908m 
 
Total Price:                   $9,659m 
  
      
        
Program 1.1: Management of 
Capability Acquisition 
 
Appropriation:            $275m 
 
Price:                     $3,907 m 
 Program 1.2: Capability 
Sustainment 
 
Appropriation:                      $529m 
 
Price:                                  $5,640m 
 Program 1.3: Policy Advice 
and Management Service 
 
Appropriation:               $104m 
 
Price:                          $113m 
 
Source: 2013-14 PBS 
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Outcome and planned performance  
The PBS sets the strategy for achieving its outcome on page 145 of the PBS, including actions 
to be taken within each of its three programs. The objectives and indicators for the three 
programs are summarised in Table 2.8.3. 
Management of Capability Acquisition – Program 1.1 
Each of the major acquisition projects undertaken by DMO has a Materiel Acquisition 
Agreement with Defence that specifies scope, schedule and budget. The PBS summarises the 
top 30 acquisition projects by expenditure in 2013-14 (see top 30 projects below). 
Agreements also exist to cover the minor acquisition projects DMO manages.  
Capability Sustainment – Program 1.2 
The PBS details the goals and challenges for 2013-14 in the area of capability sustainment. 
Such detail, which was first provided in the 2005-06 PBS, gives a useful insight into the range 
of activities undertaken. In general, capability sustainment includes repair and maintenance, 
engineering, supply, configuration management and disposal, as well as the provision of 
spares, technical data, support and test equipment, training equipment and explosive 
ordnance. The top 30 sustainment products by weapons system appear in the PBS, see 
below. 
Policy Advice and Management Service – Program 1.3 
This includes contracting and procurement policy advice for Defence and the DMO, industry 
policy and advice to Defence and the government, and corporate reporting requirements. 
Key performance targets for this output are given on page 189 to 190 of the PBS and relate 
primarily to advice to government and effective corporate governance and reporting.   
Table 2.8.3: DMO program objectives performance indicators 
Program 
 
Objective 
 
Performance Indicators  
Program 1.1 
Management of Capability 
Acquisition 
 
Acquisition projects will be 
delivered in accordance with the 
original approval authority 
parameters and in a transparent 
and accountable manner. 
The indicators vary with each 
project and are specified in the 
Materiel Acquisition Agreements. 
The DMO reports to its customers 
against these. 
  
Program 1.2 
Capability Sustainment 
 
Defence capabilities will be 
sustained to meet operational 
requirements as identified in the 
specific Materiel Sustainment 
Agreement.  
 
Indicators are included in individual 
Materiel Sustainment Agreements. 
The DMO reports to its customers 
against these.  
  
Program 1.3 
Policy Advice and Management 
Services 
The DMO will meet Government, 
Ministerial and departmental 
expectations and timeframes for 
the provision of policy, advice and 
support and delivery of industry 
programs. 
The DMO meets Ministerial, 
government, Defence and DMO 
expectations and timeframes for 
provision of policy, advice and 
support.  
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The ‘Top Thirty’ sustainment products 
The top 30 sustainment activities for DMO by forecast expenditure from Table 91 in the PBS 
are listed in Table 2.8.4, 2.8.5, 2.8.6 and 2.8.7 along with derived figures based on planned 
rates of effort. These include per-platform and per-flying-hour costs.  
Table 2.8.4: Top 30 sustainment products – aerospace and helicopters 
 
Number Cost ($m) Hours flown 
Annual cost per platform 
($ million) 
Cost per flying hour  
($ ‘000) 
Super Hornet 24 123 4,800 5.13 25.63 
AP-3C Orion   18 110 7,900 6.11 13.92 
F/A-18 Hornet   71 158 13,000 2.23 12.15 
Hawk LIF 127 33 78 7,500 2.36 10.40 
C-130J   12 95 7,350 7.92 12.93 
C-17 6 58 5,200 9.67 11.15 
MRH-90   27 121 4,000 4.48 30.25 
Seahawk   16 65 4,200 4.06 15.48 
Black Hawk   34 86 6,200 2.53 13.87 
ARH Tiger 22 104 3,360 4.73 30.95 
AEW&C 6 163 3,600 27.17 45.28 
SP Aircraft* 5 47 1,600 - - 
KC-30A AAR 5 59 3,100 11.8 19.03 
Source 2012-13 PBS *mixed fleet of BBJ and CL604 
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Table 2.8.5: Recent budgeted sustainment costs per unit – aerospace and helicopters 
 Cost per aircraft ($ million) 
 07-08 08-09 09-10 10-11 11-12 12-13 13-14 
Super Hornet -  -  0.67 2.58 4.58 4.63 5.13 
AP-3C Orion   6.37 6.90 6.16 6.32 5.84 5.53 6.11 
F/A-18 Hornet   1.68 1.61 1.70 1.75 2.63 2.15 2.23 
Hawk LIF 127 2.88 2.70 2.64 2.70 2.70 2.21 2.36 
C-130J   5.42 9.42 9.25 6.17 6.50 6.75 7.92 
C-130 H   -  6.25 0.00 4.50 4.75 - - 
C-17   13.75 9.75 10.75 -  14.25 - - 
MRH-90   -  47.50 4.27 5.20 6.93 2.09 2.63 
Seahawk   4.94 -  4.94 4.56 3.94 3.88 4.06 
Black Hawk   1.97 2.15 3.03 2.91 2.82 2.53 2.53 
ARM Tiger - -  3.77 3.91 4.36 4.36 4.73 
AEW&C - - - 23.5 28.5 26.83 27.17 
 Cost per flying hour ($ ‘000) 
 07-08 08-09 09-10 10-11 11-12 12-13 13-14 
Super Hornet     39.3 29.5 22.9 23.13 25.63 
AP-3C Orion   16.1 16.4 15.2 15.2 14.1 13.29 13.92 
F/A-18 Hornet   10.5 10.2 10.1 9.5 14.4 11.77 12.15 
Hawk LIF 127 15.2 13.6 13.5 11.1 11.9 9.73 10.40 
C-130J   14.1 15.7 16.2 10.1 10.6 11.02 12.93 
C-130 H     22.2  16.9 17.8   
C-17   26.2 11.6 12.7   12.7   
MRH-90     780.1 146.8 52.0 34.7 31.79 30.25 
Seahawk   31.1   23.2 20.3 15.0 14.76 15.48 
Black Hawk   10.6 10.2 12.7 11.5 11.9 11.47 13.87 
ARM Tiger   46.2 20.7 14.5 13.43 30.95 
AEW&C    70.5 65.8 57.50 45.28 
Source: PBS 
The above figures need to be treated with caution. Various fleets enjoy different amounts of 
contracted support (the cost of which is included) and manpower support from Defence’s 
own workforce (which is not included). More generally, there are usually other costs (like 
fuel) that are not included separately for each platform. Also, one-off costs can heavily 
influence the results, including when platforms are first being brought into service. It will be 
some years before useful trends emerge.  
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Table 2.8.6: Top 30 sustainment products – maritime 
 Number 
2007-08 
($m) 
2008-09 
($m) 
2009-10 
($m) 
2010-11 
($m) 
2011-12  
($m) 
2012-13 
($m) 
2013-14 
($m) 
Collins- subs 6 322 324 325 416 479 501 574 
Anzac frigate 8 219 301 206 151 189 215 224 
FFG frigate 4 103 115 113 111 127 125 89 
Mine Hunter Coastal 6 61 61 -   60 81 
Armidale PB 14       40 
Auxiliary Oiler 1      73  
Source: DAR, 2012-13 PAES, 2013-14 PBS  
 
Table 2.8.7: Top 30 sustainment products – miscellaneous 
 
2007-08 
($m) 
2008-09 
($m) 
2009-10 
($m) 
2010-11 
($m) 
2011-12 
($m) 
2012-13 
($m) 
2013-14 
($m) 
ADF Clothing and Equipment 117 89 84 70  46 70 
ADO Commercial Fleet 73 75 59  54  67 
B Vehicles 117 127 115 83 84 80 67 
Explosive ordnance 357 360 324 251 291 296 370 
Wide Area Surveillance 77 79 76 88 87 80 99 
Battlespace Communications  32 51     38 
Fuels and Lubricants 422 419 318 378 419 390 507 
Protected Mobility Fleet    22    
Command and Intelligence       45 
Air Traffic Control       42 
Health Systems       40 
Naval Communications       40 
Source: DAR, 2012-13 PAES, 2013-14 PBS  
 
It is interesting to note the downward trend in some categories of sustainment expenditure, 
including B vehicles and, encouragingly, several RAAF aircraft fleets.   
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People  
The DMO workforce is a mixture of military personnel, civilians and contractors. 
Unfortunately, military numbers were not disclosed in this year’s PBS. The available 
information is collected in Table 2.8.8. 
The civilian and military personnel in DMO are held under slightly different arrangements. 
Civilians in DMO are Defence employees and the CEO of DMO has delegations from the 
Secretary of the Department that he exercises in this regard. The expenses associated with 
DMO’s civilian workforce appear in their financial statements as employee expenses. 
In contrast, the military personnel in DMO are provided through a purchaser-provider 
arrangement with Defence. This does not cover the full per-capita cost of the military 
personnel, but rather represents a payment for their services roughly corresponding to their 
costs exclusive of allowances and overheads specific to their military role (and this is broadly 
commensurate with what would be needed to secure similar skills in the labour market). 
Thus, if the military fail to deliver sufficient personnel (due, for example, to operational 
demands or shortages) DMO has the money to hire people from outside. Note that the 
budgeted and estimated personnel figures for DMO represent a maximum ceiling and that 
DMO will only engage the staff necessary to perform acquisition and sustainment tasks that 
arise in future years.  
Table 2.8.8: Workforce summary for DMO (average funded strength) 
 04–05 
actual 
05–06 
actual 
06–07 
actual 
07–08 
actual 
08–09 
actual 
09–10 
actual 
10-11 
actual 
11-12 
est.  
12-13 
  
13-14   14-15   15-16 16-17 
RAN 306 277 281 277 296 303 303 303 311 301 360 364 368 
Army 461 411 389 386 404 412 418 389 384 383 487 492 497 
RAAF 770 762 763 794 808 802 803 718 709 705 932 944 957 
subtotal 1,537  1,450 1,433 1,457 1,508 1,794 1,525 1,410  1,404 1,389 1,779 1,800 1,822 
Civilian 4,363 4,502 4,951 5,304 5,552 5,526 5,510 5,993 5,750 5,670 5,529 5,548 5,583 
Reserve 125 191 249 311 ? ? 82       
PSP 388 393 298 181 176 120 24 31 27 48 48 46 46 
Total* 6,288 6,345 6,682 6,942 7,236 7,735 7,141 7,434 7,181 7,107 7,356 7,394 7,451 
Source: DAR, 2012-13 PAES and 2013-14 PBS. *Total excludes reservist. 
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The ‘Top Thirty’ projects 
The PBS lists the top 30 major capital investment projects by 2013–14 expenditure [PBS 
Table 85 page 152] and provides a description of each. We reproduce the top 30 projects in 
Table 2.8.9 below. See Chapter 9 of this Brief for further information on twenty of the more 
interesting projects. The PBS also includes a listing of previously approved top 30 projects 
that is useful [Table 87, p. 174]. The estimated slippage in the gross program is 18%— higher 
than last year. Note that the reliance on a relatively small number of large projects makes 
the outcome sensitive to how each of these large projects performs.  
Table 2.8.9: Top 30 Defence Major Capital Investment Projects (million $)  
Project Project Number 
Approved 
Project 
Expenditure 
Spend to 
30 June 
2013 
2013-14 
Budget 
Estimate 
Aerospace Systems     
Battlefield Airlift - Caribou Replacement 
AIR 8000  
Phase 2 
1,168 276 162 
Growler Airborne Electronic Attack Capability 
AIR 5349  
Phase 3 
2,721 37 90 
Airborne Early Warning and Control Aircraft 
AIR 5077  
Phase 3 
3,841 3,462 87 
Air to Air Refuelling Capability 
AIR 5402 
 
1,800 1,583 61 
Electronic Systems     
Battlespace Communications System (Land) 
JP 2072  
Phase 2A 
439 158 152 
Next Generation Satellite Communications 
System 
JP 2008  
Phase 4 
863 557 38 
Battle Management System 
LAND 75  
Phase 3.4 
307 183 30 
Military Satellite Capability - Wideband Terrestrial 
Terminals 
JP 2008  
Phase 3H 
42 8 29 
Anzac Electronic Support System Improvements 
SEA 1448 
Phase 4A 
260 6 25 
Joint Command Support Environment 
JP 2030 
 Phase 8 
256 148 24 
Helicopter Systems     
Future Naval Aviation Combat System Helicopter  
AIR 9000  
Phase 8 
3,625 2,203 204 
Multi Role Helicopter  
AIR 9000  
Phase 2 
2,933 459 412 
Air Warfare Destroyer Build 
SEA 4000 
Phase 3 
7,859 4,458 625 
Explosive Ordnance     
Standard Missile-2 Conversion and Upgrade 
SEA 4000 
Phase 3.2 
94 20 37 
Lightweight Torpedo Replacement 
JP 2070 
 Phase 2 
334 276 26 
Mulwala Redevelopment Project 
JP 2086  
Phase 1 
369 331 24 
Bridging Air Combat Capability 
AIR 5349  
Phase 32 
274 137 24 
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Land Systems     
Field Vehicles and Trailers - Overlander Program  
LAND 121 
Phase 3A/5A 
984 384 235 
Bushmaster Protected Mobility Vehicles  
LAND 116 
Phase 3 
1,254 859 62 
Additional Lightweight Towed Howitzers  
LAND 17  
Phase 1C.1 
69 6 47 
Overlander - Medium Heavy Capability, Field 
Vehicles, Modules and Trailers  
LAND 121 
Phase 3B 
2,564 8 45 
Digital Terminal Control System  
LAND 17  
Phase 1B 
115 41 41 
Artillery Replacement 155MM Howitzer LAND 17 
LAND 17  
Phase 1A 
323 136 28 
Maritime Systems     
Amphibious Deployment and Sustainment 
JP 2048  
Phase 4A/B 
3,071 2,394 203 
Anzac Ship Anti-Ship Missile Defence 
SEA 1448 
Phase 2B 
676 407 73 
Amphibious Watercraft Replacement 
JP 2048 
Phase 3 
224 50 37 
SM-1 Missile Replacement 
SEA 1390 
Phase 4B 
400 335 24 
Anzac Ship Anti-Ship Missile Defence 
SEA 1448 
Phase 2A 
386 288 23 
Future Submarine - Acquisition 
SEA 1000 
Phase 1A 
214 35 58 
TOTAL TOP 30 APPROVED PROJECTS  40,024 19,483 3,158 
Other Approved Project Estimate      403 
Total Program      3,561 
Management Margin  (18% slippage)    -640 
Net from existing projects    2,921 
Projects Planned for Government Approval    557 
Total Funds Available    3,478 
Source: 2013-14 PBS  
  
Embargoed from publication/broadcast until release 30 May 2013, 2pm.
 112 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Embargoed from publication/broadcast until release 30 May 2013, 2pm.
  113 
Chapter 3 – White Papers and Money 
This chapter deals with defence funding and the delivery of the 2013 Defence White Paper. 
It is divided into four parts: (1) a brief survey of Australian defence funding from the 
mid-1980s through to 2009; (2) an analysis of defence funding from 2009 until 2013; (3) an 
examination of funding in the 2013 Defence White Paper; (4) a survey of the risks and 
challenges facing the delivery of the 2013 White Paper; and (5) a look at the performance of 
Defence and DMO in delivering new equipment. 
For ease of reference, we shall refer to the 2000, 2009 and 2013 Defence White Papers as 
Defence 2000, Defence 2009 and Defence 2013 respectively. Readers interested in a more 
detailed historical survey should consult the obituary for Defence 2000 in Chapter 3 of the 
2009-10 ASPI Budget Brief. 
Defence funding from the 1980s to 2009 
The late 1980s and 1990s were lean years for Defence. Apart from fluctuations due to 
foreign exchange movements and operational supplementation, defence spending was kept 
more-or-less constant in real terms across the period. In fact, the Defence budget was higher 
in 1985-86 ($14.5 billion) than it was eleven years later in 1996-97 ($13.7 billion) as 
measured in real 2008-09 dollars.  
Because the cost of maintaining military capability exceeds inflation by 2–3%, the Defence 
budget came under growing pressure as the years went by. To try to close the gap between 
means and ends, successive governments pursued ‘efficiency’ programs of one sort or 
another through the 1990s (see Chapter 4 of the 2009-10 ASPI Budget Brief for further 
details).  
Nonetheless, by the end of the decade Defence was in a sad state: the permanent force had 
shrunk by more than 20,000 positions compared with the mid-1980s; a ‘train wreck’ of block 
obsolescence was looming with no money in sight for modernisation; the preparedness of 
the force was poor with many ‘fitted-for-but-not-with’ platforms and others badly in need of 
upgrade; and logistics was hollow and underfunded. It was against this background that the 
then government decided to develop a White Paper in 1999 with the aim of putting Defence 
planning and funding on a sustainable footing.  
The tumultuous events in East Timor in 1999 delayed the White Paper until the end of 2000. 
But it was perhaps a delay worth having. East Timor was the largest Australian operation 
since Vietnam and it stretched parts of the defence force severely. In the process, serious 
shortcomings were exposed in equipment, logistics and preparedness. It is unlikely that the 
government would have been as generous in 2000 without the experience of the East Timor 
operation.  
The 2000 White Paper  
The only Defence White Paper produced by the Howard government, Defence 2000, sought 
to achieve a coherent package of strategy, capability and funding for Australia’s defence for 
the decade 2001-02 to 2010-11. On the capability side, a Defence Capability Plan (DCP) was 
published that detailed 165 separate phases of eighty-eight capability proposals, valued at 
around $50 billion, planned for the forthcoming decade.  
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The entire package, including new and pre-existing capability, was funded through a 
decade-long funding envelope that roughly equated to 3% average annual real growth. 
Although earlier White Papers had suggested near-term funding levels, never before had a 
decade-long funding commitment been made—let alone one with a talisman-like goal of ‘3% 
real growth’.  
Defence 2000 provided more than $30 billion spread across four categories, including: 
$21 billion for the purchase of major capital equipment; $3.2 billion to cover the through-life 
support costs of new capabilities planned to enter service as a result of the DCP; $5 billion to 
cover an expected annual 2% growth (above inflation) in personnel costs and $1 billion to 
augment the operating cost baseline in the Defence budget. In addition, Defence was 
allowed to retain within its annual funding base around $450 million of unspent operational 
supplementation from East Timor.  
The 3% funding commitment was extended out to 2017-18 in the 2006 and 2008 budgets. 
Before turning to look at these and other funding measures from the last decade, it’s worth 
pausing to look back at Defence 2000 and ask how far Defence has got in delivering the goals 
set for it. 
At the risk of oversimplification, Defence 2000 sought to achieve four things: (1) modernise 
the ADF by replacing or upgrading ageing assets and introducing new capabilities in select 
areas; (2) improve the preparedness of the ADF so that it was made up of ‘fully developed 
capability’ rather than hollow units and fitted-for-but-not-with platforms; (3) boost the 
capability of the ADF to undertake expeditionary operations in the immediate region; and (4) 
sustainably align Defence plans and funding.  
Of the four goals, the modernisation of the ADF was the least successful. Persistent and 
widespread delays in the approval and execution of defence acquisitions delayed the 
delivery of many capabilities, with delays of 4-5 years not uncommon. In part, this reflected 
a systematic underestimation of costs which ensured that there was never going to be 
enough money to deliver all that was planned. Further delays arose due to insufficient 
industry capacity, tardy approval of new acquisitions and all too frequent technical problems 
with equipment under development. In fact, the combination of delayed approvals and 
delayed projects saw Defence unable to spend all the money it had been given to buy new 
equipment. Over the period covered by Defence 2000, we estimate that at least $4.4 billion 
of planned investment was deferred. The actual figures are probably higher but we cannot 
be sure because the full extent of the deferrals was not disclosed in the 2009-10 Budget.  
One area where Defence can claim success is in improving the preparedness of the defence 
force. While problems remain in some areas such as the submarine and amphibious forces, 
the trend over the past decade has been favourable. The ADF is now more ready and able to 
mount and sustain deployments—as evidenced by its current high operational tempo. 
Moreover, the capacity of the ADF to conduct expeditionary operations in our immediate 
region is better now than at any time since the Vietnam conflict.  Or at least it will be once 
the Navy’s amphibious lift capacity is fixed. The unexpected collapse of the amphibious fleet 
in 2011 showed that the management and internal reporting of preparedness remained 
poor at least until that point. Of course, we don’t know what we don’t know; there may be 
problems lurking in areas that have not been tested of late.  
Embargoed from publication/broadcast until release 30 May 2013, 2pm.
  115 
As for putting Defence finances on a sustainable footing, it was not long before Defence was 
struggling to deliver the outcomes sought by Defence 2000 within the funding provided. In 
2003 an internal Defence Capability Review recommended cuts to the force structure to 
contain costs, including the decommissioning of two FFG frigates, the early retirement of the 
F-111 fleet and the laying up of two mine-hunting vessels. But these cuts failed to bring the 
books into balance and from 2005 onwards additional funds (amounting ultimately to 
around a $1 billion a year) were made available to Defence to manage the baseline cost of 
personnel, estate and logistics. At the same time, savings measures of $200 million a year 
were imposed on Defence to redirect money towards combat capability.  
Boom times: 2002-2008 
Bridging the gap between the means and ends of Defence 2000 was only the start of the 
government’s generosity to Defence. From around 2006, the previous government provided 
additional money for a range of new capability initiatives, including four C-17 transport 
aircraft ($3.2 billion), twenty-four F/A-18F Super Hornet strike fighters ($6 billion), and the 
Enhanced Land Force initiative which included adding two infantry battalions to the Army at 
a cost of $10 billion over a decade. This additional funding came on top of that provided for 
new and expanded capabilities in the aftermath of 9/11 and the deployments that followed.   
Because official budget figures are invariably given in ‘out-turn’ format that anticipates 
future inflation and foreign exchange rates, it is difficult to give a definitive figure for the 
value of additional funds provided post-2000. The best we can do is to capture the scale of 
funding using the historical values that appeared in the budget papers at the time, 
converted to 2010-11 dollars. The result appears in Figure 3.1.  
Figure 3.1: Additional funding 2000 to 2008 
 Source: ASPI analysis of budget papers and DAR, CPI inflation used 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Bi
lli
on
 ap
pr
ox
im
at
e 
20
10
-1
1$
 
2000 White Paper funding 
(including reprogramming) 
Additional baseline funding 
Post-9/11 initiatives 
3% growth (2008) 
3% growth (2006) Operational 
supplementation 
Extra capability:  
C-17 transport aircraft 
F-18 Super hornets 
Ehanced Land Force 
Embargoed from publication/broadcast until release 30 May 2013, 2pm.
  116 
Despite all the money flowing into Defence, it remained unclear whether adequate funds 
were available pre-Defence 2009 to deliver the capabilities sought at that time. On one 
hand, it looked like not enough money had been set aside to crew and operate the raft of 
new capabilities under development—hence the $10 billion savings program announced in 
early 2008. On the other hand, Defence was unable to spend the money it had for both 
investment and recurrent spending. So much so, that they were directed to absorb 
$1.1 billion of measures in 2008-09 following an abnormally large windfall from price 
supplementation (and the embarrassing hand back of $830 million of unspent funds from 
2007-08). This was the confusing state of Defence funding prior to the release of Defence 
2009.  
The 2009 Defence White Paper and beyond 
On 3 May 2009, the Prime Minister released the long-awaited 2009 Defence White Paper. 
Entitled Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030 the 138-page document 
included one and half pages—585 words to be precise—on how the government planned to 
fund Defence over the next 21 years. The plan had two parts.  
First, a funding model with the following elements: 
x 3 per cent real growth in the Defence budget to 2017-18 
x 2.2 per cent real growth in the Defence budget from 2018-19 to 2030 
x 2.5 per cent fixed indexation to the Defence budget from 2009-10 to 2030 
x that Defence will reinvest savings from its [$20 billion decade-long] Strategic Reform 
Program back into priority Defence capabilities as agreed by the Government 
x shortfalls against the White Paper funding plan will be offset by Defence.  
Second, ‘Defence [will] undertake a substantial program of reform, efficiencies and savings 
to underpin the achievement of White Paper objectives... [and] correct long-term 
hollowness and remediate the enabling functions of the Australian Defence Force’. This is, of 
course, the aforementioned $20 billion Strategic Reform Program. 
Further detail was provided eight days later in the 2009-10 Budget. And, while the wording 
of the funding commitment in Defence 2009 was retained, the government stopped short of 
handing over the money. Instead, a substantial wedge of promised funding was deferred 
into the future. As best we can work out (the 2009-10 budget was less clear than it could 
have been) the net result was:  
x the new funding model added in excess of $10.5 billion over the decade, including 
$5.3 billion in the first four years  
x $8.8 billion was deferred within the decade, including $6.8 billion in indexation from 
the first six years along with another $2 billion from the first four years 
x the eighth, ninth and tenth years of the decade received some deferred funds, with 
the remainder pushed into the next decade.  
The shift in funding from indexation occurred by the 2.5 per cent being calculated from 
2009-10 but only applied from 2013-14. 
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Figure 3.2 depicts the deferral of funding that occurred in the 2009-10 Budget. In addition to 
this deferral and the imposition of the decade-long $20 billion savings program, Defence was 
also directed to ‘absorb’ additional new budget measures amounting to $585 million over 
four years and $1.7 billion over the decade in the 2009-10 Budget.  
 Figure 3.2: Defence funding as inferred from the 2009-10 PBS 
 Source: ASPI analysis of budget papers  
The initial deferral of funds in 2009 was only the start of the steady erosion of the money 
available to Defence to deliver Force 2030. Table 3.1 collects together the key measures. 
Each of the categories has a different impact on the availability of funds.  
The $10.6 billion of deferrals do not represent lost money, but rather money that was 
shifted (reprogrammed) to mostly unknown points in time in the second half of this decade 
or beyond.  
The $10 billion dollars of savings represent cuts to defence funding for which there is no 
suggestion of the money every being returned at some point in the future. Around 
$4.5 billion of the savings are supposedly the result of efficiencies, the remainder are 
outright cuts. Defence has no one to blame but itself for most of the former having handed 
back money in 2010-11 and advised the government of additional savings available from 
shared services reform (an area which subsequently had to be supplemented with additional 
funds in the 2012-13 budget). 
Absorbed costs are an additional impost put on Defence to deliver something extra without 
additional funding. The figure we’ve used is actually only a subset of the measures which 
have technically been absorbed. Specifically, we’ve excluded the acquisition of two C-17 
aircraft ($531 million), two Chinook helicopters ($40 million), the Offshore Support Vessel 
($123 million), acquisition of the Largs Bay from the United Kingdom ($277 million) and 
long-lead items for the Growler modification of part of the Super Hornet fighter fleet 
($20 million). These items represent the normal evolution of the government’s capability 
priorities for the ADF for which offsets will eventually arise. The three items that have been 
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included are rather different; they represent additional tasks that somehow have to be 
delivered without any obvious offset (e.g. 700 extra Navy personnel added in 2009). As such, 
they represent the imposition of an unfunded budget pressure. Note that only around half of 
the absorbed cost of force protection measures in Afghanistan (which under long-standing 
convention would have been funded through supplementation) has been included because 
it removed the need for some projects previously planned for later in the decade. Finally, the 
hand backs of unspent funds represent lost opportunities.    
Table 3.1: Key budget actions impacting the Defence budget 2009-2012 
Year Initiative Cost 
Deferrals   
2009 Budget Deferral of funding to beyond 2015-16 $8,810 million 
2010 Budget Deferral of investment funding to beyond 2015-16 $521 million 
2011 Budget Deferral of investment funding to beyond 2014-15 $1,281 million 
 Total $10,612 million 
Savings   
2011 Budget Increased efficiencies and savings (over 10 years) $3,837 million 
2011 mid-year Efficiency dividend (over 10 years) $670 million 
2012 Budget Expenditure reduction measures (over 10 years) $5,455 million 
 Total $9,962 million 
Absorbed costs   
2009 Budget Costs absorbed 2009-10 to 2018-19  $1,680 million 
2010 Budget Cost of force protection ($912 m) – Cost of existing projects ($402 m)*  $510 million 
2012 Budget Cost of Moorebank-Holsworthy relocation $332 million 
 Total $2,522 million 
Hand backs   
2009-10** $131 million unspecified   $131 million 
2010-11 $1.1 billion in capital investment $1,100 million 
2010-11 $400 million in recurrent expenses $400 million 
 Total $1,631 million 
Source: DAR and PBS. *Senate question on notice #140, September 2010. **SLC Hansard 30 May 2011. 
At this point an aside is necessary regarding the hand-back of $1.5 billion in 2010-11. As it 
turned out, DMO managed to progress an additional $845 million worth of investment in 
May and June of 2011 beyond what it thought it could, which at the time was expected to be 
a $1.1 billion hand back. Conversely, they underspent on sustainment by $125 million in 
addition to the hand back by Defence of $400 million. The net result was that in accrual 
terms, the capital underspend for 2010-11 was only $255 million while the recurrent 
underspend was $525 million. In cash terms, this led to a $699 million payment (taking other 
factors into account) to DMO from Defence’s investment funds in 2011-12, thereby reducing 
the amount of money available for investment that year. Two questions remain unanswered 
to this day: Why did such large changes occur at the end of 2010-11? How necessary were 
the capital deferrals made in May 2011? 
The summary then, over the life of the 2009 Defence White paper (May 2009 to April 2013) 
Defence handed back $1.6 billion, of which $780 million it was unable to spend. $10.6 billion 
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of planned investment was deferred and $10 billion of promised funding was returned to 
Treasury, including from areas that were supposed to be delivering efficiencies but which 
subsequently encountered cost pressures. Cost pressures that were exacerbated by the 
need to absorb $2.5 billion worth of unfunded measures.  
Setting aside the hand backs, Defence’s budget bottom was impacted by two categories of 
government decision; deferrals and savings cuts. The aggregate effect of these measures is 
plotted in Figure 3.3 atop the underlying cash balance for the Commonwealth as estimated 
at the time of the 2012-13 budget. Note that if Defence spending had been held at the levels 
promised in the 2009 Defence White Paper, in May 2012 the Commonwealth would have 
been projected to remain in deficit for two additional years until 2014-15. 
Figure 3.3: Reduced Defence funding and the underlying cash balance 
 
Source: DAR, PBS and the 2012-13 Budget Overview. 
The clear correlation between reduced defence expenditure and the return to surplus is not 
a surprise. Back in 2007-08, the ASPI Budget Brief (Section 7 p. 135) included a precautionary 
risk analysis of factors that could impede the progress of the 2000 White Paper, including 
the risk posed by a recession. The conclusion at that time, based upon the experience of the 
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recessions in the early 1980s and 1990s, was that the threat to defence funding occurred not 
at the outset of an economic downturn, but around the time when the government was 
striving to return to surplus. Events of the past three years have confirmed that analysis.  
When discussing the prospects for a surplus last year we added the following precautionary 
note:   
The government’s projected surpluses over the next two years are heroically thin. As a share 
of projected government revenues, they represent a mere 0.4%. Past experience shows that 
the outcomes for revenues and expenditure often vary substantially from estimated values. 
On average (excluding the dramatic GFC years) the observed volatility is around 2.5% of 
revenues, or around $9 billion in absolute terms. Thus, all other things being equal there, is 
roughly a 50% chance that the budget will slip into deficit during the year.  
As it happens, the fiscal balance in 2012-13 fell into deficit by $19.5 billion due a collapse in 
revenues off the back of deterioration in the terms of trade.  
The situation prior to the 2013 Defence White Paper 
The 2012-13 budget contained $5.5 billion of expenditure reductions and $2.9 billion of 
redirected funding. The impact of the two is captured in Table 3.2 in term of capital, 
personnel and operating (i.e. everything else) costs. In the absence of precise figures, it’s 
assumed that the $2.9 billion was taken entirely from capital investment (the PBS says that 
the operating budget also makes a contribution in 2012-13).  
Table 3.2: The net impact of cuts and readjustments in the budget 
 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 Total 
Operating costs 43 158 169 149 519 
Capital costs -948 -1,770 -1,379 -1,896 -5,993 
Personnel costs -65 -21 68 37 20 
Total -970 -1,633 -1,142 -1,710 -5,454 
Source: ASPI analysis of 2012-13 PBS Tables 5 and 6. 
Given that money is fungible, it’s fair to say that Capital investment was cut by $6 billion, 
operating costs were increased by around $500 million, not much happened to personnel, 
and a lot of money was shifted around within the three categories. Consistent with this, the 
underlying trends in baseline aggregate operating and personnel costs did not change much.  
Figure 3.4 is our best attempt to isolate the underlying real trends in the three categories of 
spending by subtracting supplementation for operational deployments. To do so, we have 
assumed that (1) all of the supplementation for force protection in Afghanistan is capital 
investment, (2) deployed personnel each add an extra $45,000 a year to personnel costs, 
and (3) 15% of the remaining supplementation represents capital investment. These 
assumptions are the best we can do absent disclosure of what makes up the operational 
supplementation received by Defence. As expected, the capital investment budget was hit 
hardest by last year’s cuts and redirections of funding. 
 
Neither Defence 2009 nor any of the subsequent Budgets disclosed the actual level of 
planned defence funding beyond the forward estimates period. Fortunately, in February 
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2010 the government’s Intergenerational Report provided a graph of long-term defence 
funding as a share of GDP from which it is possible to calculate defence spending. Taking into 
account decisions from the 2010, 2011, 2012 budgets, and the 2012-13 portfolio additional 
estimates, it’s possible to estimate the long-term funding situation prior to Defence 2013. 
Given the difficulties in mapping one data source to another, the result is indicative rather 
than precise.  
Figure 3.4: Underlying trends in defence costs pre–Defence 2013 
Source: ASPI analysis of 2012-13 PBS and earlier Annual Reports. 
Figure 3.5: Indicative Defence funding 2000 to 2029 
Source: 2010 Intergenerational Report, Annual reports and various PBS and PAES (2012 = 2012-13 etc.) 
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The 2013 Defence White Paper 
On 3 May 2013, the Prime Minister and Defence Minister released the 2013 Defence White 
Paper—four years to the day after its predecessor and one year earlier than planned. 
Entitled simply Defence White Paper 2013, the 132-page document includes one and half 
pages—675 words to be precise—on how the government plans to fund Defence. Although 
it devotes 90 more words to the topic than its predecessor, it actually manages to tell us 
less. Key points include: 
x The government ‘remains committed to maintaining an ADF workforce of 
approximately 59,000 permanent members’ though elsewhere it says that 
‘adjustments to the balance of investment in the capability, personnel and operating 
components of the Defence budget may be needed over time’. 
 
x The ‘Defence funding model will be based on the four-year Forward Estimates 
Budget cycle, determined on an annual basis taking into account contemporary 
strategic economic and fiscal circumstances’. 
 
x In addition to the annually updated four-year Forward Estimates funding model 
there will also be a ‘subsequent six-year general guidance for Defence planning 
purposes’. In practice, this means that a single aggregate funding figure will be 
provided for the six years subsequent to the four-year Forward Estimates. The PBS 
gives that figure as $220 billion.  
 
x The ‘Government is committed to increasing Defence funding towards a target of 2 
per cent of GDP. This is a long-term objective that will be implemented in an 
economically responsible manner as and when fiscal circumstances allow’. 
As the White Paper notes, the new four plus six-year funding model is consistent with the 
format of the four-year public Defence Capability Plan and six-year Defence Capability Guide 
introduced last year.  
How much more or less money has been provided? 
Comparing the common three years appearing in both the 2012-13 PAES and the 2013-14 
PBS, there has been roughly $3 billion extra provided. To see what’s happened to the 
subsequent years we need to go back and compare with the long-term funding estimate 
displayed in Figure 3.5. To do so, we need to first estimate the funding envelope implied by 
the 2013-14 Budget.  
We know the first four years exactly, and we know that the subsequent six years amount to 
$220 billion. If we make the minimalist assumption that the budget grows at a constant 
annual rate from the last year of the Forward Estimates across the next six years, it’s a 
simple matter to find the rate of growth consistent with a $220 billion total. Rather neatly, it 
turns out to be just on 5% in nominal terms, or 2.5% in real terms after accounting for 
inflation. Figure 3.6 shows the resulting new ten-year funding envelope along with our best 
estimate of the funding notionally available prior to the 2013 Defence White Paper.  
Consistent with what the PBS says about money being ‘reprofiled’, around $3 billion has 
been brought forward from the fourth year of the Forward Estimates and the years beyond 
while $10.7 billion of funding has been removed to parts unknown.  
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Figure 3.6: Indicative Defence funding before and after Defence 2013 
Source: 2010 Intergenerational Report, Annual reports and various PBS and PAES (2012 = 2012-13 etc.) 
Of course, the difference represented in Figure 3.6 underestimates the deficit relative to the 
promises made in 2009 because it ignores the roughly $10 billion in funding taken away (as 
opposed to deferred) in 2011 and 2012. Moreover, it does not capture any funds deferred to 
beyond 2022 or the erosion of buying power due to absorbed costs. Adding the missing 
funds in Figure 3.6 to the known $10 billion taken away in 2011 and 2012, yields a lower 
bound of around $20 billion for the deficit relative to 2009 promises. 
In Figure 3.7, post-Defence 2013 funding is explicitly compared with the Defence 2009 
promise of 3% real growth to 2017-18 and 2.2% subsequently. To avoid overestimating the 
difference between current and past plans, 3% real growth has been projected relative to 
the underling defence spending in 2008-09 exclusive of operational costs. That’s 
notwithstanding that Defence absorbed just over a billion dollars of operational costs in that 
year, which would make it reasonable to use the full figure. A much larger difference would 
have resulted from using the figure inclusive of the cost of operations or even more so by 
commencing the projection from 2009-10 when spending was significantly higher.  
Even with these conservative steps taken, the difference in funding between the promises of 
2009 and those of 2013 come out to be $32.9 billion as measured in real 2013-14 dollars for 
the period 2009-10 to 2022-23, or $35.9 billion in the out-turned dollars used routinely in 
government budgeting and announcements.  
When looking at the change in funding, it is important to remember that the capability goals 
of the 2009 Defence White Paper have largely survived though into the 2013 document. 
Where items have been cancelled or deferred—as with the Offshore Combatant Vessel—
there are usually additional new initiatives that offset the potential savings. In the case of 
the maritime sector, the decision to bring forward the replacement of the RAN’s patrol boats 
and support vessels (and potentially also the Future Frigate) is a case in point.  
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The situation is similar in the air domain. Although the decision to acquire 12 F-18 Super 
Hornet Growler configured aircraft will likely be offset by a smaller purchase of F-35 Joint 
Strike Fighters, the fact that we’ll now be operating both fleets out until the 2030 means 
that the RAAF will have to find money and personnel to cover the fixed impost of operating 
two advanced combat aircraft at the same time. Similarly, the recent decision to focus 
attention of the two most expensive and risky options for the replacement submarine can 
only drive costs higher in the long run.  
Figure 3.7: Defence 2013 funding compared with the promises of Defence 2009 
 
Source: Annual reports and various PBS and PAES (2012 = 2012-13 etc.) 
Given that the capability goals of 2009 have remained more-or-less as they were, but 
funding has been reduced by an average of $3 million over the period from 2009 to 2022, 
there is a clear mismatch between means and ends. We return to this issue later in the 
Chapter.  
Defence 2013 says that the government ‘is committed to increasing Defence funding 
towards a target of 2 per cent of GDP.’ We turn now to explore the extent to which this 
commitment is reflected in the funding provided over the next decade. Assuming the GDP 
figures for the next four years provided in the 2013-14 Budget Papers and projecting forward 
with the sort of medium-term GDP growth forecast in Treasury’s 2010 Intergenerational 
Report (IGR), it is a simple matter to calculate the future defence GDP share.  
GDP growth is estimated to be 2.75%, 3%, 3% and 3% over the next four years. According to 
the 2010 IGR, this will moderate to 2.7% by 2019-20 and 2.6% by 2029-30. Smoothly 
interpolating between the two sets of figures allows real GDP to be calculated for each year. 
Note that if we had simply rolled forward with 3% real growth over the decade, the 
projected GDP share would have been smaller still. The results are contained in Figure 3.8.  
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Unsurprisingly, with defence spending growing at 2.5% and the economy growing 
somewhere between 2.7% and 3%, the defence share of GDP will decline slowly over the 
decade ahead. Fortunately, there is no reason to believe that spending 2% of GDP is either 
adequate or otherwise meritorious for Australia. Under the original 2009 funding 
commitment, the defence share of GDP in 2022-23 still would have only been 1.76%. 
Figure 3.8: Actual, budgeted and projected defence GDP share for Defence 2013  
 
Source: Annual reports and various PBS and 2010 Intergenerational Report. (2012 = 2012-13 etc.) 
If the government wanted to smoothly transition by linear increments to a level of defence 
spending corresponding to 2% of GDP in a decade’s time, an additional $35.5 billion would 
need to be found, corresponding to an average annual real rate of growth in defence 
spending of 5.3%.  
Delivering the 2013 White Paper 
In this section, the risks and challenges to the successful delivery of the capability goals in 
the 2013 are examined. Three questions will be explored: 
x What is the likelihood of the promised funding actually being made available?  
x Is current funding adequate to deliver the goals of Defence 2013? 
x Is the balance between personnel, operating and investment sustainable? 
The ability of DMO and Defence to approve and deliver projects is examined in the next 
section. 
Will the money really be there in the years ahead? 
The most immediate threat to planned defence funding over the next few years is that the 
government of the day is going to want to return the federal budget to surplus at some 
point. It is hard to escape the conclusion that defence funding was only increased in this 
year’s budget because of the government’s failure to deliver a surplus. Had a surplus been 
within reach, the story would have been very different.  
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Because of the relatively low absolute level of debt, deficit spending is not a pressing 
economic issue for Australia. From a political perspective, the issue in binary: surplus good, 
deficit bad. Hence once a surplus moved beyond reach this year, the way was open to spend 
more on defence. The Treasurer’s loss became the Defence Minister’s gain. 
Regardless of who wins the upcoming election, the pressure will be on to deliver a surplus 
within the term of the next government. For Labor it would be the first time in more than 
two decades that they have managed to so. For the Coalition, it would be an opportunity to 
deny Labor that much sought for prize and more. Past experience with the recessions of the 
early 80s and 90s confirms that Defence cannot count on being spared when the time 
comes. If any proof is needed, the cuts in anticipation of ‘the surplus that was not’ in 2012-
13 should settle the matter (see Figure 3.3). 
Figure 3.9 shows the latest Treasury estimates of the fiscal balance over the next four years. 
Although a surplus is planned for 2015-16, the margin is wafer-thin at $6 billion in terms of 
the fiscal balance or a miniscule $800 million in underlying cash terms. Given that this year’s 
projected surplus of $1.5 billion degenerated into a deficit of $19.4 billion, it would be a 
foolhardy Treasurer to promise a surplus one year out without a substantial buffer to guard 
against volatility in revenues. It’s therefore likely that further fiscal belt tightening will occur 
over the next couple of years thereby putting defence spending at risk. 
Figure 3.9: The fiscal and underlying cash balances – past and anticipated 
Source: Treasury Budget Paper #1 2012-13 and 2013-14 
Beyond the immediate term, there are the intertwined questions of our terms of trade and 
structural deficit. Figure 3.9 shows the surge in the terms of trade in the late 2000s (which 
pushed government revenues up) and the deterioration over the past few years (which 
pushed government revenues down). The terms of trade are a key factor—though not the 
only factor—in determining the size of the structural deficit Australia is carrying. That is, the 
underlying difference between government revenues and expenditure when the impact of 
the business cycle is accounted for. The worse our terms of trade, the larger our structural 
deficit and the more difficult it will be to return to surplus. (See Treasury Working paper 
2010: Estimating the structural balance of the Australian Government.) 
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The fiscal outcomes in Figure 3.8 are based upon our terms of trade remaining relatively 
high. Specifically, it’s assumed that the terms of trade index will have only fallen by 0.75% in 
2013-14 and 1.75% per cent in 2014-15. But as the Treasury Budget Papers point out ‘here is 
considerable uncertainty around terms of trade projections, including in the medium-to-long 
term’. As Figure 3.10 implies, commodity prices and Australia’s terms of trade are high by 
historical standards. The Grattan Institute (Budget Pressures on Australian Government, 
2013) estimates that if our terms of trade were to return to their long run average, tax 
revenues would decline in the range of 1% to 2% of GDP. Thus, if Treasury’s projection for 
the terms of trade turn out to be overoptimistic, further pressures are likely on the budget 
bottom line. 
Figure 3.10: ABS terms of trade index 1959 to 2012 
Source: ABS series 5302.0, 2013. 
Is there enough money to deliver all that is planned? 
No. As we’ve seen already, our goals have remained high even though there’s now less 
money available. Something has to give. At best, we’ll have to wait longer to achieve what’s 
planned. But that’s probably too optimistic a conclusion. 
Previous ASPI analysis of the underlying cost of maintaining defence (see Thomson and 
Davies, Strategic Choices: Defending Australia in the 21st Century, 2008) estimated that to 
‘tread water’ in terms of size and scope of capability while maintaining an inventory of 
modern equipment requires average annual growth above inflation of around 2.6%. This 
also accords with the long-term post-WW II trend in Australian defence funding (see Chapter 
5 of this Brief). Thus, although there might be enough money to maintain the force in its 
present state with long-term growth of 2.5%, that won’t allow for new additions such as a 
doubling of the submarine fleet and protected mobility for the entire land force.  
An even more pessimistic prognosis can be found in examining the post-WWII trends in the 
unit cost of maintaining ships, aircraft and troops in the US military (see Thomson, Trends in 
US defence spending: implications for Australia, 2010). Using historical data going back to 
the 1950s, it’s possible to measure the real annual increase in the cost per unit of US military 
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capability. As an example, see Figure 3.11, which shows the average annual spending by the 
US Navy per active duty vessel in the fleet. Typical results for aircraft, ships and army 
personnel come out at around 3.0%. If similar trends apply to Australia, long-term growth of 
2.5% will not be enough to maintain the ADF, let alone expand its maritime forces as 
planned.  
Figure 3.11: Unit cost of US Navy per vessel 1951 to 2011 
Sources: US Pentagon Green Book 2014 and www.history.navy.mil  
Is the balance between operating, personnel and investment sustainable? 
After the cuts to the defence budget in 2012, the resulting split between operating, 
personnel and investment (Figure 3.4) provided too little money for investment on the basis 
of recent trends. So let’s check how things look following the Defence 2013. Figure 3.12 
shows the split between the three components using the same methodology as used to 
produce Figure 3.4.  
Figure 3.12: Underlying trends in defence costs post-Defence 2013 
 
Source: ASPI analysis of 2013-14 PBS and earlier Annual Reports. 
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On balance, the relative underfunding of investment that arose in 2012 is on the way to 
being fixed. All three components of the budget are returning to earlier trends. While this is 
no guarantee of a sustainable balance, it is better than the manifest imbalance seen last 
year.   
Capability planning and delivery 
Even if all the money needed to deliver the capabilities sought in Defence 2013 becomes 
available, the feasibility of what’s planned will be far from assured. The unambiguous lesson 
since 2000 is that while planning for new capability is easy, delivering it can be very difficult. 
Most recently, major equipment acquisition projects planned under Defence 2009 were 
neither approved nor delivered on schedule—even after rescheduling in successive Defence 
Capability Plans (DCP) and Defence Capability Guidance (DCG).  
The next DCP/DCG will reflect the decisions taken in Defence 2013. Until those documents 
are released, the best we can do is to look at the feasibility and delivery of the latest 
available DCP/DCG from July 2012 in tandem with a discussion of the difficulties faced in 
planning, approving and delivering defence materiel. 
Approval and commencement of projects 
Before an item of major capital equipment can be purchased, the acquisition has to be 
approved by the National Security Committee of Cabinet or, for projects valued less than 
$100 million, by the Ministers for Defence and Finance. Under the arrangements introduced 
following the 2003 Kinnaird Defence Procurement Review, each major project is considered 
twice. Initial approval (known as first pass) allows a project to begin planning in earnest, 
including collecting information on potential options. Sometime later, final approval (second 
pass) is sought to allow a project to proceed to contract with a supplier.  
Tracking the achievement of first and second pass approval of major capital investment 
projects is not straightforward. The public DCP/DCG no longer includes specific years for the 
planned approval of projects. Instead, there are now only multi-year brackets which obscure 
what’s going on with individual projects. However, with a bit of work, it’s possible to 
generate a clearer picture of plans for the overall program. This can be done by tabulating all 
the multi-year windows for the individual projects, and in the absence of more precise data, 
assigning an equal probability of an approval in each year of the window.  
For example, if a project has a window of 2011-12 to 2012-13, it is assigned a 50% chance 
that it will be approved in each of the years. Weighting the probabilities for all the projects 
available in the 2012 revision of the DCP/DCG in this way yields the project approval 
patterns in Figure 3.13 and 3.14. For comparison, previously planned and achieved approvals 
for the period 2004-05 to 2011-12 have been included. Because they are not listed in the 
DCP/DCG, we’ve excluded the approval of classified projects. Where project have been split 
into additional phases at the time of approval, these have been added to the number 
approvals planned (that way we can count all of the projects approved without double 
counting split projects).  
Several points stand out from Figures 3.13 and 3.14: 
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x The pace of second pass approvals improved substantially in 2011-12, although 
some of the approvals were ‘one-off’ non-DCP projects such as long-lead items for 
the Growler upgrade and another C-17 purchased as the financial year came to a 
close.  
x First pass approvals—the lead indicator of future work—are still very badly behind 
schedule, despite some improvement in 2011-12. 
x The failure to approve projects has created a ‘bow wave’ of approvals over the next 
3-5 years. 
x As expected, because second pass is contingent on first pass, the peak of planned 
second pass approvals occurs a year to two after that for first pass.  
As of May 17, the government had achieved five first pass approvals (including one classified 
project) and 11 second pass approvals this financial year. Defence say they plan to take 
forward three more first pass and five more second pass approvals prior to June 30. 2012-13 
is looking to be another reasonable year for second pass approvals but disappointing for first 
pass. Nonetheless, on past experience the planned volume of approvals over the next few 
years will be hard to achieve.  
Last year’s PBS listed 6 projects intended for first pass, and 19 for second pass, in 2012-13. 
This year, there are 12 first pass and 17 second pass projects planned (PBS Tables 73-75).   
Despite the reforms to the Capability Development Group and the promise of a new DCP, an 
examination of historical patterns of project approval implies caution about how much can 
be achieved in the near term. As Figure 3.15 shows, high approval rates commensurate to 
those planned recently have been achieved in the past, but not since the introduction of the 
more demanding two-pass process in 2004. With an election due in September 2013 (which 
historically reduces the number of approvals) there may be a reduced throughput of 
approvals over the next six to twelve months.   
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Figure 3.13: Projects planned for second pass approval  
Source: Past and current DCP, PBS and Annual Reports. 
Figure 3.14: Projects planned for first pass approval  
Source: Past and current DCP, PBS and Annual Reports. 
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Figure 3.15: Planned approvals (second pass); 1984 to 2022 
Source: DAR and 2012 DCP/DCG, excludes classified projects.  
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Performance in delivering capital equipment 
The critical path to expanding and modernising the ADF goes through the acquisition of 
major capital equipment. In this section we examine recent and historical trends in the 
Major Capital Investment Program. 
For more than a decade, Defence has struggled to deliver on its plans for re-equipping the 
ADF. Between 2000 and 2013, around $6.2 billion of investment was deferred into the 
future, mostly because DMO was unable to spend the money. The typical pattern was for 
DMO to hand money back at the end of a year, and then have funding in future years taken 
away with the promise that it will be returned at some point in the more distant future. As 
we’ve seen over the past two years (see Table 3.1 and Figure 3.6), there is no reason to 
believe that deferred funds will be available in the future. It is entirely at the discretion of 
the government how much it funds investment from year to year irrespective of any 
undertakings made in prior years.   
Things changed in 2012, when a further $5.9 billion was cut over four years to try and help 
put the federal budget back into surplus. This year, around $1.2 billion for major capital 
investment was brought forward. The net result of these partially cancelling transactions is 
to reduce the funds for investment between 2012-13 and 2015-16 by $4.2 billion. Successive 
plans and actual results are potted in Figure 3.16.  
Figure 3.16: Major Capital Investment – plans and actual results  
Source: PBS, DAR, PAES, PBS and speeches by Defence officials. 
Even when projects are approved and funding is available, acquisitions tend to progress 
more slowly than anticipated. Usually this is managed through the mechanism of 
‘overprogramming’ whereby more spending is planned than available money. The 
systematic slippage in projects then, more or less, brings things into balance at the end of 
the year (with a little management intervention as necessary). Sometimes things don’t go to 
plan and money has to be handed back.  
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To track the evolving performance of delivering projects on schedule, we’ve collected data 
on the planned and actual expenditure on the top 20 or 30 projects reported each year. 
Within these projects, figures are not overprogrammed and therefore reflect a project’s 
anticipated and actual in-year performance. The simplest test is to look at the aggregate 
planned and actual expenditure for the available projects, see Figure 3.4. Because foreign 
exchange rates sometimes change mid-year, these need to be taken into account. 
Unfortunately, the impact is hard to assess because the projects for which information is 
available only represent a sub-set of the total program, and the impact of foreign exchange 
is only available over the entire program. But because foreign exchange has been relatively 
small (apart from in 2009-10), a reasonable comparison is possible. The results are graphed 
in Figure 3.17. Note that the results from 1993-94 to 1995-96 only take into account 
‘significant’ changes. As a result, the figures for these years probably slightly underestimate 
the extent of underperformance. 
A couple of points are worth making. First, given the consistent tendency of projects to 
underperform, the current and longstanding application of overprogramming is entirely 
appropriate. Second, if projects are being more carefully developed prior to approval as is 
claimed, an improvement should be expected as newer projects replace the old. Similarly, 
the development of a more commercially adept and professional acquisition workforce 
should be reflected in improved in-year performance of projects old and new. While there is 
no dramatic improvement to be seen in the data post-2004, recent results are better than 
recorded in 2006-07 and 2007-08.  
Figure 3.17: Per cent under- and over-spent on top 20/30 capital equipment projects 
 
Source: Defence Budget Papers and Annual Reports. Only the revised figure is available for 2012-13 
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responsibility for problems. This year, we looked carefully at the causes of slippage in the 
top 30 projects as given in the 2012-13 PAES. The story is somewhat more complex than 
‘them’ or ‘us’. Of the $653 million worth of delays reported at that time, fully $209 million 
were ‘good news’; including cost reductions and early payments in the previous reporting 
period. Of the roughly $314 million in ‘bad news’, our assessment was that industry was 
primarily responsible for the delays (remembering that this assessment is based on DMO 
reporting). Our best estimate of the situation appears in Table 3.3.  
Table 3.3: ASPI assessment of ‘responsibility’ for slippage 
  Commonwealth Suppliers Unallocated 
Positive $130 million  $79 million 
$130 million 
Negative -  $314 million 
Source: ASPI assessment of information in the 2012-13 PAES 
The Feasibility of Plans for Defence 2013 
On the basis of experience during the 2000s when investment had to be deferred on a 
number of occasions, we can only be confident of ramping up investment by an average of 
around 5% a year in real terms. Beyond that rate, there is a demonstrated risk of industry 
and/or DMO being unable to marshal capacity quickly enough. As Figure 3.18 shows, current 
plans entail a very rapid increase in Major Capital Investment well beyond what has been 
achieved in the past. In the absence of one or more large off-the-shelf purchases, it’s likely 
that money will be handed back in the years ahead.  
Figure 3.18: Past and planned Major Capital Investment 
Source: DAR, 2013-14 PBS  
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Chapter 4 –Strategic Reform Program 
There were three key elements to the Strategic Reform Program 
(SRP); improved accountability, improved planning, and 
enhanced productivity. Planned reforms to accountability and 
planning were examined in detail in the 2009-10 Budget Brief.  
Reporting against the $20 billion savings program central to the 
SRP has been abandoned only three years into its planned ten-year life. No public 
explanation has been given, but it is likely that the savings program became unviable 
because of deep cuts to Defence funding in the 2012-13 budget coupled with mounting 
budget pressures in areas that had supposedly been delivering savings.  
This is no great loss. As previous editions of the Budget Brief showed in detail, the much 
lauded $20 billion savings program was implausible and exaggerated, with savings reported 
against inflated hypothetical business-as-usual baselines. In reality, there was no transferring 
of savings from one part of Defence to another. The notional savings were built into group 
budgets back in 2009. Key aspects of the SRP savings are recounted below for the purpose of 
bringing closure to this episode. Make no mistake; savings are being achieved and real 
worthwhile reform is underway, but not on the dollar scale claimed.  
Background  
Towards the end of the last decade, there emerged two (almost contradictory) propositions 
about Defence funding. First, that there was not enough money in projected Defence 
funding to afford all that was planned in terms of new equipment and attendant personnel 
and operating costs. Second, that Defence was not as efficient as it could be, having grown 
fat and complacent after close to a decade of escalating funding. Faced with this situation, in 
early 2008 the government directed Defence to find $10 billion of savings over the next 
decade. 
Then in May 2008, the government appointed George Pappas to audit the Defence budget. 
His report was delivered to the Minister in April 2009. The Budget Audit identified 
prospective savings of $1.3 billion to $1.8 billion a year based on 2007-08 spending, plus 
one-off savings of between $218 million and $398 million. On an out-turned basis (taking 
anticipated inflation into account), the prospective recurrent savings over the decade 
commencing 2009-10 were between $15 billion and $20.7 billion.   
To the work of the Budget Audit were added (1) the initial work done by Defence to save 
$10 billion, (2) the results of the 2008 Defence Procurement and Sustainment Review and 
(3) the results of a series of internal ‘companion reviews’ conducted in parallel to the 
development of the 2009 Defence White Paper. The result was the SRP; a package of 
reforms and efficiency initiatives to improve Defence’s performance and deliver $20.6 billion 
of savings over the following decade.  
Where were the savings supposed to come from? 
Table 4.1 summarises the results of our analysis of the initial SRP savings targets as they 
were announced in 2009-10. Savings were only counted as having been as explained if a 
Key Point 
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moderately complete explanation had been published. In some cases, the explanations 
offered were either implausible or inconsistent.  
Table 4.1: What was known and unknown about SRP savings? 
 Planned 
Savings 
Explained 
Savings 
Unexplained 
Savings 
SRP savings streams    
ICT -1,948 -650 -1,298 
Inventory  -700 -700 0 
Smart Maintenance -4,827 -4,286 -541 
Logistics  -350 -331 -19 
Non-Equipment Procurement -3,767 -3,172 -595 
Reserves -359 -179 -162 
Shared Services -1,864 -706 -1,158 
Workforce Reforms (civilianisation of ADF & 
PSP) 
-925 -781 -144 
subtotal -14,740 -10,805 -3,917 
Other savings    
Zero-Based Budget -3,922 -3,922  
Cuts to Minor Capital Program -238 -238  
Cuts to Facilities Program -510 -510  
Administrative Savings -70 -70  
Productivity Savings -357 -357  
Reduced NPOC -586 -586  
Cuts to Personnel Initiatives -238 -238  
subtotal -5,920 -5,920 -3,917 
TOTAL -20,640 -16,725 -3,917 
Source: ASPI Budget Brief 2009-10. 
Defence reporting of annual targets and achieved savings appears in Table 4.2. As explained 
in the 2010-11 and 2011-12 editions of the Budget Brief, the quanta of savings reported 
should not be accepted at face value. The 2011-12 Defence Annual Report says that the 
reported savings were exclusive of $323 million in expenses ‘outside the control of SRP 
management’.  
In 2011 and 2012, further savings efficiencies were announced in addition to the original SRP 
program. Unlike their predecessors, the new efficiencies represented cuts to defence 
funding rather than the freeing up of funds for redirection within Defence. As such, there is 
no question of whether the savings were delivered or not; the money was removed from the 
Defence budget and returned to the Treasury. Table 4.3 lists the cuts made in 2011 and 
2012. The final tranche of savings made in the 2012 Budget was distinguished from its 
predecessors by the absence of any pretence of being achieved through efficiencies or 
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productivity gains. It was an outright cut to the Defence budget. The key savings under the 
SRP and subsequent initiatives are captured schematically in Figure 4.1.  
Table 4.2: Reported gross SRP savings for 2009-10, 2010-11 and 2011-12 
 
Source: SLC Question 6, February 2012 and recent Defence Annual Reports 
Table 4.3: Further ‘efficiencies’ and cuts announced in 2011 and 2012 
Initiative 
Savings 
(over 10 years) 
Comment 
‘second phase of SRP-related 
savings’ 
(announced May 2011) 
$2,948 million  
Additional efficiencies in Defence’s 
corporate and support functions, including 
constraining forecast APS workforce 
growth by 1000 positions (i.e. not 
employing extra people). 
A further $400 million was handed back 
by Defence in FY 2010-11.  
‘increased efficiency dividend’  
(announced May 2011) 
$406 million  
No details have been provided on how 
this efficiency dividend will be delivered. 
‘buy C-17 instead of two C-130 
aircraft’ 
(announced May 2011) 
$520 million  
Rather than purchase two C-130 aircraft, a 
single (much larger) C-17 aircraft has been 
purchased. Inexplicably, Defence has lost 
the funding for the C-130 option but is 
fully funding the C-17 option. This 
represents a cut to the funding available 
to Defence.  
‘one-off 2.5% efficiency dividend’ 
(announced February 2012) 
$670 million 
No details have been provided on how 
this efficiency dividend will be delivered. 
‘expenditure reduction measures’ 
(announced May 2012) 
$5,454 million 
These are cuts pure and simple, with no 
suggestion of efficiency gains or dividends.   
Total $9,998 million  
Source: Defence Annual Reports and Budget Papers. 
 
 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 
Reform stream 
Target  
($m) 
Claimed  
($m) 
Target  
($m) 
Claimed  
($m) 
Target  
($m) 
Claimed  
($m) 
ITC 49 94  128 27  148 216 
Smart Sustainment1 263 461  288 326  370 389 
Non-equipment Procurement 172  343  177 318  207 148 
Workforce & Shared Services 58 -131 171  103  238 156 
Reserves   5 -4  28 47 
Logistics   6 53 8 0.3 
Other Savings  255  255  242 242  286 285 
Total 797  1,022  1,016 1,064  1,284 1,241 
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Figure 4.1: Planned SRP and other savings 2009 to 2012 
 
Reform costs 
$2.4 billion 
Zero-based 
budget 
$3.9 billion 
Minor Capital 
cut  
$239 million 
Efficiencies 
$2.95 billion 
Total cuts to 
the Defence 
budget 
$3.9 billion 
Efficiency 
Dividend  
$406 million 
C-130 cut 
$520 million  
(2011) 
Expenditure 
reduction 
$5,454 million  
Net savings 
available for 
redirection 
within 
Defence 
$18.2 billion 
Accounting 
transfers 
$4.6 billion 
Cuts to 
personnel 
initiatives 
$238 million 
Efficiencies 
$15.7 billion 
Gross savings 
$20.6 billion 
 
Capital 
Facilities cut  
$510 million 
Buy less and 
pay less 
$12.6 billion 
Workforce 
reform 
$3.1 million 
  
Buy less and 
pay less 
$1.9 billion 
Workforce 
reform 
$1.05 billion 
Defence Reform Program  
Phase 1: 2009 & 2010 
Defence Reform Program  
Phase 2: 2011 
Total savings 
$3.9 billion 
Savings Measures  
2011 
 
Efficiency  
Dividend 
$607 million Total cuts to 
the Defence 
budget 
$6.1 billion 
Savings Measures  
2012 
Total savings 
$6.1 billion 
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Chapter 5 – International Defence Economics 
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first examines key international defence 
spending trends. The second explores Australian defence spending in an international and 
historical context, and the third explores the continuing impact of the Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC) on countries’ abilities to spend on defence.  
Throughout this chapter, defence spending statistics from a variety of source are used. Given 
the unresolvable questions of definition and reliability, one source is usually as good as 
another. With this in mind, the most convenient source of data has been chosen to allow for 
a consistent comparison in each case.  
International defence spending 
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the world 
expended a total of US$1,745 billion on defence in 2012, equivalent to around 2.5% of global 
GDP. With the exception of China, the bulk of the spending occurred in the developed 
economies of North America and Western Europe, with East Asia also figuring highly in the 
data, see Figure 5.1.  
Figure 5.1: Geographic distribution of defence expenditure 2012 
 
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expenditure Database 2013 edition, www.sipri.org.  
Global defence spending from 1988 to 2012 is graphed in Figure 5.2, where ‘BRIC’ refers to 
the (re-)emerging powers of Brazil, Russia, India and China, and the US allies outside of 
Europe are Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, New Zealand and Taiwan. As can be seen, the 
peace dividend following the end of the Cold War resulted in a contraction in global defence 
expenditure of around 30% over a decade. From 2001 onwards, the trend reversed as the 
United States mobilised following the attacks 9/11.    
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Figure 5.2: Global defence spending 1988 to 2012 
 
 Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expenditure Database 2013 edition, www.sipri.org. 
 Russian spending interpolated for 1991. Chinese spending extrapolated for 1988.  
The United States dominates global defence spending, and the recent US-led invasions of 
Afghanistan and Iraq gave rise to a decade-plus increase in the global figure. In 2012 the 
United States accounted for 39% of global defence spending, and once its friends and allies 
are taken into account the ‘West’ as a whole accounts for just over 64%. However, over the 
past couple of years, global defence spending has peaked with expenditure in the United 
States and other developed nations beginning to fall.  
It looks as though the world (or at least the developed world) is about to experience another 
downward swing in defence spending. The United States and most of the countries of 
Western Europe are projecting either insipid growth or declining defence expenditures out 
to the middle of this decade. In part, this reflects a mini peace dividend from the drawdown 
of Western forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. At least as important, however, are the mounting 
fiscal pressures across developed economies.  
A combination of rising social spending and the legacy of crippling debts due to the 2008 
GFC are forcing many countries to reconsider the priority for defence spending.  Western 
Europe in particular is facing a long-term fiscal crunch due its ageing population; with tax 
revenues falling and pension costs rising, something has to give. In the absence of a serious 
deterioration in the strategic situation in Europe, it’s likely that cuts to defence spending will 
be the most politically expedient course of action for many European countries in the years 
ahead.  
But not all trends are downwards. Falling defence spending by the United States (-6%), 
Western Europe (-1.7%) and other US allies (-0.8%) in 2012 was offset by strong growth in 
the BRICs (+7.1%) and the rest of the world (+7.0%).  
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The United States  
After a decade of strong growth, the US defence budget has moderated over the past five 
years and begun to fall. And the trend is likely to continue; from 2013 to 2021 US defence 
spending is capped under the Budget Control Act enacted in 2011 (sequestration) in 
response to mounting fiscal pressures and a political deadlock.  
Over the past couple of years, the cuts have been accommodated through reduced 
personnel numbers (and remuneration), base closures, acquisition deferrals, and the early 
retirement of some assets. Most recently, sequestration has put pressure on the readiness 
of the US military by reducing the money available for operations and maintenance.    
Further cuts may be necessary. Figure 5.3 shows historical US defence spending and the 
President’s 2014 budget request (which exceeds the cap imposed under sequestration). The 
actual level of defence spending post-2013 will be determined by budget negotiations 
presently underway in Washington. Higher and lower levels of defence spending than that 
depicted are possible.  
Figure 5.3: US defence spending 1950 to 2018 
 Source: CSBA Analysis of the FY 2012 Defense Budget and FY2013 and FY 2014 US budget papers.  
 
Even if US baseline defence spending returns to its long-term historical trend of 1.29% 
annual real growth (relative to the GDP deflator), the size of US armed forces will continue 
to decline. Over the past six decades, the annual cost of maintaining a US Navy vessel in 
service has risen by an average of 3.5% above inflation. Over the same period, the costs of 
aircraft and soldiers have risen in real terms by 3.5% and 3.1% per annum respectively. As a 
result, the strength of the army has more than halved and the numbers of aircraft and ships 
have been reduced four-fold since the 1950s (see ASPI Policy Analysis #56, 2010).  
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Consequently, although the United States remains the most powerful military force on 
earth, its ability to mount large-scale operations is slowly eroding, along with its capacity for 
concurrent operations.  
The People's Republic of China  
China has enjoyed rapid economic growth since the early 1990s. Over the same period, 
defence spending has grown apace. Controversy surrounds the scale of Chinese defence 
spending. US estimates of Chinese spending are substantially higher than the official figure. 
Independent estimates fall somewhere in between, see Figure 5.4.  
By any estimate, Chinese defence spending is rising rapidly; between 10% and 14.6% each 
year above inflation over the past decade, as measured in US$. In terms of Chinese currency, 
the growth rate averaged 12.7% between 2002 and 2011 (the ongoing appreciation of the 
RMB and differential inflation means that the growth rate differs from that calculated using 
US$). Because defence spending growth has been matched by strong growth in the Chinese 
economy, the defence share of GDP has remained around 1.3% according to official figures.   
Although China is often criticised (including by Australia) for not being transparent enough 
about its military build-up, its biannual defence white papers are reasonably clear and 
largely consistent with what can be observed; China is developing the military capability to 
exclude the United States and its allies from its maritime approaches with a particular focus 
on operations against Taiwan. This is reflected in a focus on developing and modernising 
what the US term ‘anti-access/area denial capabilities’.  
To a lesser extent, China is investing in power-projection assets—including an aircraft 
carrier—to protect its sea lines of communication and assert its interests further afield. By 
the end of the decade, China will have the ability to deploy and sustain a modest joint force 
including - several battalions on low-intensity operations far from China.  
Figure 5.4: Chinese defence spending 1990 to 2013 
Sources: Analysis of data from SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2012, www.sipri.org; Pentagon Report to Congress on the 
Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, FY2004, FY2010, FY2011 and FY2012 and Adam P. Liff and Andrew S. Erickson 
Demystifying China's Defence Spending: Less Mysterious in the Aggregate. The China Quarterly, March 2013.  
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Comparing the United States and China 
Much has been said lately about the changing economic 
and strategic balance between the United States and 
China. Here’s some numbers to put things in 
perspective.  
According to the World Bank, the United States 
economy (US$15.0 trillion) was 2.1 times larger than 
China’s (US$7.3 trillion) at market exchange rates in 
2011. If China’s economy grows at 7% per annum and 
the US at 2.5% per annum, it will only take 17 years for 
economic parity to be reached in 2027.   
The raw statistics for recent military expenditure by the 
United States and the People’s Republic of China are 
shown in Table 5.1. Note that China’s smaller GDP share 
gives it a relatively greater capacity to increase defence 
spending.  
Table 5.1: United States and Chinese defence spending circa 2013 
 
Baseline defence 
expenditure 
2012/13 US$ 
Defence  
expenditure 
percentage of GDP 
Rate of growth  
 
United States (official 2013) 578 billion 3.7% 1.29% (trend) 
China (official 2013) 120 billion 1.3% 10.7% (year on year) 
China (SIPRI estimate 2012) 161 billion 2.0% 7.8% (year on year) 
Plausible defence spending trajectories for the United States and China are plotted in 
Figure 5.5 based on the latest SIPRI estimate of Chinese spending (2012), and using growth 
rates commensurate with historical trends. It shows that it is fully possible for Chinese 
defence spending to exceed that of the United States within the next two decades.  
Figure 5.5: Plausible US and Chinese defence spending trajectories  
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United Kingdom 
Like the United States, the United Kingdom ramped up defence spending in the 2000s 
(though not to the same extent). This trend is now being reversed as part of a rapid fiscal 
consolidation. The 2011 UK defence budget sets out real reductions in underlying defence 
spending (exclusive of the cost of deployments) of 7.7% over four years from 2010-11 to 
2014-15. Subsequent decisions increased the reductions to 8.8% over four years. However, 
once the withdrawal of operational funding post-Afghanistan is taken into account, the 
reduction will be closer to 15%. The initial moves to accommodate the budget cuts include: 
x Military personnel reductions of 25,000 (from a base of 158,500) and civilian personnel 
cuts of 29,000 by 2015, plus the withdrawal of land forces from Germany by 2020. 
Reduction in tank and heavy artillery numbers by 40% and 35% respectively.  
x Immediate decommissioning of an existing Aircraft Carrier, one Landing Platform 
Helicopter and one Land Ship Dock. Continuing with plans to build two new aircraft 
carriers but keeping one at ‘extended readiness’ (mothballing). Putting one existing 
Landing Platform Dock ship at ‘extended readiness’. 
x Scrapping of the Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft and Harrier jump-jet fleets and a 
reduction in the number of Chinook helicopters to be purchased from 22 to 12.  
x Five year delay in the replacement of ballistic missile submarine fleet and reduction in 
the number of warheads from 160 to 120.  
Further capability reductions are likely as internal budget pressures mount in the years 
ahead. To make matters worse, further budget cuts are widely anticipated.  
Figure 5.6: United Kingdom defence spending 1955 to 2011  
 
Source: UK House of Commons Library Report SN/SG/113, 2009 & SN/SG/3139, 2012, UK MoD, UK Defence Statistics 2012.  
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North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 
Until recently, NATO defence spending (exclusive of the United States) had been remarkably 
static in real terms since the end of the Cold War, with the subsequent expansion of NATO 
doing little to change the situation. However, in recent years spending has fallen.  
Figure 5.7: NATO defence spending 1988 to 2012 
 
 Source: Analysis of data from SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2013, www.sipri.org  
The larger members of NATO and the scale of their present defence spending are given in 
Table 5.2. In addition to the United States and United Kingdom, many other NATO members 
are under pressure to reduce defence spending due to fiscal pressures. The resulting cuts are 
being accommodated in various ways.  For example, in 2012 Italy announced plans to reduce 
its troop strength from 183,000 to 150,000, Germany ended conscription in 2011, and since 
2009 France has shed 54,000 military and civilian positions. Because these countries are 
subject to the same cost pressures as the United States, the scale of NATO forces will 
continue to decline in the years ahead making it even more difficult to undertake operations 
such Afghanistan.   
Table 5.2: Key NATO members’ defence spending 2012 
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Regional trends 
Defence spending trends in Maritime Southeast Asia and Greater Asia are summarised on 
the following two pages and examined in depth overleaf. 
Maritime Southeast Asia 
Defence spending for 2012 in the seven largest Southeast Asian states plus Australia is 
plotted in Figure 5.8 and further detailed in Table 5.3. Two points are worth making.  
(1) Australia outspends any of its neighbours by a comfortable margin. (2) Only Singapore 
shows any real sign of strategic angst, with a GDP share of 2.8%. Note that changes to 
reporting make New Zealand defence spending data inconsistent.  
Figure 5.8: Defence spending 2012 in Maritime Southeast Asia 
 
Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2013. 
Table 5.3: Defence spending 1990 to 2012; Maritime Southeast Asia  
 
N
ew
 Z
ea
la
nd
 
Vi
et
na
m
 
Ph
ili
pp
in
es
 
M
al
ay
sia
 
In
do
ne
sia
 
Th
ai
la
nd
 
Si
ng
ap
or
e 
Au
st
ra
lia
 
2012 defence spending as 
a share of GDP 
1.39% 2.42% 1.08% 1.45% 0.87% 1.46% 3.61% 1.63% 
Average annual defence 
spending growth  
2000 to 2012 
- -3.7% 3.6% 4.8% 6.5% 3.8% 2.1% 2.8% 
Average annual defence 
spending growth  
1990 to 2000 
-3.4% - -1.4% 3.5% 2.6% -1.4% 6.0% 1.6% 
Sources: GDP share taken from IISS, The Military Balance 2013, defence spending growth is measured in own currency. 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
New
Zealand
Philippines Vietnam Malaysia Thailand Indonesia Singapore Australia
bi
lli
on
 2
01
2 
 U
S$
 
Embargoed from publication/broadcast until release 30 May 2013, 2pm.
  
149 
Greater Asia 
Defence spending for 2012 in the six largest Greater Asian states plus Australia is plotted in 
Figure 5.9 and further detailed in Table 5.4 (Note: US figures have been scaled to fit). Several 
points are worth making. (1) Australia is a minnow in the tank of North Asian security.  
(2) Only India and South Korea shows any real sign of strategic concern with GDP shares of 
around 2.0% and 2.5% respectively. (3) Taiwan and Japan are allowing their defence 
capabilities to atrophy, notwithstanding that Taiwan’s GDP share remains above 2%.  
(4) Although China devotes less than 1.3 % of GDP to Defence, it has been increasing its 
defence spending at an impressive rate over the past two decades.  
On the basis of defence spending, it is clear that the balance of military power in the region 
is slowly shifting from the United States and its allies to China.  
Figure 5.9: Defence spending 2012 in Greater Asia 
 
Source: IISS The Military Balance 2013 
Table 5.4: Defence spending 1990 to 2012; Greater Asia 
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Regional economic and defence spending trends – the details 
The least ambiguous way to track relative changes in the size of a country’s economy is to 
adjust its GDP in local currency to a single base year using its GDP-deflator. Similarly, the 
least ambiguous way to track relative changes in defence spending is to adjust spending in 
local currency to a single base year using its CPI index.  
With ‘real’ GDP and defence spending so calculated, the relative growth between countries 
can be compared by normalising the initial values in the base year. This has been done for a 
selection of countries in Maritime Southeast Asia and Greater Asia in Figures 5.10 and 5.11. 
Data sources for these and subsequent graphs are listed at the end of this section.  
 Figure 5.10: Relative economic and defence spending growth, Maritime Southeast Asia 
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It is clear that developing countries have achieved faster economic growth than their more-
developed counterparts. China in particular has achieved spectacular economic growth since 
the early 1990s—though its military spending did not take off until around a decade later. 
Among the countries of Maritime Southeast Asia, Singapore has managed steady economic 
growth which has been reflected in a similar trend in their defence spending. In comparison, 
our closest neighbour, Indonesia, has achieved healthy economic growth but has not seen 
the need to increase its defence spending.   
The impact of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis is apparent in Figure 5.10 and to a lesser extent 
in Figure 5.11.  
Figure 5.11: Relative economic and defence spending growth in Greater Asia 
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Comparative economic performance 
Comparing the relative size of economies (as opposed to the relative rate of growth in size) 
requires converting the domestic currencies involved to a common currency. In practice, this 
is performed in one of two ways; either by converting to US dollars at prevailing market 
exchange rates, or by using the World Bank’s Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) exchange rates 
which attempt to capture the buying power of the currency within the country it is used. 
Typically, PPP exchange rates yield a significantly larger figure for developing countries than 
market exchange rates. By construction, PPP exchange rates are normalised relative to the 
US dollar. Figures 5.12 and 5.13 plot national GDP at market exchange rates and PPP for 
Maritime Southeast Asia and Greater Asia respectively.  
Figure 5.12: Comparative economic performance, Maritime Southeast Asia 
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Whether market exchange rates or PPP exchange rates present a more accurate picture of 
comparative economic performance is debatable. In some sense, they provide 
complementary views of what is occurring. That said; the substantial volatility of 
international exchange rates (which are driven more by near-term financial factors than 
long-term economic fundamentals) introduces large transient vagaries into time-series. For 
example, the rapid rise of Australian GDP in terms of US$ in Figure 5.11 and the oscillation of 
Japanese GDP in terms of US$ in Figure 5.13 are both artefacts of exchange rate fluctuations 
rather than any reflection of actual changes in economic performance. Note that in Figure 
5.13 the size of the United States economy has been scaled by a factor of ten to 
accommodate it on the chart without compressing the data for other countries.  
Figure 5.13: Comparative economic performance in Greater Asia 
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Comparative defence spending—Maritime Southeast Asia 
Just as was the case with GDP, comparing the level of defence spending between countries 
requires conversion to a common basis, usually either US$ or PPP$. In terms of maintaining 
modern high-tech military capabilities, spending expressed in US$ is probably a better 
comparative measure. Conversely, the cost of maintaining a large low-tech defence force is 
probably better compared using PPP exchange rates. Figures 5.15 and 5.16 plot defence 
spending in Maritime Southeast Asia from 1980 to the present in terms of US$ and PPP$ 
respectively.  
The only countries to consistently and significantly increase their defence spending post-
Cold War are Australia, Singapore and Vietnam. All the others have either decreased their 
spending or are still working to recover ground lost in the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. An 
equally sanguine picture emerges from the trends in the share of GDP devoted to defence. 
The long-term trend for all the countries of Maritime Southeast Asia is one of declining 
defence burden, see Figure 5.14. Even for those countries with the fastest growth—
Singapore and Australia—GDP share has not been growing by an appreciable amount in 
recent years.  
In contradicting those who discern a ‘regional arms race’, there is little in the defence 
spending patterns of Maritime Southeast Asia to support such a conclusion. Given that the 
cost of high-tech military equipment is increasing by around 4% above inflation every year, it 
is hard to see how anyone other than Australia and Singapore can afford to modernise or 
significantly expand their air and naval assets on present spending trends. 
 Figure 5.14: Defence burden, Maritime Southeast Asia  
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 Figure 5.15: Real defence spending (2000 US$), Maritime Southeast Asia   
 
 Figure 5.16: Real defence spending (2000 PPP$), Maritime Southeast Asia 
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Comparative defence spending—Greater Asia 
A somewhat more interesting picture emerges of defence spending in Greater Asia and the 
United States. The strongest and clearest trend has been the steady and substantial decline 
in the defence burden carried by countries since 1980, see Figure 5.17. The only countries to 
exhibit a significant rise in defence burden in the nearer-term (albeit limited compared with 
historical levels) are China from the late 1990s and the United States from 2001 onwards.  
In terms of absolute spending levels (see Figures 5.18 and 5.19) several points are worth 
making. China’s defence spending has grown appreciably by any measure. The United States 
remains far ahead of any other country but spending is set to slow. India’s defence spending 
continues to rise as does South Korea’s. Taiwan has given up.   
Unlike Maritime Southeast Asia, it is clear that the military balance of power is slowly but 
surely shifting among Greater Asia and the United States—at least to the extent that 
defence spending translates into military capability. China has comfortably overtaken 
Taiwan, South Korea and India, and recently Japan. Critically, the Chinese spending figures 
presented here are taken from official sources and are deemed by many observers to 
understate the true picture. The US Pentagon report to Congress on Chinese military power 
has argued that defence spending by the People’s Republic is appreciably larger than 
disclosed.   
 Figure 5.17: Defence burden, Greater Asia  
 
 
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
10%
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
20
10
20
12
Australia
China
India
Japan
South Korea
Taiwan
United States
Embargoed from publication/broadcast until release 30 May 2013, 2pm.
  
157 
Figure 5.18: Real defence spending (2000 US$), Greater Asia 
 
Figure 5.19: Real defence spending (2000 PPP$), Greater Asia 
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Historical Defence Spending 
Historical Australian defence spending 
Real and nominal Australian defence spending from 1870 to the present appears in Figure 
5.20. Although inflation dominates the nominal data and obscures much of the historical 
detail, the impact of the wars of the twentieth century is clearly visible in the ‘real’ data 
corrected for inflation.  
 Figure 5.20: Australian defence spending, 1870–2013.  
Source: ASPI collation of data from various sources, real dollars calculated using retail/consumer price index.  
An even more useful graph of historical spending appears in Figure 5.21 where real spending 
has been plotted on a logarithmic scale, on which exponential growth (which is close to 
compounding growth for small rates of increase) appears as a straight line. It shows there 
have been two epochs of underlying steady growth in defence spending; from 1870 to 1929 
spending grew by around 7% per annum, and from 1945 to the present underlying spending 
grew by around 2.7% per annum.  
None of this should be taken to imply that the defence force has expanded significantly 
during the post-war period—it has not. Rather, the observed growth in defence spending 
largely reflects the rising intrinsic cost of delivering modern military capability. The 2003 
ASPI publication, A Trillion Dollars and Counting, estimated that real growth of around 2.65% 
per annum was necessary just to maintain the present scale and range of capabilities in the 
ADF. Comparable analysis of US defence spending and force structure trends leads to a 
similar conclusion. Thus, the recent and ongoing rise of 3% per annum is more about 
maintaining than significantly expanding the defence force.    
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 Figure 5.21: Australian defence spending, 1870–2013. 
 
Source: ASPI collation of data from various sources, real dollars calculated using retail/consumer price index.   
The steady increase in real defence spending since the end of the World War II has been 
possible because of ongoing growth in the Australian economy over the same period. In fact, 
as a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) the longer-term trend has been for defence 
spending to account for a progressively smaller share of domestic output. Figure 5.22 plots 
defence spending as both a share of GDP and as a proportion of total Commonwealth 
outlays.  
 Figure 5.22: Australian defence spending as a share of GDP and Outlays.   
Source: ASPI collation of data from various sources.  
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Given the importance of defence spending as a share of GDP, a magnification of the post-
war period has been prepared in Figure 5.23.  
 Figure 5.23: Defence burden (per cent of Gross Domestic Product) 1946–2013  
 Source: ASPI collation of data from various sources.  
GDP share is not a measure of the adequacy or otherwise of defence spending—that’s 
something that depends on the task at hand. Rather, it measures the proportion of national 
wealth that a nation devotes to defence.  
The planned growth in Australian defence spending (from the 2013 White Paper) will see the 
share of GDP devoted to national defence stay below 1.7% out to 2022, which is not high by 
recent standards. Moreover, the United States is has recently been expending more than 
4.7% of GDP and the United Kingdom 2.5%. 
Even taking account of the growing fiscal burden due to the ageing of the Australian 
population, there is no reason to conclude that a defence burden in the range of 2% to 3% is 
unsustainable. While it is true that health and ageing will steadily demand a growing share of 
GDP in the decades ahead, the concurrent rise in individual prosperity (as measured by GDP 
per capita) will allow living standards to grow appreciably even if a larger share of national 
product is diverted for public goods like health, aged care and defence.   
A more detailed examination of the affordability of Australian defence spending can be 
found in the 2008 ASPI publication Strategic choices: Defending Australia in the 21st century.  
Australia’s defence effort in an international context 
According to the World Bank, in 2011 Australia had the thirteenth largest economy on earth 
measured at market exchange rates (and nineteenth using Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 
according to the CIA Factbook). From this annual bounty of around 1.6 trillion dollars, 
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Australia finds the money to fund its defence. Table 5.5 displays Australia’s 2012 defence 
spending (the latest year for which comprehensive data is available) along with that of a 
selection of countries including allies, regional neighbours and other developed industrial 
economies around the globe. All figures are given in US dollars calculated at prevailing 
market exchange rates. 
Table 5.5: Defence spending and burden 2012 
2012 GDP 2012 Defence expenditure 2012 % GDP 
Country $US(b) Country $US(b) Country % 
USA 15,672 USA 645.7 Israel 7.85 
China 8,261 China 102.4 USA 4.12 
Japan 6,004 United Kingdom 64.1 Singapore 3.61 
Germany 3,363 Russia 59.9 Russia 3.06 
France 2,587 Japan 59.4 United Kingdom 2.63 
United Kingdom 2,437 France 48.1 Pakistan 2.55 
Italy 1,986 Germany 40.4 South Korea 2.52 
Russia 1,956 India 38.5 Vietnam 2.42 
India 1,946 South Korea 29.0 Taiwan 2.21 
Canada 1,765 Australia 25.1 Turkey 2.17 
Australia 1,539 Italy 23.6 India 1.98 
Spain 1,339 Israel 19.4 France 1.86 
South Korea 1,150 Canada 18.4 Australia 1.63 
Indonesia  890 Turkey 17.0 Thailand 1.46 
Turkey 781 Spain 11.8 Malaysia 1.45 
Netherlands 768 Netherlands 10.4 New Zealand 1.39 
Sweden  521 Taiwan 10.3 Netherlands 1.36 
Taiwan 467 Singapore 9.7 China 1.24 
Thailand 377 Indonesia  7.7 Germany 1.2 
Malaysia 307 Pakistan 5.9 Italy 1.19 
Singapore 268 Sweden  5.8 Sweden  1.11 
Israel 247 Thailand 5.5 Philippines 1.08 
Philippines 242 Malaysia 4.5 Canada 1.04 
Pakistan 231 Vietnam 3.3 Japan 0.99 
New Zealand 167 Philippines 2.6 Spain 0.88 
Vietnam 138 New Zealand 2.3 Indonesia  0.87 
PNG 15 PNG 0.1 PNG 0.67 
Source: IISS: The Military Balance 2012. Note Australian results vary somewhat from local reporting. 
With the caveat that fluctuation in exchange rates can make a significant difference in 
relative ranking, there are three observations worth making. First, our level of defence 
spending gives us a budget broadly comparable with South Korea and the Netherlands, but 
far below heavy hitters like Italy, Germany, UK, Japan, France and China. Second, we 
out-spend all our Southeast Asian neighbours by a considerable margin. Third, the United 
States remains in a class of its own. 
In terms of defence spending as a percentage of GDP, until recently when our GDP share 
dropped to 1.6%, we devoted significantly more than the Netherlands (1.4%), Germany 
(1.2%), Spain (0.9%), Canada (1.0%) and Japan (1.0%). According to the data, the only fully 
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developed Western countries to allocate a larger share of GDP than us are the (the nuclear-
armed) United States (4.1%), France (1.9%) and the United Kingdom (2.6%). Closer to home, 
we devote a smaller share of GDP than Vietnam (2.4%), India (2.0%), South Korea (2.5%), 
and Singapore (3.6%), but more than Indonesia (0.9%), Thailand (1.5%) and the Philippines 
(1.1%). Not surprisingly, we rank well ahead of New Zealand (1.4%). 
To summarise, we spend a greater share than most developed Western nations but a lesser 
share than many of our significant regional neighbours. This probably reflects two things:  
(1) the synergy derived from collective defence in Western Europe, and (2) that some of our 
poorer neighbours have to spend a larger share of GDP to meet the demands of a more 
challenging strategic environment than that of Western Europe.  
An alternative and often illuminating depiction of the economic resources a country 
allocates to defence can be achieved by plotting its position on a graph of GDP against 
defence spending along with other nations. We’ve done this in Figure 5.24 for 157 countries 
based on data collected by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS). To properly 
capture the wide spread of GDP and defence spending values, the data has been plotted on 
a dual logarithmic scale.  
 Figure 5.24: GDP and defence spending for 157 countries 2012
 
Source: Compiled from data in The Military Balance 2013 (IISS). 
A couple of things are immediately apparent. Most obviously, there is a clear correlation 
between defence spending and economic size; the larger a nation’s economy the more it 
tends to spend on defence. In addition, the vast bulk of nations spend within the band of 
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between 1 and 4% of GDP on defence. Not surprisingly, those countries that spend larger 
shares of GDP tend to have more challenging strategic circumstances than those that spend 
less, or else they are impoverished nations that need to spend a greater share of their 
meagre resources to achieve a credible capability. Small shares of GDP spending tend to 
correlate with advantageous geography, strong alliances and benign neighbours. But 
another factor is also at play. Economically prosperous developed nations tend, 
understandably, to be able to provide for their defence with a smaller share of GDP. 
Money is not the only resource that a nation has available to devote to its defence; there is 
also people. Table 5.6 lists population numbers, permanent defence force numbers and 
population percentage in the armed services for our selection of allies, neighbours and 
Western powers.  
Table 5.6: Human resources circa 2012  
Country Population Country 
Armed 
Forces Country 
% of 
POP 
China 1,349,585,838 China 2,285,000 North Korea 4.81% 
India 1,220,800,359 United States 1,520,000 Israel 2.30% 
United States 316,668,567 India 1,325,000 South Korea 1.34% 
Indonesia 251,160,124 North Korea 1,190,000 Singapore 1.34% 
Pakistan 193,238,868 Russia 845,000 Taiwan 1.24% 
Russia 142,500,482 South Korea 655,000 Turkey 0.63% 
Japan 127,253,075 Pakistan 642,000 Russia 0.59% 
Philippines 105,720,644 Turkey 511,000 Thailand 0.54% 
Vietnam 92,477,857 Vietnam 482,000 Vietnam 0.52% 
Germany 81,147,265 Indonesia 396,000 United States 0.48% 
Turkey 80,694,485 Thailand 361,000 Malaysia 0.37% 
Thailand 67,448,120 Taiwan 290,000 France 0.35% 
France 65,951,611 Japan 247,000 Pakistan 0.33% 
United Kingdom 63,395,574 France 229,000 Italy 0.29% 
Italy 61,482,297 Germany 196,000 Spain 0.29% 
South Korea 48,955,203 Italy 181,000 United Kingdom 0.26% 
Spain 47,370,542 Israel 177,000 Australia 0.26% 
Canada 34,568,211 United Kingdom 166,000 Germany 0.24% 
Malaysia 29,628,392 Spain 136,000 Sweden 0.23% 
North Korea 24,720,407 Philippines 125,000 Netherlands 0.22% 
Taiwan 23,299,716 Malaysia 109,000 New Zealand 0.21% 
Australia 22,262,501 Singapore 73,000 Japan 0.19% 
Netherlands 16,805,037 Canada 66,000 Canada 0.19% 
Sweden 9,119,423 Australia 57,000 China 0.17% 
Israel 7,707,042 Netherlands 37,000 Indonesia 0.16% 
PNG 6,431,902 Sweden 21,000 Philippines 0.12% 
Singapore 5,460,302 New Zealand 9,000 India 0.11% 
New Zealand 4,365,113 PNG 3,000 PNG 0.05% 
Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies: The Military Balance, 2013. CIA Factbook. 
Here Australia is less well endowed. According to the CIA Factbook, Australia ranked 55th in 
population in 2012; ahead of Cote d’Ivoire and below Romania. We have about one-third the 
population of the larger European powers and less than one-tenth that of the US. In regional 
terms, we’re just a little smaller than Malaysia, North Korea and Taiwan, but only a quarter 
the size of Thailand and the Philippines. Indonesia has more than ten times our population, 
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and we are but a drop in the ocean compared with India and China. The sobering fact is that 
we account for less than one-third of one per cent of the world’s people.  
Our permanent armed forces in 2013 amounted to around 57,000, which puts us near the 
bottom of the table in our selection of countries. Overall, there are around 57 countries with 
armed forces numerically superior to ours. As a proportion of population, we have around 
one-quarter of one per cent of our population engaged as full-time military personnel. This is 
less than European nations Spain (0.29%), Italy (0.29%) and France (0.35%), and behind the 
United States (0.49%). In fact, in our selection, the only Western countries we comfortably 
beat are those well-known strategic optimists, Canada and New Zealand (both of which have 
their strategic approaches covered by more powerful neighbours) and Sweden which makes 
extensive use of reserve personnel. That said; we do come ahead of Germany (0.24%) and 
the Netherlands (0.22%). In regional terms, we fall well behind Singapore (1.34%), Malaysia 
(0.37%) and Thailand (0.54%) but ahead of Japan (0.19%), China (0.17%), Indonesia (0.16%) 
and the Philippines (0.12%).  
Australia’s relatively modest ranking in terms of proportion of population needs to be seen 
in the context of our avowed ‘maritime strategy’. With the exception of a short period in the 
1960s which saw conscription boost the Army to over 40,000, Australia has never 
maintained a large peacetime standing Army. As a country with no land borders and no 
prospective adversaries with an amphibious capability, the imperative to develop a 
manpower-intensive land force is slight.  
Impact of the Global Financial Crisis 
In 2009, the ASPI Budget Brief devoted an entire chapter to the potential impact of the GFC. 
The key aspects of that analysis are updated below. Figure 5.25 shows the recorded and 
prospective economic contraction globally and for advanced and developing economies 
separately. As can be seen, the impact was more severe in the former. In fact, compared 
with the initial estimates from early 2009, developing countries have gotten off even more 
lightly than expected—typically 2-3% less contraction—thereby widening the gap between 
the impact on developed and developing counties.  
The results for specific countries and sub-regions are shown in the lower graph. Note that 
China and Australia managed to avoid the worst of the recession compared with our 
respective cohorts.  
Over the past twelve months, the world economic outlook has oscillated between 
pessimistic and uncertain. The ongoing sovereign debt crisis in Europe has cast a shadow 
over the global economy, growth in China has been less rapid than anticipated, and the 
United Kingdom is undergoing a double-dip recession. Overall, near-term growth projections 
are slightly less optimistic today than they were this time last year. The United States, in 
particular, is undergoing the slowest and most hesitant recovery from recession in the 
post-war era. Even in Australia, where the impact of the GFC was not severe, the recovery 
has been slow by historical standards.  
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Figure 5.25: The Great Recession  
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, April 2013. 
At the time, the GFC only had a limited impact on international defence spending—probably 
because insufficient time was available to make substantial adjustments. Three years later, 
and the longer-term consequences are beginning to emerge. As shown earlier, from around 
2010 onwards, substantial cuts have been made in a number of countries.  
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From the perspective of defence spending (and government spending more generally), the 
GFC did two things. First, it rapidly exacerbated long-standing problems with government 
debt in many advanced economies, seeFigure 5.26.  
 Figure 5.26: The GFC and government debt  
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2013. 
Second, the GFC removed the complacency surrounding the sustainability of the financial 
system in general and government finances in particular. No longer is it possible to pretend 
that advanced economies can live beyond their means forever. Moreover, the GFC forced 
many countries to face up to the fiscal dilemma caused by ageing populations. A 2010 study 
by the IMF projects that, on current policy settings, the average general government net 
debt among G-7 countries will reach 200% by 2030 and 441% by 2050.  
The extent to which a country decides to reduce its defence spending as a result of mounting 
debt will depend on many factors—economic, strategic and cultural. A proper analysis of 
how these factors might come together for even one country is beyond the scope of this 
brief. But as we’ve already seen, a number of advanced economies are already working 
towards fiscal consolidation, including through cuts to defence spending.  
As a guide to the extent of fiscal pressures, key economic and fiscal data for countries of 
interest has been collected in Table 5.7. France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the 
United States all face sizable growing debts. And while the United States used to be a 
possible exception when it came to fiscal pressure because it owns the world’s reserve 
currency, the devaluation of the US dollar is eroding that comfort.   
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As the data makes clear, there will be much more pressure on advanced economies to rein 
in defence spending than on developing ones. Among the advanced countries, Australia is in 
a relatively strong position given its low debt and relatively shallow downturn.  
It is worth noting that the debt held by advanced economies will be more difficult to pay off 
than that in developing countries. Not just because advanced economies tend to owe a 
greater share of GDP, but also because developing economies grow two or three times 
faster than their advanced counterparts. Japan, in particular, faces an increasingly serious 
situation where its ageing population will impede growth at the same time as aged care and 
health costs rise in the years ahead. China, on the other hand, could erase its public debt 
within several years if it chose to do so.  
 
References and sources 
Economic data including GDP, deflators and CPI indices comes taken from the International Monetary 
Fund’s World Economic Outlook Database 2013 (April 2013) available at www.imf.org. Most of the 
defence spending data is taken from successive editions of the International Institute of Strategic 
Studies’ The Military Balance from 1980 to 2013. Additional data has been drawn from the 
Department of Defence’s Defence Economic Trends produced by the Defence Intelligence 
Organisation between 2000 and 2007. Defence Economic Trends is available at 
http://www.defence.gov.au/dio/product.html. Additional national defence spending data has been taken 
from: Analysis of the FY 2012 Defense Budget Request, 2012, from the Center for Strategic and 
Budgetary Analysis available at www.csbaonline.org; China’s National Defense in 2010, the Defense 
White Paper for the People’s Republic of China, available at http://china.org.cn/e-white/index.htm; 
Historical Statistics of Japan; The Statistical Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications, Japan, http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/chouki/index.htm. The IMF study referred 
to is ‘Long-term Trends in Public Finances in the G-7 Economies’, Carlo Cottarelli and Andrea 
Schaechter, SPN/10/13, 2010.  
 
 
Embargoed from publication/broadcast until release 30 May 2013, 2pm.
  
168 
Table 5.7: Pressures on government spending that might curtail defence spending 
 
Fiscal 
balance 
 2013 
(% GDP) 
 
 
Percentage annual  
GDP growth 
 
 
Net general government debt (IMF)  
or  
Public debt (CIA) 
 
as a share of annual GDP  
 2007 2009 2013 2005 2012 2018 
Advanced 
economies 
        
Australia -1.1% 4.6% 1.4% 3.0% -3.8% 11.6% 5.6% 
Canada -2.8% 2.1% -2.8% 1.5% 31% 34.6% 34.9% 
France -3.9% 2.3% -3.1% -0.1% 61% 84% 82% 
Germany -0.3% 3.4% -5.1% 0.6% 53% 57% 51% 
Italy -2.6% 1.7% -5.5% -1.5% 89% 103% 101% 
Japan -9.8% 2.2% -5.5% 1.6% 82% 134% 155% 
Korea 2.4% 5.1% 0.3% 2.8% 27% 32% 22% 
Netherlands -3.4% 3.9% -3.7% -0.5% 26% 32.5% 44% 
New Zealand -1.9% 3.5% -1.6% 2.7% 11.3% 26.4% 26.9% 
Singapore 5.0% 9.0% -0.8% 2.0% 102% 111% - 
Spain -6.6% 3.5% -3.7% -1.6% 35% 72% 98% 
Taiwan   -3.0% 6.0% -1.8% 3.0% 32% 36% - 
United Kingdom -7.0% 3.6% -4.0% 0.7% 37% 83% 91% 
United States -6.5% 1.9% -3.1% 1.9% 49% 88% 87% 
Regional 
economies 
       
Indonesia -2.8% 6.3% 4.6% 6.3% 56% 24.8% - 
Malaysia -4.0% 6.5% -1.5% 5.1% 45% 53.5% - 
Philippines -0.8% 6.6% 1.1% 6.0% 74% 51% - 
Thailand -2.7% 5.0% -2.30% 5.9% 48% 43.3% - 
Vietnam  -4.0% 8.5% 5.3% 5.2% 66% 48.2% - 
Emerging 
powers 
       
China -2.1% 14.2% 9.2% 8.0% 31% 31.7% - 
India -8.3% 10.1% 5.0% 5.7% 60% 51.9% - 
Russia -0.3% 8.5% -7.8% 3.4% 28% 12.2% - 
Source: International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook, April 2013, CIA Factbook 2013.  
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Chapter 6 – The Cost of War 
Introduction 
The 2003-04 ASPI Budget Brief included a full 
analysis of the cost of all deployments since 
1999-2000. In later briefs, rather than repeat that 
extensive discussion, we’ve maintained a shorter 
format. This chapter includes an explanation of how 
Defence is funded for deployments, updated 
information on historical deployment costs and a 
summary of the cost of recent operations including 
Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, the accumulating 
number of disability pensioners arising from recent 
deployments is surveyed. 
What do we mean by the cost of a war? 
As a rule, Defence is supplemented for the net additional cost of any major military 
operation. This makes good sense because, in principle at least, it ensures that Defence does 
not have to compromise peacetime training to fund operations, and avoids them having to 
maintain a contingency reserve to cover unanticipated costs. This practice was suspended in 
2008-09 because of a surplus of funding. It was then reinstated in 2009-10 but has only been 
applied partially since then because of the absorption of the cost of force protection 
measures in Afghanistan.  
Figure 6.1 shows how the net additional cost of an operation is calculated. In the past, 
Defence only disclosed the aggregate net additional operations cost, the total value of new 
capital investment and the amount recovered from third parties. However, although offsets 
remain undisclosed, Defence sometimes provides itemised lists of the individual costs 
incurred in operations. 
Figure 6.1 Calculating the ‘Net Additional Cost of War’ 
 
Net Additional 
Cost of War 
 
  = 
Net  
Additional 
Operations 
Cost 
 
 + 
Net 
Additional 
Capital 
Investment 
 
Where: 
 
Net Additional 
Operations 
Cost 
 Additional 
costs above 
normal 
peacetime 
expenditure 
 Offsetting 
savings due to 
cancelled 
peacetime 
activities 
 Costs 
recovered 
from 
3rd parties 
=   
   
 
The net additional operations cost includes the additional cost of personnel allowances, 
shipping and travel, repair and maintenance, health and inoculations, ammunition, 
contracted support, fuel, inventory, consumables etc. Offsetting savings includes the money 
saved from foregone activities like the cancelled Exercise Crocodile 99 and the Avalon Air 
Key Points 
Since 1999, Australia has committed 
more than $15.7 billion on military 
operations/overseas deployments. 
The total commitment to operations in 
Timor-Leste has been $4.3 billion. 
The total commitment to operations in 
Afghanistan has been $8.3 billion. 
Defence has absorbed $1.7 billion of 
the cost of operations. 
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Show in 1999-00 due to the deployment of Australian Forces to East Timor. Those costs 
recovered from 3rd parties include the partial recouping of costs from the UN when 
participating in a UN peacekeeping operation.  
The net additional capital investment usually represents the accelerated filling of capability 
gaps specific to the operation. Recent examples include the purchase of additional electronic 
warfare self-protection (EWSP) equipment for the AP-3C maritime patrol aircraft for Iraq, 
and the rapid acquisition of the Javelin anti-armour missile for Afghanistan. Capital costs 
sometimes also include modifications to platforms and additional inventory purchases.  
It’s also worth being specific about what is not included. The net additional cost of an 
operation does not include pay and allowances that would normally be incurred, or the cost 
of operating platforms within the planned peacetime rate of effort. Nor does it cover the 
costs incurred outside of Defence by the Australian Federal Police, DFAT or others involved 
in operations. Thus, aside from additional items like new equipment, ammunition, transport 
and contracted services, the net additional cost is the marginal cost of increased ADF activity 
due to an operation. 
What’s the big picture? 
Figure 6.2 shows the net cost of Defence deployments from 1998-99 to 2016-17. Note that 
Defence had been directed to absorb costs of $22 million in 2007-08, $1,082 million in 
2008-09, $43.1 million in 2009-10, $271 million in 2010-11, $368 million in 2011-12, $176 
million in 2012-13 and $32.3 million in 2013-14.  
 Figure 6.2: The net additional cost of ADF operations 
Source: Defence Annual Reports and Budget Papers 
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Minor operations include: Bougainville, which cost $109 million between 1998 and 2003 (of 
which $43.3 million was absorbed by Defence); Border Protection, which will incur costs of 
$159 million between 2001 and 2013; the 2006 Commonwealth Games ($13 million); and 
support to the G20 Summit in 2014 ($7.1 billion).  
Figure 6.2 excludes the ‘force generation’ costs nominally associated with expanding the 
ADF by 3,555 troops for East Timor in late 1999. This was roughly $450 million per annum 
permanently included into the Defence funding base at the time of the 2000 White Paper. In 
the figure, ‘Afghanistan’ includes the Multinational Interception Force (MNIF) which became, 
for a time, part of the Iraq operation in March 2003.  
As shown in Figure 6.2, the cost of operations fell for the first time in eight years in 2012.  
New money for operations in the 2013-14 Budget  
In a departure from previous practice, the PBS does not explain the new supplementation 
that has been provided to cover the net additional cost of operational deployments beyond 
giving the figures [PBS page 31]. Here’s what we know about funding for ADF operations: 
Afghanistan  
The government has funded the ADF deployment to Afghanistan until June 2014 at a cost of 
$885 million for 2013-14, including $10 million for enhanced force protection measures 
(both including previous funding). The total commitment to the cost of operations in 
Afghanistan now stands at $8.3 billion since 2001. A sizable component of the ADF 
contingent will draw down at the end of 2013. 
Timor-Leste (East Timor) 
Last year, the government extended the ADF deployment to Timor-Leste until June 2013. 
The operation ceased on 27 March 2013 with the return of the final ADF elements. The total 
cost of operations in Timor-Leste now stands at $4.3 billion including ‘force generation’ since 
1999 or $2.5 billion exclusive of force generation.  
Solomon Islands 
The ADF contribution to the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands will cease in 
the second half of 2013; $11.3 million over one year has been provided for that purpose. The 
total cost of operations in the Solomon Islands now stands at $353 million.  
Note that the duration of the spending should not be taken as implying anything final about 
the likely length of deployment; operations are reviewed at least annually and new funding 
is added in each budget. Also, additional money is often provided post-deployment for 
repatriation and reconstitution of equipment. Nonetheless, ADF operations in Afghanistan, 
Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands are all drawing to a close. 
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Current operations at a glance 
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 Note: Force Generation funding to temporarily expand the Army and Air Force (which did not occur) is not included.  
 
Indicative deployed personnel numbers, circa May each year. 
 Note: numbers do not include approximately 400 personnel on border protection duty. 
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The human cost of war 
The financial costs of Australia’s military deployments do not account for the human cost 
incurred by deployed personnel and their families. A partial picture of this complex area is 
reflected in battle casualty statistics and disability pensions awarded to ADF members in 
recent conflicts. These are presented below in Figures 6.3 and 6.4. In Figure 6.4, the 
percentages refer to the percentage of the general veteran’s disability pension rate while 
the Special rate refers to totally and permanently (or temporarily) incapacitated. 
Figure 6.3: Battle casualties in Afghanistan 2002 to 2013 
 
Source: Department of Defence website, as at May 2013. 
Figure 6.4: Pensions arising from recent conflicts 
  
Source: Department of Veteran’s Affairs Annual Report 2011-12. 
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Chapter 7 – Defence Industry  
Since at least the 1970s, Australia has aspired to be 
self-reliant when it comes to its own defence. The 
caveats and qualifications to what is meant by 
self-reliance are many and changing, and need not 
concern us here. What’s important is that everyone 
agrees that an essential component of self-reliance 
is a local defence industry that can (at the least) 
repair, maintain and adapt the equipment used by 
our defence force.  
To this end, successive governments have adopted 
policies to ensure that Australia’s defence industrial 
base is adequate for the task. This outcome is 
deemed to be important enough for governments to publish formal defence industry policy 
statements from time to time. The last such statement was made by the Rudd government 
in June 2010. In recent years, Defence has also released ‘health checks’ of particular defence 
industry sectors as part of an ongoing process of assessment.  
There is also a series of mostly long-standing government programs designed to assist local 
industry. These include support for skills development (у$23 million p.a.), research and 
development (у$30 million p.a.) and export facilitation (у$11 million p.a.). The government 
also tries to leverage its foreign arms purchases to allow local firms to bid into global 
defence materiel supply chains.  
Despite the effort and priority accorded to maintaining a healthy local defence industry, 
there is surprisingly little hard data in the public domain about the size and shape of the 
sector. This chapter tries to redress that shortfall by collating and analysing what 
information is available. Our aim is to analyse macro trends, such as the rate of growth and 
pace of commercial consolidation or diversification. Readers seeking a detailed 
company-by-company description of the sector should consult the latest Australian Defence 
Magazine (ADM) Top-40 Defence Contractors (see ADM magazine Dec 2012/Jan 2013), a 
reliable and informative source from which much of the data used here is derived.  However, 
because of its unique status of being 100% government-owned, a detailed analysis of the 
ship builder ASC Pty Ltd has also been included here. In addition, a critical analysis of the 
shipbuilding plan outlined in the Future Submarine Industry Skills Plan (released in tandem 
with the 2013 Defence White Paper) has been included.  
Australian Defence Industry 
According to the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO), the Australian defence industry 
employs around 29,000 people, about 50% of whom are employed by Small to Medium 
Enterprises (SME). An SME is defined as a firm employing less than 200 employees. DMO 
further estimates that there are over 3,000 SMEs operating in local defence industry, mostly 
as subcontractors to a small number of prime contractors. In most cases, SMEs operating in 
the defence sector also trade in the civilian economy. This explains how 15,000 defence SME 
Key Points 
Local defence industry grew two-fold 
between 1995 and 2006 in terms of 
revenue, but has remained stagnant 
since.  
Local defence industry is dominated 
by a handful of foreign-owned 
companies. 
The new naval shipbuilding plan will 
make it more expensive to acquire the 
vessels in the DCP.     
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jobs can be spread between 3,000 companies (implying, naively, a mere five employees per 
SME).   
Of the amount spent on materiel acquisition and sustainment in Australia, DMO estimates 
that around a third goes to local SMEs and two-thirds to large enterprises. According to the 
2012 Defence Capability Plan, around $4.9 billion is currently being spent in Australia every 
year on defence materiel acquisitions ($1.4 billion) and materiel support ($3.5 billion). The 
latter figure excludes the $507 million DMO spends on fuels, oils and lubricants each year. 
Applying a little arithmetic to these official estimates reveals several interesting things. The 
average revenue per employee for a large (non-SME) defence firm is $225,300, and for an 
SME is only $112,650 per employee. The relatively low revenue per employee in defence 
SMEs probably reflects the fact that they receive further revenue as subcontractors to the 
larger defence firms (i.e. in addition to what they receive directly from Defence). Quite 
literally, some defence spending gets double handled so the consequential turnover in local 
defence industry exceeds the amount that Defence initially spends. Assuming that defence 
SMEs actually generate revenue per employee at the same rate as large defence firms, total 
revenue for the sector would be $6.5 billion (of which $1.6 billion is double counted).  
But in absolute terms, even revenue of $225,300 per employee is low compared with the 
average ($408,000) for Australian manufacturing firms (ABS series 8155 for 2009-10). But 
this latter figure is inflated by the high output per employee in the large-scale 
capital-intensive petroleum and primary metal production. Arguably better comparators are 
‘transport equipment manufacture’ ($388,500 per employee) and ‘machinery and 
equipment manufacturing’ ($303,464 per employee). The remaining difference in revenue 
per employee probably reflects a combination of three factors: poor economies of scale 
leading to relatively high fixed labour-intensive administrative overheads, an absence of 
mechanisation (due to poor economies of scale), and intrinsically labour-intensive software 
and computer work.   
The size of the Australian defence industry sector is compared with manufacturing and 
Australian industry overall in Table 7.1.  
Table 7.1: The scale of Australian defence industry (circa 2010-2013) 
 
Australian  
Industry 
Australian Manufacturing 
Sector 
Australian  
Defence Industry 
employees 10,057,000 955,000 29,000 
revenue ($m) 2,587,204 389,980 6,500 
value add ($m) 832,247 96,809 *2,025 
revenue per employee $257,254 $408,356 $225,300 
Source: ABS series 8155, DMO and ASPI analysis. *estimated as explained below 
It follows that defence industry accounts for 0.29% of jobs in Australia, equivalent to 3% of 
jobs in the manufacturing sector. In terms of annual revenue, defence industry accounts for 
0.26% of Australian industry and 1.74% of the manufacturing sector. Moreover, if we 
assume that defence industry results in the same ratio of value added to revenue (31%) as 
the (relatively high value add) machinery and equipment manufacturing sector, the defence 
sector gives rise to only around 0.25% of Australia’s GDP. So although Australian defence 
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industry is undoubtedly important for our defence force, it represents only a small fraction 
of the overall Australian economy.  
A closer look 
Getting below the aggregate data for local defence industry is difficult because there aren’t 
any official statistics on the detailed size and shape of the sector. Fortunately, however, the 
ADM has been surveying local defence contractors since 1995 and has generously made 
their eighteen years of data available to us. Two points need to be made before proceeding. 
First, the nature of the survey results in both limitations and uncertainties on the data set—
these will be pointed out as we go. Second, ASPI takes full responsibility for the analysis and 
conclusions which follow. Whatever violence is done to the data is our fault alone. 
The best way to understand the data set is to look in detail at the latest results presented in 
the Dec 2012/Jan2013 edition of the ADM. The Top-40 Defence Contractors list, as it is 
known, details the top 40 firms contracted to deliver goods and services to Defence either 
directly or via sub-contracting work to prime contractors. This includes not only defence 
materiel production and maintenance, but also functions such as catering, cleaning and 
facilities construction. Because these latter activities draw services from the highly 
competitive broader economy, they are of less interest to us and are therefore excluded as 
far as possible in what follows.  
This is not to imply that such suppliers are irrelevant to the operation of the ADF—far from 
it, they are absolutely essential. But our concern is with companies with specialist defence 
materiel knowledge who are usually highly dependent upon defence contracts for survival.  
Irrespective of what Defence might do, there will always be companies ready to build 
facilities, cook meals, clean buildings, mow lawns and transport goods. The same is not true 
of firms capable of supplying and sustaining military equipment, hence our focus on these 
firms.  
Table 7.2 lists the ADM Top-40 for 2012 with defence materiel and non-defence materiel 
companies separated. Some companies straddle the boundary between providing civil and 
defence specific items, particularly in the information and telecommunications sector. 
We’ve done our best to assign such companies on the balance of their activities. 
It should also be kept in mind that the ADM Top-40 survey is voluntary and from time to 
time companies have chosen not to participate—sometimes reflecting a policy of 
non-disclosure.  
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Table 7.2: ADM Top-40 Defence Contractors 2012 
Rank Company 
Revenue 
($m) 
Personnel 
$ per 
employee 
('000s) 
Predominately defence materiel contractors  
1 BAE Systems Australia 1,700 5,500 309 
2 Thales Australia 815 3,300 247 
3 ASC Pty Ltd 796 2,300 346 
4 Raytheon Australia Pty Ltd 736 1,480 497 
5 Australian Aerospace Limited 600 1,100 545 
8 Boeing Defence Australia 322 1,300 248 
10 Transfield Services 242 1,200 202 
11 Lockheed Martin Australia Pty Limited 208 725 287 
12 Saab Technologies Australia 166 340 489 
13 DMS Maritime Pty Limited 150 450 333 
14 Qantas Defence Services Pty Limited 127 400 318 
18 Sikorsky Helitech 80 185 432 
19 CSC Australia Pty Ltd 79 500 158 
20 Babcock Pty Ltd 65 298 218 
22 CAE Australia Pty Ltd 60 152 395 
24 Nova Systems 55 190 289 
25 Qinetiq Pty Ltd 53 300 177 
27 Australian Defence Apparel Pty Ltd 47 255 184 
29 CEA Technologies Pty Limited 46 265 172 
30 Airbus Military 38 20 1,900 
30 Chemring Australia 38 85 447 
32 Austal 35 470 74 
32 General Dynamics Land Systems - Australia 35 85 412 
32 Rohde & Schwarz (Australia) Pty Ltd 35 46 761 
32 Safe Air Limited 35 260 135 
39 KBR 32 275 117 
40 Communications Design & Management Pty Limited 32 164 193 
Total 6626.4 21,645 306   
Predominately non-defence materiel contractors    
6 John Holland Group Pty Ltd 421 240 1,755 
7 Spotless Services Australia Ltd 350 950 368 
9 Serco Sodexo Defence Services Pty Ltd 314 2900 108 
15 Compass Group (Australia) Pty Ltd - ESS 110 650 169 
16 IBM Australia Limited 103 260 394 
17 Aspen Medical 96 1426 67 
21 Adagold Aviation Pty Ltd 63 12 5,233 
23 Accenture 59 ?   
26 GHD  53 ?   
28 Serco Asia Pacific 46 ?   
32 DHL Global Forwarding 35 ?   
37 Sinclair Knight & Merz Pty Ltd - SKM 35 ?   
38 AECOM 34 ?   
  Total 1,718 6,438+  
Source: ADM Top-40 Defence Contractors –1995-2012, published by Australian Defence Magazine, Dec/Jan edition each year. 
Surveying the data reveals several interesting things. To start with, several companies have 
surprisingly low revenues per employee, as low as $74,000 in one instance, which probably 
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reflects an overstatement of the number of employees engaged in defence work within the 
firm. Conversely, a number of firms have surprisingly high revenues per employee, of the 
sort more commonly attached to large-scale capital-intensive primary production. Setting 
aside the possibility that Defence is simply paying egregious monopoly rents, there are two 
likely explanations. First, some firms may have included revenue earned from retailing 
imported equipment. Indeed, several of the companies in question import weapons systems 
on a large scale. Second, other firms (particularly in the facilities construction sector) have a 
natural heavy reliance on subcontractors.  
Taking the data at face value, it says that the top thirty contractors by defence revenue have 
a collective turnover of $6.6 billion and employ around 21,650 people, implying average 
revenue per employee of $305,000 a year. While these figures are broadly commensurate 
with those derived earlier from Defence’s aggregate data, it appears that Defence might 
have overestimated the number of people employed in the sector (leading to the 
surprisingly low average revenue per employee previously mentioned). With no further 
information available to decide the matter, we turn now to examine the ADM dataset in 
more detail. 
Over the past seventeen years, the top five firms in any given year have accounted for, on 
average, 65% of total revenue of defence materiel contractors in the ADM Top-40. In 2012, 
as shown in Figure 7.1, the share was 70%.   
Figure 7.1: Revenue distribution for ADM Top-40 2012 
 
Source: ADM Top-40 Defence Contractors –1995-2012, published by Australian Defence Magazine, Dec/Jan edition each year. 
From year to year, the actual companies in the top five change as contracts ebb and flow. 
Yet the current major players are easily identified. Table 7.3 reproduces the key prime 
contractors identified in the government’s 2010 defence industry policy statement. It is 
important to note that only one of the firms—the government-owned ASC Pty Ltd—is 
controlled by an Australian-based entity, with the remainder split between the United States 
and Europe.   
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Table 7.3: Key Australia-based prime contractors 
Prime 
Parent 
company or 
owner 
Country of 
origin 
Key activities 
Per cent of 
parent 
revenues 
Stock exchange 
listing 
ASC Pty Ltd 
Australian 
Government 
Australia 
submarines and 
ships 
n/a n/a 
Australian 
Aerospace 
EADS 
France, 
Germany & 
Spain 
helicopters < 1 Paris 
BAE Systems 
Australia 
BAE United Kingdom varied 3.2 London 
Boeing Defence 
Australia 
Boeing United States aerospace 0.5 New York 
Raytheon 
Australia 
Raytheon United States 
systems 
integration 
1.3 New York 
Saab Systems Saab AB Sweden 
land and 
maritime 
3.1 Stockholm 
Lockheed 
Martin Australia 
Lockheed 
Martin 
United States 
electronic and 
information 
systems 
<1 New York 
Thales Australia Thales France 
maritime and 
varied 
2 Paris 
Source: 2010 Defence Industry Policy Statement. 
Foreign ownership of our key prime defence contractors brings benefits and risks. On the 
plus side, we undoubtedly get better access to foreign weapons systems than we otherwise 
would. In addition, foreign subsidiaries in Australia can ‘reach back’ to their parent owners 
for skilled personnel, knowledge and intellectual property. And because we have 
relationships with arms manufacturers on both sides of the Atlantic, competitive pressures 
can in theory be brought to bear when making purchases.   
On the minus side, because foreign-owned Australian primes account for very small shares 
of parent company revenue, they are unlikely to command priority if a commercial or 
strategic conflict of interest arises. For example, if a foreign parent has to choose between 
supplying Australia or its home country with munitions in a crisis, there is no question about 
what will happen. In most areas this is unavoidable; Australia does not have sufficient 
demand to support fully indigenous defence industrial capabilities in all but a limited range 
of niche areas. Choosing and maintaining such capabilities is a strategic challenge of the first 
order.  
The relatively small number of prime contractors operating in Australia is consistent with the 
consolidation of defence manufacturing that has been underway in Europe and the United 
States since 1945 and which accelerated following the end of the Cold War. However, in our 
particular case, the local cycle of having a small number of large defence projects 
dominating spending at any one time is probably also important. It’s perhaps noteworthy 
that revenue among local defence firms broadened between 1995 and 2006 (as the Anzac 
and Collins programs were completed) and narrowed again between 2006 and 2011, see 
Figure 7.2. The consolidation of various local companies over the years may have also played 
a role. Some of the key mergers and acquisitions are depicted in Figure 7.3.  
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Figure 7.2: Revenue distribution for top-30 defence contractors 1995 to 2012  
 Source: ADM Top-40 Defence Contractors –1995-2012, published by Australian Defence Magazine, Dec/Jan edition each year. 
Figure 7.3: Key mergers, acquisitions and name changes in local defence industry  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With eighteen years of data on local defence industry, the obvious question is whether the 
sector has grown or contracted over time. Figure 7.4 provides the answer using the 
Consumer Price Index to inflate historical data. Because total revenues are dominated by a 
small number of large turnover firms every year, changes to the ADM Top-40 over time are a 
credible indicator of trends in the sector. Roughly speaking, the size of the sector in revenue 
terms has almost doubled since the mid-1990s. Looking more closely, three eras can be 
identified; moderate growth during the late 1990s, rapid growth in the early- to mid-2000s, 
and stagnation over the past six years at a higher than usual level. It is not surprising that 
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Defence. Similarly, the mounting deferrals of investment and various efficiency measures of 
recent years broadly accord with the observed stagnation in growth.   
Figure 7.4: Growth and stagnation: Turnover of defence materiel contractors in ADM Top 40 
 Source: ADM Top-40 Defence Contractors –1995-2012, published by Australian Defence Magazine, Dec/Jan edition each year. 
At this point it is natural to compare the trends in local defence industry with spending by 
Defence on materiel. However, this can only be done with the caveat that repeated changes 
to Defence's accounting rules and reporting make this difficult, as does the absence and 
unreliability of data in the years around the turn of the century. Our best attempt to make 
sense of the available data appears in Figure 7.5. It looks as though the share of local work 
rose and fell with the wave of large naval construction and aviation upgrades in the 1990s. 
Figure 7.5: Percentage of equipment by cost purchased locally 1975 to 2013-14  
 Source: Defence Annual Reports and FAD&T SLC Question on Notice 44, 29 May 2012. 
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It’s possible that the levelling off in revenue for local firms after 2006 (and the corresponding 
reduced share of total investment) also reflects the increasing tendency of governments to 
purchase equipment off-the-shelf from foreign suppliers. Recent examples include the 
twenty-four F/A-18 Super Hornet fighters and five C-17 Globemaster transport aircraft. 
Fortunately, the United States Government collects and discloses detailed information on 
commercial and government-to-government arms exports through the US Foreign Military 
Sales (FMS) program. Similarly, the European Union publishes the value of export licences 
granted each year. Historical trends in US and EU defence exports to Australia are shown in 
Figure 7.6, where it should be noted that the figures include both equipment acquisitions 
and sustainment goods and services such as spare parts and repair of rotable items. To allow 
comparison, the value of each year’s exports has been converted from US and Euro to 
Australian dollars at the prevailing exchange rate before translation into 2011 dollars. 
Figure 7.6: US defence exports and European Union export licences to Australia (billion 2011 A$) 
 
Source: Data from US Security Cooperation Agency, as at 30 September 2011, and US State Department export controls reports.  
Looking at the surge in foreign exports to Australia in the period 2005 to 2010, it’s plausible 
that spending was diverted from local to foreign suppliers, thereby contributing to the 
recent plateau in local revenue. Recent analysis by the Australian Business Defence Industry 
Unit (an industry group representing small to medium local enterprises) supports this 
hypothesis. Between 2007-08 and 2011-12 the percentage of Defence Materiel Organisation 
contracts going to local firms fell from 80% to 53%. Over the same period, the number of 
contracts going directly to the United States through the FMS program grew from 12% to 
over 40%. 
Conclusion 
Hopefully, the brief analysis presented here will provide grist for the mill for those interested 
in the local defence industry. To the extent that conclusions can be drawn from the data, the 
picture is mixed. While the past decade and a half has seen the scale of local industry grow 
substantially, growth has all but stalled since around 2007. The likely main reasons are 
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slowing defence investment and a rise in imports. Accordingly, the future prospects for local 
industry will depend on whether and how quickly defence spending recovers from the 
current retrenchment and the extent to which future purchases come from offshore.  
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ASC Pty Ltd (formerly the Australian Submarine Corporation) 
The Australian Submarine Corporation was formed in 1985, and in 1987 was awarded the 
contract to build six Collins class submarines. Initially, ownership of the corporation was 
shared between the Australian Government, submarine designer Kockums of Sweden, 
Wormald International and Chicago Bridge and Iron, but by 1991 only Kockums and the 
government remained as shareholders. In 2000, the Australian Government bought out 
Kockums and became the sole owner.  
Overview 
At present, ASC is operated as a Government Business Enterprise (GBE) under the 
Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997 with the Minister for Finance and 
Deregulation as sole shareholder. Consistent with its status as a GBE, the company has a 
board made up of executive and non-executive members. The corporate structure appears 
below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The three direct subsidiaries of ASC reflect the diversification of ASC into areas beyond the 
construction, upgrade and maintenance of the Collins class. ASC Engineering was established 
to undertake the design, construction and project management of civil heavy engineering 
projects. At present, ASC Engineering is not an active entity. Deep Blue Tech was established 
to secure a role in the design of the Collins class replacement. With around 60 personnel, 
Deep Blue Tech is working on options for the future submarine. The largest of the three 
entities, ASC Shipbuilding, was established to bid for what has become the $8 billion Air 
Warfare Destroyer project for the RAN. Its two subsidiaries ASC Modules and ASC AWD 
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Shipbuilding were created to operate within the AWD Alliance which we explore in detail in 
the next section. ASC also runs a submarine training school for the RAN that is based in WA. 
Putting aside the latent ASC Engineering and nascent Deep Blue Tech, there are two main 
projects underway at ASC: the construction of the AWD, and sustainment and upgrade of 
the Collins fleet. The former occurs at the ‘ASC South’ facility at Osborne SA while the latter 
occurs mostly at the (original) ‘ASC North’ facility at Osborne SA. Some additional submarine 
work is also undertaken at ‘ASC West’ in WA near the RAN submarine homeport. ASC South 
and ASC North are separated by the SA Government’s taxpayer-funded Common User 
Facility which includes the massive ship-lift and hardstand being used for the consolidation 
and later launch of the three AWDs by ASC.  
There are two ways to track the scale of activity at ASC over time: financial turnover and 
personnel numbers. As shown in Figure 7.7, the ASC workforce grew during the construction 
of the Collins fleet and fell before rising again as the full volume of Collins class remediation, 
upgrade and maintenance work was felt. In recent days, the ASC workforce has grown to 
around 2,400 as the AWD workload approaches its maximum.  
Figure 7.7: ASC workforce 1987 to 2012 
 
Source: ASC Pty Ltd Annual Reports 
Only a small number of personnel were employed by ASC on the AWD project prior to 2006 
(and even in that year the AWD workforce was only about 60 staff). Consequently, by the 
middle of the last decade, the size of the ASC workforce engaged in submarine 
post-construction work was close to the peak reached during the Collins construction 
program twelve years earlier. This demonstrates the relative high labour-intensity of Collins 
through-life-support compared with construction.  
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The consolidated corporate turnover and profit for recent years is shown overleaf in 
Figure 7.8, where the increase in revenue after the commencement of AWD construction in 
mid-2007 is clear. Note, however, that ASC’s after-tax profit as a share of revenue fell from 
9.7% in 2007 to 0.8% in 2010 and 1.5% in 2011. This reflects a decision to reinvest profits 
back into the business, including into facilities and Deep Blue Tech.  
Figure 7.8: ASC Key Financial Results  
 
Source: ASC Pty Ltd Annual Reports 
We now turn to examine in Dickensian fashion the various activities of ASC in a little more 
detail before concluding with some observations about its future ownership. 
The ghost of submarines past—Collins through-life support 
For reasons that we do not understand, Defence failed to have a through-life-support 
strategy or contract in place for the Collins class at the end of the construction program. 
Instead, ASC undertook piecemeal work as requested to maintain, repair and upgrade the 
fleet. In 2003, a long-term Through Life Support Agreement (TLSA) was established between 
Defence and ASC. Nominally a 15-year $3.5 billion agreement, the TLSA is essentially a 
cost-plus contract with limited options for incentives and sanctions.  
Because we do not know the price paid each year to ASC to maintain the Collins, we have to 
rely on the reported total sustainment costs for an indication of costs. Note that total 
sustainment costs include many things that do not result in payments to ASC (such as fuel 
and government furnished equipment). In particular, sustainment of mission system items 
such as sonar, combat system and electronic warfare is provided separately by other 
suppliers through DMO. Total sustainment costs for the Collins fleet are given in Figure 7.9, 
beginning with the first year that data is available, 2007-08. To allow a comparison over 
time, historical costs have been inflated using the 2.5% deflator applied to the Defence 
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budget. Known payments to ASC under the TLSA for sustainment and projects have also 
been included. 
Figure 7.9: Total annual Collins class sustainment costs 
  
Source: Defence Annual Reports and 2013-14 PAES, FAD&T QoN 19, 17 October 2012 & Q196, 28/29 May 2012. 
Caution must be exercised when inferring anything from Figure 7.9, large year-to-year 
fluctuations naturally arise due to the timing of full-cycle-dockings, spares purchases, and 
the number of boats actually being operated by the RAN (as opposed to lying idle absent a 
crew). 
Notwithstanding these uncertainties, the overall cost of sustaining the Collins fleet is 
perceived to be high. Coupled with long-standing problems with the availability and 
reliability of the vessels, this has led to three initiatives that are reshaping the sustainment 
of the fleet and ASC’s role therein.  
First, ASC has a comprehensive program to boost labour productivity. As a 
government-owned entity working under what are effectively cost-plus contracts, it would 
be surprising if inefficiency had not crept in over time. Initial reports confirm this to be case, 
with substantial improvements achieved over the past couple of years—including a boost in 
labour utilisation from 30% to 75% in some areas.  
Second, in June 2012 Defence and ASC agreed a performance-based In-Service Support 
Contract (ISSC). By moving away from cost-plus reimbursement for work, ASC will have 
strong incentives to continue productivity and performance improvements within its 
business. 
Third, the government is implementing the recommendations of a review of Collins 
sustainment undertaken by an independent expert, Mr John Cole. The phase one report, 
which was delivered in December 2011, identified a host of problems within and between 
Defence, DMO, Navy and ASC that contribute to poor and/or costly outcomes for Collins 
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class sustainment. The phase two report was delivered in December 2012 and suggested the 
following target levels for the Collins fleet: 
x 2 boats available 100% of the time 
x 3 boats available 90% of the time 
x 4 boats available 50% of the time. 
To achieve this, the report made 25 recommendations, including reducing the length of 
full-cycle dockings from three to two years, moving to a cycle involving a one-year mid-cycle 
docking and six-month intermediate dockings, and appointing a Transformation Manager to 
implement the report’s recommendations. 
Overall then, it looks as though the arrangements for sustainment of the Collins class are 
finally going to be put on a solid technical and commercial base—eighteen years after the 
first vessel entered service. This will hopefully mean a more integrated relationship between 
ASC and its customer as well as higher expectations of performance and efficiency.] 
The ghost of ships present—the Air Warfare Destroyer project 
In October 2001, the last of the RAN’s three Charles F Adams class DDG destroyers, HMAS 
Brisbane, was decommissioned, leaving a capability gap in the area of fleet air defence. The 
2000 Defence White Paper (produced sometime after the stable door had been left wide 
open) included Project SEA 4000 Air Warfare Destroyer to redress the shortfall. After 
preliminary studies in the first half of the decade, the project effectively gained first pass 
approval in mid-2005 when two companies, ASC Shipbuilding and Raytheon Australia, were 
selected as alliance partners to work with Defence to take the proposal forward to second 
pass. A third firm, Gibbs and Cox, was designated as the preferred designer, with Spanish 
builder Navantia also engaged as a design partner. 
Two options were developed for second pass consideration: an Australianised (and smaller) 
version of the US DDG-51 Arleigh Burke destroyer, the so-called ‘baby Burke’, and the 
military-off-the-shelf Spanish F-100 frigate with an Australianised combat system. In each 
case, the core of the combat system was to be the Lockheed Martin Aegis system with its 
phased array radar. Purchase of the combat system commenced in 2006 under an FMS 
program with the United States Government. 
When the F-100 was announced as the winner in June 2007, some people were surprised. 
Gibbs and Cox, the designer of the DDG-51, had been designated as the ‘preferred designer’ 
of the evolved option back in 2005 and many perceived the F-100 as a 'stalking horse' to put 
commercial pressure on the US option. As it turned out, the extra cost and risk associated 
with a scaled-down but on-paper-only DDG-51 tipped the balance in favour of the smaller 
pre-existing Spanish vessel.  
From the commencement of the project through to second pass, a total of $251 million was 
spent, excluding long lead-time purchases for the Aegis combat system. Most of the money 
(roughly $211 million) was spent in the two years between mid-2005 and mid-2007. It 
remains to be explained how so much money was spent simply to make a decision between 
two designs. 
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The AWD Alliance, as it is known, involves three parties in a contractual arrangement, which 
is novel for Australian Defence (see Figure 7.10). ASC is the designated shipbuilder, Raytheon 
Australia is the combat system integrator and DMO acts as both the customer on behalf of 
the RAN (and ultimately the Commonwealth) and as a full participant in the alliance. 
Governance is exercised by a Board made up of representatives of the three parties with a 
commitment to consensus decision-making.  
The alliance is predicated upon an ‘equitable sharing of risks and rewards’ between the 
three participants. In practice, this revolves around achieving a Target Cost Estimate (TCE) 
for the project that was developed back in 2007. The TCE is around $4.5 billion for the work 
covered by the alliance. This includes the direct recovery cost of planned activities by the 
participants and their respective subcontractors. The remainder of the overall $8 billion 
project cost involves other expenses to be covered directly by DMO, including government 
furnished equipment such as the Aegis combat system.  
 
Figure 7.10: The AWD Alliance   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DMO also holds the prospective ‘fee’ made up of an agreed profit margin and corporate 
overhead provision from which the alliance’s ‘gain-share’ and ‘pain-share’ is managed. 
Here’s how it works. If the alliance manages to meet the target cost estimate, the industry 
participants each receive a proportionate share of the overall target fee. If the project comes 
in under budget, all three participants share the unspent funds up to the amount of twice 
the fee. If the project goes over budget, the additional costs are shared by all three 
participants up to the amount of twice the fee. After this point, the Commonwealth is 
responsible for any additional costs.  
Thus, if the fee was set at a hypothetical 10% of the TCE, the participants could share a 
maximum fee payment of 20% of the TCE, or share the extra costs and earn zero fee. 
Because the fee includes not just profit but also corporate overheads—which are likely to be 
substantial—participants have a strong incentive to meet and if possible come in under the 
TCE.  
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The critical point is that the risks and rewards are pooled for the three members of the 
alliance—it is the bottom line for the alliance as a whole that matters, not the individual 
performance of the participants. High productivity by one participant (or its subcontractors) 
benefits all participants proportionately; low productivity by one participant (or its 
subcontractors) imposes costs on all participants proportionately. Thus, the alliance 
encourages not only cooperation, but close monitoring of performance among participants.   
In addition to the ‘gain-share’ and ‘pain-share’ built around the TCE, there are potential 
additional payments and liquidated damages associated with project schedule milestones. 
These incentives and sanctions prevent alliance participants from sacrificing schedule to 
achieve the TCE. As a practical measure, the participants are able to progressively claim part 
of their prospective fee provided that progress meets planned cost and schedule targets. If 
this proves not to be the case at a later time, there is provision for a claw-back of the fee.  
Assuming that the TCE represents a credible estimate of the cost of the work to be done, the 
arrangement has clear merits. Not only are there strong incentives to meet cost and 
schedule targets, but the participants are encouraged to work together to solve problems 
and are inhibited from shifting costs between one another. Of course, if the TCE is uncertain 
or inadvertently erroneous, the whole arrangement becomes a lottery; with the potential for 
the taxpayer to be ripped off, or for the commercial participants to be taken to the cleaners. 
In principle, it is also possible that the participants have ‘gamed’ the TCE by setting it 
artificially high from the start—thus making it easy to achieve. With the project politically 
locked in long before the TCE was set, Defence arguably faced a soft budget constraint, with 
few incentives to drive a hard bargain. As we’ll see, this appears not to have occurred. For 
the purpose of what follows, we shall assume that the TCE is credible. 
Although the alliance arrangement brings benefits, no contracting arrangement is ever 
devoid of disadvantages or perverse incentives. In the particular arrangement adopted for 
the AWD, there are at least two risks to be aware of. In pointing these out, we do not mean 
to impugn the motivations of the actual participants, but rather to identify issues intrinsic to 
the alliance structure.  
The first risk is that of free-riding. Because pain and gain is shared among the members of 
the alliance, it’s possible for participants to allow others to do the heavy lifting to meet 
schedule and cost targets—or even to impose additional costs on the alliance in order to 
pursue other opportunities at a reduced cost to themselves. To understand why an alliance 
participant might do so, consider an alliance with four equal participants. If one of the 
participants acts (or fails to act) so as to increase the cost of the project by $100, they incur a 
loss of only $25. In contrast, under a traditional fixed price customer-supplier arrangement, 
a supplier carries the full $100 burden of any additional costs.  
Nonetheless, a loss is a loss; so there’s always some inventive for participants in an alliance 
to contain costs. But what if a participant has competing demands on its time and 
resources? For example, other projects to deliver or bid for. The logical course of action 
might be to redirect resources (such as management attention and skilled personnel) away 
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from the effectively subsidised alliance arrangement to avoid full opportunity costs 
elsewhere.  
While that risk arises in other contractual arrangements, it is accentuated in an alliance by 
the spreading of additional costs among participants.  And, as with free-riding more 
generally, the smaller the participant’s share of the whole, the more the tendency is 
accentuated. In this respect, alliances should work best when they have only a few 
members, all with relatively similar shares. On the basis of contracts signed back in 2007, the 
relative stakes of the industry participants in the AWD Alliance are Raytheon $1.7 billion and 
ASC $2.6 billion.  
The second risk is that the DMO will find itself with mixed motives. On the one hand, they 
will want to meet the TCE and schedule milestones so as to claim kudos for delivering a 
complex project (at least) on-time and on-budget. On the other hand, as an agent for the 
RAN, they will be under pressure to deliver as much capability as can be afforded. It is a 
simple fact that trade-offs will emerge between cost, schedule and capability throughout the 
project. To the extent that there is any ambiguity in the specification of the vessels to be 
delivered—and it is inevitable that there will be some—DMO will be under pressure from 
the RAN to exploit the ambiguity towards increased capability at the expense of cost and 
schedule.  
Such tensions routinely emerge in fixed price contracts and can become problematic (as 
witnessed in the recent AEW&C and FFG Upgrade projects). What makes the alliance 
different is that a proportion of the extra costs of additional capability can be continuously 
passed on to the other participants without hitting the barrier of a fixed contract price. One 
way or another, DMO will face a moral hazard; either delivering less than it can to the RAN, 
or imposing additional costs on its alliance partners. It is damned either way. Unlike a fixed 
price contract where it would naturally strive to achieve as much as it can for the RAN within 
the fixed contract price (and perhaps beyond if the basic product is not forthcoming), as 
both agent and alliance participant, its ultimate allegiance is unclear. In theory, an alliance 
ameliorates such a situation by providing all parties with visibility of each other’s position 
thereby reducing the likelihood of unrealistic expectations and unreasonable claims.   
Enough of what might go wrong. Let’s look at progress to date. It’s been almost five years 
since the project received second pass approval. The annual expenditure on pre- and 
post-approval phases of the project so far is shown in Figure 7.11. 
To date, the build phase of the project has spent $3,840 million from an approved project 
budget of $7,868 million, representing about 49% of available funds. Some care needs to be 
taken in inferring progress from aggregate expenditure because a significant share of the 
budget is allocated to the combat system and weapons purchases which are somewhat 
unrelated to the progress in physical construction. A better measure comes from comparing 
planned and actual expenditure on a year-by-year basis as in Figure 7.12. As can be seen, the 
project exceeded its spending targets for the first two years, fell well short for the next two, 
but came close to planned expenditure targets over the past two years.   
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Figure 7.11: AWD expenditure ($m)  
  
Source: Defence Annual Reports and 2013-14 PBS 
Figure 7.12: Planned and actual expenditure ($m)  
 
Source: Defence Annual Reports and 2012-13 PBS 
At the time of second pass approval, the first AWD was scheduled to be delivered in 
December 2014, the second in March 2016 and the third in June 2017. Due to early 
problems with the construction of modules, the schedule for the delivery of the first AWD 
has slipped by twelve months to December 2015.   
Specific issues included the difficulty of activating new and reactivating long unused 
fabrication operations, as well as problems with learning to work with the style of drawing 
provided by the Spanish designer. As a result, responsibility for fabricating 18 of the 90 
modules was reallocated in May 2011. Then, in March 2012, a further reallocation of 
modules occurred, resulting in additional work going offshore to Spain. It was thought at the 
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time that these changes, coupled with refinements within the consolidation yard, would be 
sufficient to make the revised schedule feasible. Indeed, work was well underway on the 
fabrication of the first two vessels and work had commenced on modules for the third.  
However, in September 2012 it was announced that there would be a further delay to AWD 
delivery. The formal announcement was unhelpfully ambiguous about the reasons for the 
delay. On the one hand it said that the ‘revised AWD plan will reduce peak demand on 
project critical resources and facilities, and reduces project risk’. On the other, it said that 
‘the delay will help avoid a decline in naval shipbuilding skills before the commencement of 
Australia’s largest and most complex naval project – the Future Submarine’.  
Table 7.4: Progressive delivery schedule for the AWD project  
 Original delivery date 2011 reschedule 2012 reschedule 
HMAS Hobart December 2014 December 2015 March 2016 
HMAS Brisbane March 2016 March 2017 September 2017 
HMAS Sydney June 2017 June 2018 March 2019 
Source: Various Ministerial Media Releases. 
It’s unlikely that the preservation of naval shipbuilding skills was a significant factor in 
bringing about the delay. As Figure 7.13 shows, most of the workforce was planned to have 
dissipated well prior to the delivery of the final vessel, so even with the additional 
nine-month delay for the final vessel, most of the workforce will have moved on from the 
maritime sector by 2016.  
Figure 7.13: AWD workforce demands – alliance plus local contractors  
Source: presentation by Defence official, January 2012 
What’s more, the skills needed at the end of a shipbuilding project are different to those 
needed at the start of a submarine project. Add to this that the Future Submarine project is 
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
Fe
b-
07
Ju
n-
07
O
ct
-0
7
Fe
b-
08
Ju
n-
08
O
ct
-0
8
Fe
b-
09
Ju
n-
09
O
ct
-0
9
Fe
b-
10
Ju
n-
10
O
ct
-1
0
Fe
b-
11
Ju
n-
11
O
ct
-1
1
Fe
b-
12
Ju
n-
12
O
ct
-1
2
Fe
b-
13
Ju
n-
13
O
ct
-1
3
Fe
b-
14
Ju
n-
14
O
ct
-1
4
Fe
b-
15
Ju
n-
15
O
ct
-1
5
Fe
b-
16
Ju
n-
16
O
ct
-1
6
Fe
b-
17
Trades  
 (6,332 work years) 
White Collar 
 (3,234 work years) 
Design 
 (586 work years) 
Combat System 
 (3,381 work years) 
we are here 
Embargoed from publication/broadcast until release 30 May 2013, 2pm.
195 
 
not due for second pass consideration until 2016–17 at the earliest, and it’s clear that 
maintaining skills in the sector for that purpose was largely irrelevant to the reschedule.  
One way that the workforce issue might be relevant (now if not necessarily back at the time 
of the announced delay) is if the government brings forward other work in the maritime 
sector, such as the Future Frigates. This possibility is discussed in the next section in the 
context of the Naval Shipbuilding Industry Plan contained in the Future Submarine Industry 
Skills Plan. 
Finally, there’s a curious point to be considered about the announcement of the delays. 
According to the Minister, the ‘new schedule will not increase the cost of the project’. At 
first blush, this is difficult to make sense of, at least from an industrial production 
perspective. By extending the project by nine months, the overheads due to the fixed 
administrative and engineering workforces will be extended, as will facilities operations 
costs. So even if the actual blue-collar production activity can be rescheduled at zero cost 
(which it probably can for a large project such as the AWD), additional costs will still arise in 
the production process. 
Of course, that does not necessarily mean that the price of the project to the government 
has to rise. One explanation for the ready embrace of the delays by industry is that they 
were having trouble delivering on schedule and were happy to be cut some slack. So happy 
in fact, that they were willing to bear the additional cost of an extended production schedule 
in order to avoid the risk of larger losses due to missed deadlines over the next few years. 
According to the Future Submarine Industry Skills Plan the financial consequence of the 
delays to the AWD project have been in the order of $200 million, which they attribute to 
‘lack of experience across production engineering and production supervision’. An 
alternative measure of the impact of the delays can be garnered from the shipbuilding 
workforce profiles provided in the Future Submarine Industry Skills Plan for the period prior, 
and subsequent, to the delays (Scenario 2 verses Scenario 5). The workforce demands in the 
charts group together the LHD and AWD projects, but since the LHD project is apparently 
going well, the difference must be due to the extension of the AWD schedule. With a sharp 
pencil and a little care, the additional workload can be measured. The result is around an 
additional 2,153 work-years (representing 19% of the total) to complete the project.  
It is difficult to credit that problems with engineering and supervision alone can account for 
a change this large—especially that we are now told that the problems have been fixed. It’s 
therefore likely that the problem was due in some measure to underestimating the amount 
of work required, or alternatively to overestimating the productivity that could be achieved.  
Ultimately the delays to the project are not the result of having too inexperienced an 
engineering and construction workforce, but rather reflect a failure by the alliance to 
understand what could be achieved with the workforce available to itself and its contractors. 
As the Future Submarine Industry Skills Plan observes, ‘[t]o an experienced shipbuilder, the 
result was predictable’. Nonetheless, Defence and Industry continue to depict the problems 
with the AWD as resulting from externalities beyond their control rather than accept 
responsibility for poor planning.  
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As would be expected, the problems and delays have been costly to the alliance participants. 
ASPI understands that the alliance is ‘behind the curve’ in meeting the TCE which means 
that, for the moment at least, participants stand to forego at least some of their anticipated 
profit and corporate overhead. That does not mean that the project will necessarily go over 
budget relative to the 2007 government approval (DMO presumably holds substantial 
contingency funds in reserve), but it does mean that the commercial participants stand to 
lose all or part of their fee if productivity does not improve sufficiently.  
With 33 months before the first vessel is delivered, there is a lot that could happen. The 
construction of modules and their consolidation are but initial steps along the road of fitting 
out the vessels with their propulsion, communications, navigation and weapons systems. On 
the basis of past experience, it would be fair to say that the hard parts are yet to come. 
Some appreciation of the complexity of the project can be gained from the workforce 
breakdown in Figure 7.13. 
Of the 135 worker-centuries of toil involved in the construction of the three AWD (pre 2012-
delays), less than half actually entail tradespersons fabricating the vessels. Despite being a 
proven off-the-shelf design, there are close to six centuries of design work needed. The 
remaining three and half millennia of effort is divided between 32 worker-centuries of 
white-collar engineering and administration and 34 worker-centuries for the development 
and installation of the combat system and its peripheral components. The former is hard to 
judge in the absence of a benchmark; certainly the project demands the close coordination 
of compatible inputs from a great many different suppliers—not to mention the 
administrative burden of the alliance itself.  
But what is certainly surprising, at least initially, is the very large workload associated with 
the combat system and components. However, the explanation is simple: despite much talk 
of the F-100 being an off-the-shelf option, the combat system was always intended (even 
prior to the choice of platform) to be ‘Australianised’ through the integration of a number of 
new peripheral systems with the core Aegis combat system. In the past, systems integration 
has been the bane of many a defence project. There is no doubt that there are risks intrinsic 
to the systems integration around the combat system akin to those that have caused serious 
problems in defence projects previously. For the moment at least, things are reportedly 
‘progressing well’. And it’s encouraging that when other countries have adapted the Aegis 
system to their specific requirements the problems have been manageable. We will have to 
wait and see.   
Finally, before leaving the AWD project, there is the long-term question of through-life 
support. Successive naval platforms have been delivered to the RAN without a coherent 
sustainment plan or contract in place. The Collins class is perhaps the most visible failure of 
this type, but other classes of vessel have suffered similarly. Regrettably, defence projects 
have sometimes sacrificed the purchasing of spares to accommodate cost pressures during 
acquisition. Let’s hope that a plan emerges soon.  (For the record, we said this last year.) 
The ghost of submarines future—replacing the Collins 
Just prior to the 2012 May budget, the government announced the next steps in the process 
of replacing the Collins class submarine. In broad terms, the goal is to achieve first pass 
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approval in late 2013 or early 2014 and second pass approval in 2017. The options being 
considered were (verbatim):  
x An existing submarine design available off-the-shelf, modified only to meet 
Australia’s regulatory requirements. 
x An existing off-the-shelf design modified to incorporate Australia’s specific 
requirements, including in relation to combat systems and weapons. 
x An evolved design that enhances the capabilities of existing off-the-shelf designs 
including the Collins Class. 
x An entirely new developmental submarine. 
Activities to take forward these options were outlined by the government, including: 
x Design studies of military-off-the-shelf options by French, German and Spanish 
companies. 
x Initial design studies for an updated Collins design by the Swedish firm Kockums that 
designed the Collins class.  
x An expert submarine design firm will be engaged to conduct cost and capability 
trade-off analysis of all options. 
x US firms Systems Planning and Analysis and Electric Boat will undertake work 
relating to a number of submarine conceptual designs.  
A total of $214 million over three years was allocated in 2012 for studies to support the 
Future Submarines Project. Table 7.5 outlines the allocation of that money. Note that the 
largest share of funds will be spent internally at Defence in DSTO. The Submarine Propulsion 
Energy Support and Integration Facility referred to is usually known as the Land-based Test 
Facility and will be used to develop a solution to the long-standing problems with the Collins 
propulsions system—potentially with application to its replacement.  
Table 7.5 
Activity $m 
Design studies with DCNS (France), HDW (Germany) & Navantia (Spain) 6.2 
Design studies with Kokum’s (Sweden) for new-build Collins 12.7 
Analysis of options 30.0 
Mission support studies 7.4 
Support system studies 3.0 
Various DSTO technical studies 62.2 
US support (Foreign Military Sales) 3 
Specialised computer systems and software 4.8 
Submarine Propulsion Energy Support and Integration Facility Development 8.6 
Submarine performance modelling 0.1 
Engineer development programs 1.6 
Engineer signature analysis studies 0.7 
Hydrodynamic design studies 1.4 
Collins IP purchase 30.9 
Miscellaneous studies 0.5 
Project Office costs 5.0 
Contingency 35.9 
Total 214.0 
Source: FAD&T QoN #20 17 October 2012.  
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Concurrent with the release of the 2013 Defence White Paper in May 2013, the government 
announced that it would:  
’…suspend further investigation of the two Future Submarine options based on military-off-
the-shelf designs in favour of focusing resources on progressing an ‘evolved Collins’ and new 
design options that are likely to best meet Australia’s future strategic and capability 
requirements’.  
Two points are worth noting. First, the effective shortlisting means that efforts will now be 
directed towards the two most costly, risky and time-consuming options for Collins 
replacement. Second, the word ‘suspend’ is far from accidental. The government has 
reserved the option of returning to the less costly and risky options at some point in the 
future.  
Also in May 2013, the government identified the US AN/BYG-1 as the reference combat 
system for the development of Future Submarine and announced the results of a study of 
the service life of the Collins:  
‘The study found there is no single technical issue that would fundamentally prevent the 
Collins Class submarines from achieving their indicative service life or a service life extension 
of one operating cycle for the fleet, which is currently around seven years, excluding docking 
periods’.  
Given the extended time necessary to execute the two options now being concentrated on, 
the extension of the Collins life-of-type by an additional operating cycle is now a foregone 
conclusion. 
Despite the raft of recent announcements, some things remain unclear. First, by what means 
will ‘an entirely new developmental submarine’ be investigated? Second, and more 
pertinent to the present discussion, what role if any will Deep Blue Tech play in any of the 
actions underway?   
Until clarification is gained on the role of ASC in general and Deep Blue Tech in particular, 
there is not much more to say, except that it would be extraordinary not to tap the latter 
resource to assist in some way. Submarine expertise is very hard to come by. Perhaps the 
Ministers for Defence and Finance should have a cup of coffee and discuss how this valuable 
national resource (ultimately owned by the taxpayer) can be put to best use—or at least to 
some use. 
Ownership of ASC Pty Ltd 
The ownership of ASC presents the government with a difficult problem. The past decade of 
public ownership has hardly been a resounding success. Relations between Defence and ASC 
have been difficult for much of the period—despite both entities being publicly owned. 
There has also been a manifest lack of coordination of activity, perhaps best demonstrated 
by ASC’s decision to develop a submarine design capability absent any sign from Defence 
that such a capability is desired. More generally, until recently, an orderly approach to 
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long-term management of the Collins fleet has fallen between the gaps within and between 
ASC and Defence.  
To some extent, the problems between ASC and Defence reflect the peculiar arrangement 
whereby Defence reports to one Minister, while ASC reports to another Minister through an 
independent board. A bit like doing business with a family member, it’s never clear whether 
you should be driving a hard bargain or doing them a favour. If ASC had been commercially 
owned, it's possible that a more business-like approach would have emerged sooner. Or 
perhaps the taxpayer would have just been taken for a ride as the commercial entity 
exploited Defence’s lack of business acumen.   
In principle, the Commonwealth would probably be better off if ASC was transferred to 
commercial ownership in the long term. But there are several difficulties with this 
proposition. From the government’s point of view, an inefficient publicly-owned entity might 
be preferable to an efficient privately-owned entity which it cannot control. Transferring 
ownership of ASC while still retaining strategic control of Australia’s only submarine support 
and fabrication facility is a sizable challenge.  
Equally challenging would be selling ASC without making a decision about the long-elusive 
‘national approach to naval shipbuilding’ eagerly sought by vested interests of various hues. 
The fear is that the government could very easily find itself at the mercy of a monopoly 
domestic shipbuilder following the sale of ASC.  
Finally, the sale of ASC is complicated by the ongoing massive contracts it has with 
Defence—contracts that would feel the cold winds of commercial due diligence before a sale 
could proceed. One of the difficult issues with a sale would be the indemnification of the 
buyer for the risks embedded in existing contracts—and all the moral hazard that entails.  
Sometimes the problem you know is better than one you have not yet experienced.  
Postscript – public transparency of ASC and the AWD project 
In preparing this discussion of ASC Pty Ltd and the AWD Alliance, it became apparent that 
the amount of public disclosure on each is surprisingly low. The quantity of useful detail 
provided in the ASC annual report has declined significantly since 2003. And as for the AWD 
Alliance, which is spending billions of taxpayers’ dollars, we only get an occasional press 
release and a couple of paragraphs in the Defence Annual Report. This is not good enough 
given that the AWD Alliance involves two fully government-owned entities and a single 
minority commercial participant.  
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Future Submarine Industry Skills Plan: A Plan for the Naval Shipbuilding 
Industry 
The new Defence White Paper was accompanied by a report from DMO entitled Future 
Submarine Industry Skills Plan: A Plan for the Naval Shipbuilding Industry (FSISP). Developed 
in close consultation with industry and overseen by an expert panel of stakeholders, the 
184-page FSISP offers 11 recommendations as follows (paraphrased): 
(1) To the extent practical, planning of the whole scheme of naval shipbuilding 
programs should be optimised to provide industry more predictable, 
better-sequenced and long-term work. 
 
(2) Consolidate planning for all new warship programs into one group within Defence.  
 
(3) DMO should consult more with organisations involved in naval shipbuilding,  
including companies, unions and industry groups. Plans should be achievable.  
 
(4) Defence sponsorship of individual skills development schemes in industry should 
continue and be refined. Options to second industry personnel to active submarine 
design and build programs should be explored.  
 
(5) Industry should develop a clear plan to improve shipbuilding productivity in 
Australia, including setting specific targets, and commit to Defence and Government 
to delivering these dividends. Defence should continue to benchmark productivity 
on an annual basis. 
 
(6) Defence should structure the Future Submarine Program as a rolling build program, 
supported by an ongoing R&D program to manage equipment obsolescence and 
capability changes. 
 
(7) Defence should pursue the opportunity to flow key skills and expertise into the 
Future Frigate Program at the completion of the three-ship Air Warfare Destroyer 
Program. 
 
(8) Investigate͒the practicality and worth of a common architecture for Australian 
warship combat and platform management systems.   
 
(9) Rethink the proposed Offshore Combatant Vessel; there are probably better ways to 
maintain the capabilities sought. 
 
(10) Coordinate with other government agencies on future vessel requirements. 
 
(11) Retain the expert panel to oversee the implementation of the plan. 
While there is little to dispute in many of the recommendations, the merit of others is 
inadequately supported by the arguments presented in the FSISP and is unlikely to be 
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supported by a more complete analysis. The fundamental problem is encapsulated in the 
long-winded but seeming reasonable first recommendation which reads in full:  
Without adversely impacting the Australian Defence Force’s capability, planning of the whole 
scheme of naval shipbuilding programs should be optimised to provide industry more 
predictable, better sequenced and long term work: the necessary foundations for innovation, 
business investment, productivity and performance improvement. This of course does not 
mean that all naval projects in the Defence Capability Plan will necessarily be built in 
Australia. Rather it means that naval shipbuilding projects should be planned with the aim of 
retaining wherever practical the current Australian workforce to place Defence and industry 
in the best position possible at the start of the next generation of projects. Defence and 
Government should take early action to ensure current workforce reductions are not causing 
the loss of skills important to future projects. 
If you read the recommendation fast enough, it sounds like common sense. But there’s a 
critical factor missing: cost effectiveness. Sure there are benefits to be gained by arranging 
projects to ‘provide industry more predictable, better sequenced and long term work’ but 
there are also costs. Costs due to shorter vessel life of type, costs due to slower production 
rates, and costs due to having firms share rather than compete for work. It’s simply taken as 
an article of faith that industry continuity will lead to savings. 
The FSISP spends a lot of time discussing the savings to be had from higher productivity. But 
nowhere is there anything resembling a business case to demonstrate that the claimed 
savings are greater than the costs incurred in their pursuit—despite claims that savings in 
the ‘tens of billions’ of dollars are possible. Moreover, the FSISP repeatedly fails to even 
acknowledge the existence of additional costs attendant to the strategies it proposes. As 
such, it fails to present an objective analysis of the competing options for ensuring that Navy 
is equipped with the vessels it needs. 
The government has said they will ‘implement the Future Submarine Industry Skills Plan’ but 
this should not be taken as implying that each and every recommendation is now 
government policy. Critically, the government has not yet committed itself to a rolling build 
program for the future submarine. It’s clear nevertheless that the FSISP has influenced 
government thinking about shipbuilding in important ways. Specific measures reflected in 
2013 Defence White Paper and related announcements include:  
x Reallocation of work on four AWD steel hull blocks from the Forgacs shipyard in 
Newcastle to the BAE Systems shipyard in Melbourne, with additional work on 
existing hull blocks being provided to Forgacs to ensure there is no reduction of 
work there. 
 
x Replacement of the supply ships HMAS Success and HMAS Sirius at the earliest 
opportunity, with options for local, hybrid and overseas build or the leasing of an 
existing vessel. 
 
x Early replacement of the Armidale Class Patrol Boats.  
 
x Consideration will be given to bringing forward the replacement of the current 
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Anzac Class frigates with a new Future Frigate to be assembled in Australia.  
 
x Further work will be undertaken to develop the submarine propulsion Land-based 
Test Facility in Adelaide. 
The remainder of this section is set out as follows. First, we analyse the various measures 
relating to shipbuilding taken by the government. Second, the key recommendations of the 
FSISP are critically examined. Third, we test the assertion that there are ‘tens of billions of 
dollars’ in savings possible in naval construction. Finally, we’ll explore the many vexing issues 
around Australian naval shipbuilding which the FSISP fails to address.  
Steps taken by the government with regard to naval shipbuilding 
In a media release from the Defence Minister and Prime Minister on 3 May 2013, it was 
stated that:  
‘The Government will assure Australia’s maritime security capability while providing more 
certainty to Australian industry through consideration of a smoother, coordinated 
shipbuilding program that will provide a more stable pattern of work for the industry and 
retain critical skills for the future through a range of specific measures:’ 
Setting aside curious notion that some things will happen simply through the consideration 
of other things, the meaning is clear; here is what we are doing to provide continuity and 
preserve skills in Australian naval shipbuilding. We explore the ‘specific measures’ below 
with this in mind.  
Re-baseline the AWD construction schedule (September 2012) 
This appears to be a case of making a virtue out of necessity by putting a positive gloss on a 
project in trouble. As argued earlier, the additional nine-month delay for the final vessel is 
unlikely to yield industry continuity or skills retention—especially when most of the 
workforce will have dissipated well prior to the delivery of the final vessel. By itself, this 
measure does nothing to prevent a gap emerging mid-decade.  
Reallocate AWD module block to BAE Williamstown 
The announcement that BAE had been given four additional AWD modules to construct said 
that this ‘recognises that BAE Systems has the capacity and skill to successfully take on an 
increased share of the workload’. Okay, but that does not explain why the action was taken. 
At best, it removes one reason for not giving them work.  
Media reports prior to the announcement decried the imminent closure of the yard and the 
loss of 1,000 jobs. Accordingly, it’s been assumed by most observers that the move is 
intended to maintain work in the Williamstown yard—certainly that’s the implication in the 
government’s 3 May media release. Cynics would say that it was to preserve jobs, though a 
more charitable explanation would be that the intention is to preserve skills. 
In either case, the shifting of module work between yards puts paid to the notion that the 
AWD alliance framework enjoys competition at the subcontractor level for module 
construction. It looks as though what was touted as a layer of effective competition has 
degenerated into a work sharing arrangement where incumbents are sustained for one 
reason or another.   
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We don’t know what the cost or saving is to the taxpayer from reallocating blocks. 
Differences in price between yards, differing transport costs, and possible contractual 
penalties make it unlikely that the shift was cost neutral.  
Within days of the announcement, BAE Systems responded by saying that there was 
inadequate work to keep the Williamstown yard open after the end of 2014.  
Early replacement of HMAS Supply and HMAS Sirius 
Under the 2012 Defence Capability Plan, the replenishment vessel HMAS Success 
(commissioned 1986) and the oiler HMAS Sirius (commissioned 2006) would have remained 
in service until at least 2018 and as late as 2023, but they are now to be replaced at the 
‘earliest opportunity’. Options to be examined include ‘local, hybrid and overseas build or 
the leasing of an existing vessel’.  
Given the range of acquisition strategies under consideration, the early replacement of 
these two vessels is unlikely to be aimed primarily at maintaining work in local shipyards. 
Unless a rapid decision was taken to sole source the vessels (via either local build or hybrid 
foreign-local build) to either BAE Systems or ASC, this decision will not avoid the gap in naval 
construction work mid-decade. 
The more likely factors driving this move are: 
x The desire for a reliable high capacity afloat support capability to support a fleet 
soon to be expanded by the addition of two amphibious vessels and three AWD.  
x The difficulty of maintaining the unique and ageing HMAS Success and the less than 
optimal performance of the commercially-built HMAS Sirius which was purchased as 
an interim measure.   
Given current pressures on the defence budget, we can only presume that these factors 
make the early replacement imperative. Irrespective of the rationale behind the decision, 
lobbying for a local build has already begun. At the very least, local industry will hope to see 
the vessels fitted out in Australia (as is occurring for the two amphibious vessels) even if 
their hulls are built overseas.  
Rethink the Offshore Combatant Vessel / early replacement of the Armidale class 
The 2009 White Paper included a scheme to move to a twenty-vessel fleet of Offshore 
Combatant Vessels to replace the Navy’s existing fleets of patrol boats, minehunters and 
oceanographic vessels. It was judged at that time that modular mission packages would 
allow a single class of vessel to efficiently perform the three different roles. What, if any, 
analysis informed that conclusion is unknown. Fortunately, the many counterarguments 
against the proposal need not be recounted because the proposal has now been put on the 
backburner. Instead, the government has decided on an early replacement of the fourteen 
Armidale class patrol boats which entered service between 2005 and 2008. 
It appears that this decision has very little to do with the preservation of shipbuilding skills or 
expertise. The early replacement of the Armidale class is almost certainly because they have 
suffered damage through being repeatedly operated beyond their design limits in order to 
ensure rapid response to safety at sea incidents—a regrettable but totally justified 
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occurrence. Given that the Australian aluminium shipbuilder Austal (which built the 
Armidale class) is presently building Cape class patrol vessels for the Australian Customs and 
Border Protection Service, it’s likely that the current production line will be used to deliver a 
modified version of these boats to the Navy. Although Navy might prefer a steel hulled 
vessel, it will be hard to argue that the Cape class is inadequate given that Customs will 
operate the vessels in essentially the same role. Having the RAN and Customs operate the 
same class of vessel would result in cost efficiencies in sustainment, training and operations. 
Because the Armidale class and its likely replacement the Cape class are small aluminum 
vessels, their early replacement will do little to sustain work in the traditional naval 
construction sector in Australia. (Of course, they will provide more continuity of work for 
Austal.) And even if the additional cost of building new steel hulled patrol vessels is 
accepted, it will maintain only a fraction of the skills used in large advanced warships such as 
the AWD. To put the matter in perspective; the Armidale class displace 270 tons compared 
with 6,250 tons for the Hobart class AWD.  
Consider bringing forward the replacement of the Anzac class frigates. 
According to the 2012 DCP, the Anzac class frigates are not due to be replaced until the 
period 2027 to 2030. Commissioned into service between 1996 and 2006, the Anzac class 
are presently undergoing several upgrades, including Anti-Ship Missile Defence Phase 2A 
($386 million), Anti-Ship Missile Defence Phase 2B ($676 million) and the just-commenced 
Electronic Support Systems Improvements ($260 million). The replacement for the Anzac is 
envisaged as an Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW)-optimised frigate.  
From an industrial perspective, and noting the desire to provide continuity in shipbuilding 
and skills retention after the end of the AWD program, there are two broad options for an 
acceleration of the Anzac replacement: 
x Immediately commence work on acquiring a foreign design that can be put into 
production overlapping with the latter part of the AWD program.  
 
x Evolve the AWD hull to be the basis of a new class of Australian-unique frigates and 
commence production overlapping with the latter part of the AWD program. 
A degree of overlap is required in each case because the skills employed at the end of a 
shipbuilding program (combat system fit out, set-to-work and operational test and 
evaluation) are different to that needed at the start of a new construction program 
(platform design, combat system development and module construction). If the future 
frigate commences at the end of the AWD program, the only continuity will be in a subset of 
white collar jobs. For skills to be retained across the full range of trades and professions, 
substantial overlap is required.  
Given the short time before the end of the AWD program, it is not credible that a new design 
can be chosen and put into production quickly enough to provide continuity. That leaves the 
adaptation of the AWD design to create a frigate. While it may, just may, be possible to 
achieve sufficient overlap by beginning to build modules for the new vessels concurrent with 
the design of what would be an Australian-unique frigate, the challenge would be to adapt 
the AWD platform hull and propulsion system to meet the low noise demands of ASW. It is 
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noteworthy that the United Kingdom explored the possibility of adapting their Type 45 
Destroyer design for the ASW role and decided not to proceed. 
Thus, if skills are to be retained through the early replacement of the Anzac class, it would 
require finding a way to rapidly adapt the AWD hull/propulsion design to meet the demands 
of ASW while simultaneously designing the ASW package for the vessels, including sensors, 
weapons and combat system. The result would be an Australian-unique vessel designed and 
executed in double-quick time.  
Setting aside the abundant risk in such a scheme, it would also require us to dispose of a 
perfectly good fleet of vessels that are only part way through their life, and are still being 
upgraded at a substantial cost. The proposition that this veritable mountain of additional 
cost and risk is worthwhile in exchange for continuity and skills retention in the naval 
shipbuilding sector is difficult to accept.  
The only realistic option for carrying forward skills from the AWD program is to establish a 
project office for the Future Frigates over the next couple of years and get to work on 
project definition studies and other preliminary work. Although this would only allow a 
limited number of project and engineering positions to be carried forward, it would help put 
the Future Frigate project on a firm footing. Of course, it would do nothing to close the 
valley of death for the bulk of shipbuilding workers.  
Narrowing of submarine options and commencing initial work on the Future Submarine. 
Narrowing the range of options for the future submarine (or more precisely, suspending the 
two MOTS options) will not make any difference to continuity of work or maintenance of 
skills in the shipbuilding sector. Commencing initial work on the Future Submarine and 
developing the Land Based Test Bed, will provide additional work for engineers and some 
skilled trades persons. In any case, it’s a smart step to getting to work on sustaining the 
Collins and developing its replacement.   
Table 7.6 lists the specific measures taken by the government and the assessed impact on 
providing continuity of work and preservation of skills in Australian naval shipbuilding. 
Particular attention is paid to whether the measure helps eliminate the ‘valley of death’ 
between the conclusion of the AWD program and the commencement of the Future 
Submarine.  
Table 7.6: Into the valley of death? 
Specific Measure Impact on ‘valley of death’ Comment 
AWD re-baseline (9 month delay) nil A delay is a delay.  
Reallocate AWD work to BAE nil  What happened to competition? 
Replace Support Ships early nil unless rapid sole source Only helps retain fabrication skills. 
Replace Armidale class early potentially good for Austal - 
Replace Anzac class early yes if based on AWD design High risk and high cost.  
Narrow submarine options nil  - 
Commence submarine work yes for design and specialists  Long overdue. 
 
Given that the government appears to have decided against a sole-source option for the 
support vessels, there is only one initiative mentioned that can close the valley of death. 
That is: dispose of the Anzac fleet and embark on a risky bespoke design-while-you-build 
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replacement based on the AWD hull. With so much life left in the still-being-upgraded Anzac 
fleet, the costs would far outweigh any savings due to a boost in productivity arising from 
greater continuity in naval construction.  
There is another option that hasn’t been mentioned by the government; build one or more 
additional AWD. With an election in the offing, expect lobbying to begin in earnest.    
Yet another naval shipbuilding plan  
The FSISP provides an interesting survey of warship production and the naval construction 
sector in Australia, with a particular emphasis on submarines. And although the coverage is 
selectively incomplete—especially when it comes to the economics of naval construction—
much of what it ultimately says and recommends is sensible. However, on several key issues 
the FSISP fails to provide adequate support for what it proposes. These issues are critically 
examined below. We begin with a discussion of the organisation of production and labour in 
general.  
Projects and people 
Roughly speaking, things are produced in one of two ways; either though unitary projects or 
rolling production.  
In the first category are items such as bridges, railways, airports, blast furnaces, offshore oil 
platforms, LNG plants, and tunnels under Sydney Harbour. A design is made, a workforce is 
assembled, and the project is executed. The labour and capital assets used in the project are 
then redeployed elsewhere on other efforts. In the second category are items such as cars, 
televisions, sandwiches, shoes and laundry detergent. A factory is established, a workforce is 
assembled, and products are produced in repetition with evolving designs. The labour and 
capital used in the production process stay put.  
There is nothing inherently better or worse about either projects or rolling production. The 
better approach depends on the nature of, and demand for, the product in question.  
In practice, shipbuilding occurs through both means. In the United States and elsewhere 
there are long-standing shipyards that have been producing vessels continuously for 
decades. Elsewhere, in Australia for example, shipbuilding has been accomplished through 
projects of limited duration. As a result, there have been extended periods where no actual 
warship production has occurred. For example, between 1968 when HMAS Torrens was 
launched from Cockatoo Island in Sydney and 1985 when work commenced on the first FFG, 
no major naval combatants were built in Australia. Similarly between 2006 when the last 
Anzac was commissioned and 2009 when work began on the first AWD. Of course we didn’t 
build any submarines prior to 1987 and none after 2003. In each instance, a workforce was 
assembled for the project from various places, including from the existing naval 
maintenance workforces in the shipyards and elsewhere in the economy.     
The FSISP takes a remarkably narrow view of the labour input for shipbuilding by focusing on 
the extant workforces in four shipyards. Curiously, it fails to take into account the 400 
permanent staff and 250 regular contractors employed at the Thales facility on Garden 
Island yet includes the personnel employed on maintenance work in other shipyards. In any 
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case, the resulting figure of 4,399 surely understates the available workforce and thereby 
creates the impression that the incumbent labour force should be carefully preserved.  
A less conservative viewpoint is possible. In October 2012, an independent market research 
report on the Shipbuilding and Repair Service in Australia estimated that there is a workforce 
of 8,736 persons (IBISWorld 2012). More interesting still is a study undertaken in 2007 by 
Deloitte Insight Economics on behalf of the Victorian, Queensland and Western Australian 
governments looking at Australia’s capacity to build the Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) in-
country. It observed that the pool of skilled labour needed for concurrent builds of the LHD 
and AWD was small relative to national labour pools. Figures cited included: 93,000 metal 
fitters and machinists; 10,000 precision metal tradespersons; 1,500 general fabrication 
tradespersons; 72,000 welders; 14,000 general metal working tradespersons and 12,000 
structural steel construction workers; 110,000 electricians and electrical tradespersons; 
55,000 plumbers and 45,000 managers in building and construction and 10,000 in 
engineering.  
Although these figures do not cover the specialist areas of combat systems and systems 
integration, they are surely relevant to the current focus on maintaining less than 700 
module fabrication jobs at the BAE Williamstown yard. Just as importantly, the Deloitte 
methodology draws into question the FSISP focus on the employees of a subset of 
incumbent firms.   
Here’s the reality: large and complex engineering projects are done in Australia all the time. 
Billions of dollars of infrastructure is currently being built in Australia’s North West for the 
oil, gas and mineral resources sector through projects that assemble temporary teams for 
the task. Labour comes and labour goes.  
Experience shows that unitary projects are a perfectly viable way of doing many things, 
including building batches of vessels for the RAN. That’s not to say that a continuous build or 
a sequenced program of overlapping projects would not be better, and we turn to that 
critical question below. But it’s worth making the point strongly that a great many difficult 
and challenging things are produced through unitary projects that mobilise workforces on an 
as needs basis.   
Productivity and pain 
The FSISP provides two arguments for its key recommendations. First, that continuity of 
production increases productivity and therefore reduces costs. Second, that discontinuity 
increases delays. The latter is most easily dealt with. As argued earlier in the context of the 
AWD, delays due to workforce inexperience are best viewed as planning errors rather than 
externalities beyond management control.  
On the first point, there is no doubt that continuity of work for individuals and shipyards can 
lead to higher productivity. The extent to which this will lead to reduced costs is less clear. 
The FSISP assumes that increases in shipyard productivity will lead to a one-for-one 
reduction in the price paid by the Commonwealth for vessels. This is very doubtful. To start 
with, if productivity increases in a shipyard, some of the benefits will reasonably flow to the 
owners of the yard—especially if the increased productivity derives from capital investment 
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by the shipbuilder. Indeed, as we saw with the AWD, gain-sharing incentives explicitly 
anticipate that industry participants will receive a share of productivity gains. Thus, on this 
basis alone, it’s wrong to assume that all of the gains translate to a lower price.  
More importantly, the workers engaged the production process will also take a share of the 
gains. It is fanciful to assume that highly trained and productive individuals will work for the 
same pay as less productive individuals. Market forces ensure that, to first approximation, 
the pay difference will mirror the difference in individual productivity. Moreover, workers in 
a well organised and tightly run facility will also extract some share of the multifactor 
productivity associated with the workplace.  
The extent to which productivity gains will be apportioned between workers, firms and 
customers is difficult to predict in a particular circumstance ahead of time—each party will 
naturally strive to get as much as possible for themselves. However, during the period 2000 
to 2010 labour productivity across the Australian economy grew by an average of 1.4% a 
year (Treasury 2010) and average weekly ordinary time earnings grew in real terms by an 
average of 1.8% a year (ABS 6302.0). On this basis, labour more than captured the full gains 
from productivity growth over the period.  
Capital and labour  
The FSISP points out correctly that continuity can boost productivity by (1) learning curve 
effects over a longer rather than shorter production run, and (2) by reduced first of class 
drop off in a production run, and (3) higher core productivity in an established shipyard. 
None of this is in contention. But it is important to remember that the cost of the production 
workforce is only one part of the total cost of a warship.  
To start with, according to the FSISP around half of the cost of a warship comes from 
materials and equipment. On this basis alone, the benefits from continuity will only impact 
half of the cost. But it’s not even that good. Shipyard productivity and learning curves can 
only be measured relative to recurrent activities that are repeated on a run of vessels. 
Non-recurrent activities such as platform design and combat system engineering occur only 
once for each class and do not have the opportunity to benefit from learning. Similarly for 
the large number of people employed in non-production activities (i.e. overheads) such as 
legal, accounting, executive, business development, facilities maintenance etc. Indeed, only 
around half of the current and potential workforce envisaged by the FSISP is blue collar.  
Two proposals 
The forgoing discussion has introduced the essential ideas needed to analyse the two key 
FSISP proposals in the context of the government’s recent announcements; the potential 
bringing forward of the Future Frigate program and the rolling production of submarines. For 
neither proposal do we have a business case. In the former instance this is understandable 
because the government is only ‘considering’ the option which is an extension of a more 
modest proposal in the FSISP. In the latter, it is disappointing that a firm recommendation 
has been made in the absence of a business case. With this in mind, we turn now to see how 
the two proposals stack up using publicly available data.  
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Accelerating the future frigate 
The advantage of accelerating the frigate program to dovetail into the AWD project would 
be two-fold; (1) a reduced first of class drop off, and (2) a higher core productivity level than 
would be achieved with a ‘cold start’ program. But as our earlier examination of the option 
highlighted, this would come with substantial risks (the therefore likely additional costs) and 
would require the early retirement of the Anzac fleet. There is little point trying to estimate 
the dollar value of these savings because they would be swamped by the opportunity cost of 
bringing forward the entire program. Given that the alternative is to leave the Anzacs in 
service over that period at no additional capital cost, the acceleration represents a 
multibillion dollar additional impost on the taxpayer and/or the remainder of the defence 
budget. There is no conceivable way that this could be offset by the marginal reduction in 
labour costs arising from continuity.  
Rolling build for the Future Submarine  
The advantage of building the Future Submarine in a rolling build is that skills will be 
retained for the thirteenth and subsequent vessel. Against this must be counted three 
additional costs.  
First, building submarines at two-year rather than one-year intervals will mean that 
overheads are doubled over the life of the production run.  
Second, the life-of-type of new boats will have to be set at 24 years. In comparison, it’s likely 
that the Collins class will remain in service for 35 years (assuming that a service-life-type 
extension occurs as now appears on the cards) and the US Virginia and Los Angeles class are 
being kept in service for at least 33 years. Consequently, the average capital cost per year of 
ownership will be 35/24 = 1.46 times greater, equivalent to 46% higher. With materials and 
equipment accounting for 50% of the cost of the boats, this is a very substantial additional 
cost. It’s difficult to see how this could be compensated for by increased labour productivity 
even over the longer term. 
Third, there is a penalty to be paid in terms of foregone capability. Assuming that vessel 
deliveries commence in 2026 (which is a much earlier start date than has been 
countenanced in any of Defence’s public presentations on the matter), it will still take until 
2050 to deliver the desired fleet of twelve boats.    
There is an important point to note. While we can argue about whether the long-term 
savings from higher labour productivity will compensate for the more rapid rate of 
recapitalisation, a rolling build program will unambiguously cost more between now and 
mid-century. Remember, the benefits of continuity cannot occur prior to the thirteenth 
boat.  
‘…savings to the Defence budget in the tens of billions of dollars’ 
Putting together what we have seen, it begs the question of how ‘tens of billions of dollars’ 
of savings can be achieved from the projects in the DCP. An early replacement of the Anzacs 
will cost more, and a rolling build program for the Future Submarines will cost more. With 
these being the most expensive projects in the DCP, surely the matter is settled. And that’s 
not taking into account the wishful thinking behind the assumption that all productivity gains 
will be harvested by Defence with nothing left for the companies or workers.  
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So how did the FSISP come up with the figure of ‘tens of billions of dollars’? It’s no accident; 
they say it three times. The best explanation can be found on page 30 where it says:  
This difference in productivity between 110 and 50 man–hours per compensated gross tonne 
produces a cost difference of about $5 – 10 billion for direct shipyard labour when applied to 
the whole scheme of planned naval shipbuilding projects. There would be further savings in 
labour costs throughout the supply chain as productivity and efficiency increases. 
To start with, the figure is short of ‘tens of billions’; at best it’s one ten and a bit. So they’ve 
exaggerated a little. But let’s play with their figures for a moment anyway. They imply that 
the ‘somewhere above $75 billion’ shipbuilding program has a direct shipyard labour 
component that is reduced by between $5 billion and $10 billion dollars by increasing 
productivity 110 worker-hours per CGT to 50 worker-hours per CGT. It only takes a little bit 
of math to show that this implies that the direct shipyard labour component of the cost of 
the overall program (at 110 worker-hours per CGT) is between $9.2 billion and $18.3 billion. 
Or to put it another way, shipyard labour only accounts for between 12% and 24% of the 
total cost. Why the large range? Why is it so small? This makes no sense.  
Looking more closely still; why look at the difference from 110 worker-hours per CGT. In the 
preceding paragraph we are told that the AWD (which began with a cold start) should 
achieve an average 80 worker-hours per CGT in its short run of three vessels. And on page 92 
we are told that a benchmarking of Australian shipyards estimated that core productivity is 
already in the range of 60 to 70 worker-hours per CGT—and that’s absent the much lauded 
continuity being sought. 
Finally, in addition to using an exaggerated low productivity baseline, the comparison of 110 
to 50 worker-hours per CGT assumes that a magic wand can be waved over the yards to 
instantaneously deliver a 120% productivity improvement. No I am not joking. Check out the 
colourful charts at the end of the report that show workforce demand for the future 
program with 110 worker-hours per CGT and 50 worker-hours per CGT. No learning curves, 
no first of class drop offs; simply here’s what low-productivity will cost us, and here’s what 
high-productivity can do for us.  
To say that the claimed savings and colourful charts are misleading would be an 
understatement. As we’ve seen, rather than save ‘tens of billions’ over the life of the 
projects in the DCP, the on the basis of a rolling build program for the submarines alone the 
FSISP will add costs out until at least mid-century.  
Here’s the situation: Unless the government orders a fourth AWD or initiates a crash 
program for the Future Frigates, the valley of death will arrive and large numbers of shipyard 
jobs will be cease. Sometime later we’ll start again, with the Future Frigates and Future 
Submarines largely built concurrently. There is simply no way to transition from one 
program to the other given the timings. Despite all the talk of continuity in the FSISP, the 
only long-term path to continuity is to have perpetual rolling programs for surface 
combatants and submarines. The FSISP recommends the latter but stops short on the 
former. If we pursue either course of action, the additional cost of more frequent 
replacement will swamp any savings from higher labour productivity.  
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The elephants in the room 
The subtitle of the FSISP is ‘A Plan for the Naval Shipbuilding Industry’ yet it fails to deal with 
three key interrelated issues that have haunted the sector since the sale of the government 
yards to the private sector in the late 1980s.  
The first issue is the question of competition. The FSISP takes as a given the ongoing 
existence of the incumbent shipbuilding firms without a proper discussion of the commercial 
or physical consolidation of shipbuilding, or of the sale of ASC to the private sector. These 
are vital questions that will determine the level of productivity achieved by the sector as 
much as any sequencing of projects. As things stand, the subcontracting shipyards impose 
multiple management and facilities overheads on naval construction. These questions 
cannot be avoided forever. If a rapid acquisition of support ships occurs in time to close the 
looming gap in fabrication work, the choice will probably end up being between ASC and BAE 
Systems.   
Second, there is the question of contracting methodologies and managing the strategic 
behaviour (in a game-theoretic sense) of shipyards. This applies especially to the proposal to 
create a perpetual monopoly for submarine construction. There are ways of managing such 
arrangements, but the FSISP is silent on the matter. Equally, there are questions about the 
relationships between the consolidation yard and its module building subcontractors. With 
the shifting of work to sustain jobs in subcontracting yards, we have the worst of both 
worlds; the equivalent of multiple monopoly suppliers with multiple corporate overheads 
bidding for work through the front page of newspapers.  
Third and finally, the nexus between ship repair and maintenance is given scant attention in 
the plan—to the point of ignoring the existence of the massive Garden Island facility and its 
workforce.  
Conclusion 
The FSISP is misleading and incomplete. Critically, it fails to provide an objective analysis of 
the options available for delivering the vessels planned in the DCP. Where it has concrete 
recommendations, they would impose additional costs on the taxpayer for decades hence if 
accepted in full. At the same time, it fails to address a range of issues that are crucial to 
shaping a sensible way ahead for the sector.  
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Chapter 8: Selected Defence Projects 
The Defence PBS lists the top 30 projects by expenditure for the financial year. For each, the 
‘approved project expenditure’, ‘cumulative expenditure to date’ and ‘in-year expenditure’ 
are given, along with a succinct status report (see 2013–14 PBS, DMO section, p. 155–163). 
Projects listed in prior PBS are similarly reported on (see PBS p. 164–168). The Defence 
Annual Report includes similar information along with an explanation of expenditure 
approval variations for each project (see 2011-12 DAR, p. 173–175).  
Perhaps because of the brevity of the status reports in the PBS and Annual Report, pertinent 
information is sometimes omitted with the result that a less than full picture emerges. To 
redress this problem, we’ve produced annotated versions of the status reports for selected 
projects that attempt to fill in some of the key gaps. This has proven to be a difficult task 
because of the need to search for information in old documents, press releases and 
speeches.  
Among other things, we've gone back to find out the original schedule, goal and cost for 
each projects, both at initial conception and at the milestone of government approval. In the 
former case, we’ve limited our archaeological digging to no earlier than the targets set in the 
2000 Defence White Paper and 2001 Public Defence Capability Plan. To do otherwise would 
be as time-consuming to us as it would be embarrassing to Defence’s planning staff.  
Rather than strictly keep to the current top 30 projects listed in this year’s PBS, we’ve 
selected some that we think are the most important and interesting of those from recent 
years, see Table 8.2. This makes sense because it’s possible that a highly troubled project will 
not make the top 30 for the simple reason that progress is stalled and very few dollars are 
being expended. As well, in some instances we've selected projects because they represent 
important capabilities or are pertinent to a discussion of this year's budget. To help 
understand the myriad of terms and figures that make up the lingua franca of defence 
projects, a lexicon is provided in Table 8.1. 
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Table 8.1: Defence project nomenclature 
Defence Capability Plan (DCP) 
The public listing of defence projects pending approval. First published in 
2001.  
First pass approval The initial approval of a project allowing options to be developed. 
Second pass approval The final approval of a project allowing acquisition to proceed. 
Approved expenditure (July 2012) 
The approved expenditure as given in the last relevant Defence Annual 
Report  
Real cost increases (scope) 
Cost changes due to changes in the number and types of equipment 
included. 
Real cost increases (transfer) Transfers from/to other projects and parts of Defence (e.g. facilities) 
Real cost increases (other) Cost increases due to other than scope and transfers (e.g. cost overruns)  
Initial planned IOC 
The initial target date for fielding an ‘initial operational capability’ given in 
DCP. 
IOC at time of approval The target date for fielding an IOC at the time of second pass approval. 
Current IOC Latest target date for fielding an IOC. 
Delay to IOC ‘current IOC’ minus ‘IOC at time of approval’ 
Initial project cost estimate The initial cost estimate given in the DCP. 
 
Table 8.2: ASPI selected projects 
Project # Name Approval 
AIR 5077 Phase 3 Airborne Early Warning and Control Aircraft Dec 1997 
AIR 5333 New Air Defence Command and Control Systems  Nov 1992 
AIR 5349 Phase 1 & 2 Bridging Air Combat Capability Mar 2007 
AIR 5349 Phase 3 Growler Airborne Electronic Attack Capability May 2013 
AIR 5402   Air to Air Refuelling Capability July 2003 
AIR 6000 Phase 2A/2B Joint Strike Fighter Aircraft Apr 2010 
AIR 8000 Phase 2 Battlefield airlift – Caribou replacement May 2012 
AIR 9000 Phase 2 Multi Role Helicopter Apr 2004 
AIR 9000 Phase 8 Future Naval Aviation Combat System Helicopter June 2011 
JP 2048 Phase 4A/4B Amphibious Deployment and Sustainment Jun 2007 
JP 2070 Phase 2  Lightweight Torpedo Replacement Jul 2001 
LAND 17 Phase 1A Artillery Replacement 155mm Howitzer Nov 2009 
LAND 106 Upgrade of M113 Armoured Vehicles Nov 1993 
LAND 116 Phase 3 Bushmaster Protected Mobility Vehicle Nov 1998 
SEA 1000 Phases 1A & 2 Future submarine May 2012 
SEA 1390 Phase 4B Standard Missile Replacement Sep 2004 
SEA 1448 Phase 2B Anzac Ship Anti-Ship Missile Defence Nov 2005 
SEA 4000 Phase 3 Air Warfare Destroyer Build Jun 2007 
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Airborne Early Warning and Control Aircraft (AIR 5077 Phase 3) 
First mention in DCP: n/a  Approved expenditure (July 2013) 3,841 
Initial planned first pass: n/a  Cumulative expenditure to 30 June 2013 3,462 
Actual date of first pass: n/a  Budget estimate 2013-14 87 
Delay to first pass: n/a    
Initial planned second pass: pre-2000  Initial planned IOC:  
Actual date of second pass: Dec 1997  IOC at time of contract: Nov 2006 
Delay to second pass: n/a  Current IOC: 2012–13 
   Delay to IOC: > 68 months 
Approved expenditure (Jul 2011) 3,857    
Real cost increases (scope): 266  Initial project cost estimate: n/a 
Real cost increases (transfer): 619  Actual cost at time of approval:   2,170 
Real cost increases (e.g. cost overrun): 215  Cost increases prior to/at approval: n/a 
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Planned 
expenditure 
238 404 516 462 296 439 160 68 97 385 401 289* 87** 
Actual 
expenditure 
233 567 528 518 373 58 43 17 268 176 283 209* 
 
Difference -5 163 12 56 77 -381 -117 -51 171 -209  -118 -80*  
Source: Defence Annual Reports, except for *2012-13 Defence PAES and **2013-14 Defence PBS 
Prime Contractor: Boeing (United States)  
 
This project has delivered six E-7A Wedgetail Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft, and the 
associated ground and support systems. [A] During 2013-14, this project will deliver the final logistics 
support requirements and the final element of the radar performance remediation program. This 
project will also progress the remediation of software deficiencies in the electronic support measures, 
communications and mission computing subsystem. [B] 
 
The remaining key risk is the timely integration of required software updates to the operational 
aircraft to support the Final Operational Capability declaration. [C] (Defence PBS 2013–14) 
 
A 
Scope changes post-approval: the number of aircraft was increased from four to six in June 2004 
because Defence had ordered six radar units in the initial procurement.  
B 
Problems included integration of the radars, stability of the mission system software, integration of 
the communications and electronic warfare suites. The last significant problem was the integration of 
the Electronic Support Measures system with the airframe and other mission systems. 
C 
It's understood by ASPI that compromises have been reached between the contractor and the 
Commonwealth regarding some aspects of performance. The ANAO reports that DMO's assessment 
in the delivery of capability performance as of June 2012 was 45% high confidence, 42% medium 
confidence and 13% low confidence. Source: ANAO Major Projects Report 2011–12, Figure 15. 
ASPI 
comment 
Wedgetail has been a long and difficult program for both the Commonwealth and the Prime 
Contractor. Apart from the negotiated scope change and associated increase in the approved 
expenditure, the considerable cost overruns that have been experienced have mostly fallen upon 
Boeing due to the contractual arrangements. In essence, this was an R&D project that the contractor 
agreed to deliver against a fixed price—a mistake that is unlikely to be repeated. 
Minister at approval: Ian McLachlan  
Acquisition strategy:  Commercial acquisition from prime contractor 
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Bridging Air Combat Capability (AIR 5349 Phase 1) 
First mention in DCP: n/a  Approved expenditure (July 2013) 3,281 
Initial planned first pass: n/a  Cumulative expenditure to 30 June 2012 2,697 
Actual date of first pass: Mar 2007  Budget estimate 2012-13 49 
Delay to first pass: n/a    
Initial planned second pass: n/a  Initial planned IOC: n/a 
Actual date of second pass: Mar2007  IOC at time of contract: Dec 2010 
Delay to second pass: n/a  Current IOC: Dec 2010 
   Delay to IOC: none 
Approved expenditure (July 2011) 3,3546    
Real cost increases (scope): 0  Initial project cost estimate: n/a 
Real cost increases (transfer): -132  Actual cost at time of approval:   3,546 
Real cost increases (e.g. cost overrun): -107  Cost increases prior to/at approval: n/a 
                
$m 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 
Planned 
expenditure   548 564 1401 493 177 49* ? 
Actual 
expenditure 55 285 935 965 365 107 29*  
Difference   -263 371 -436 -128  -70 -20*  
Source: Defence Annual Reports, except for *2011-12 Defence PAES and **2012-13 Defence PBS 
Prime Contractor: Boeing, through a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case with the United States Navy 
 
Phase 1 of the project has acquired and delivered 24 F/A-18F Super Hornets Block II multi-role aircraft 
and associated support systems and services. [A] The air combat capability will be maintained through 
to the transition to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. [B] 
 
During 2011-12, the project delivered the remaining four F/A-18F Super Hornet aircraft to RAAF Base 
Amberley. Delivery of mission and support equipment will continue throughout 2012 with Final 
Operational Capability expected in late 2012. [C]  
Source: 2012–13 DAR 
A 
Twelve of the aircraft were configured as 'F+' models, allowing upgrade later to the EA-18G 
electronic warfare configuration if desired. This will now not occur as Phase 3 will acquire 12 G 
models from the production line. 
B 
The Super Hornet fleet now appears likely to serve to at least 2030, alongside the F-35 from about 
2020. At the release of the 2013 Defence White Paper, Minister Smith made the comment that a 
decision could be made by future governments on replacing the Super Hornets with additional JSF 
aircraft around their expected 2030 withdrawal date. 
C 
 
The Initial Operational Capability was achieved on schedule in December 2010. 
 
ASPI 
comment 
On schedule and under budget (although some of the variation apparent in the figures above is due 
to foreign exchange variations), this off-the-shelf acquisition has been successful by any measure. 
 
Minister at approval: Brendan Nelson  
 
 
Acquisition strategy: USG Foreign Military Sales Program 
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Bridging air combat capability —AIR 5349 Phase 2 
First mention in DCP: 2009  Approved expenditure (July 2013) 274 
Initial planned first pass:   Cumulative expenditure to 30 June 2013 137 
Actual date of first pass:   Budget estimate 2013-14 24 
Delay to first pass:     
Initial planned second pass:   Initial planned IOC:  
Actual date of second pass:   IOC at time of approval:  
Delay to second pass:   Current IOC:  
   Delay to IOC:  
Approved expenditure (May 2013) 182    
Real cost increases (scope): 0  Initial project cost estimate:  
Real cost increases (transfer): 99  Actual cost at time of approval:    
Real cost increases (e.g. cost overrun): 0  Cost increases prior to/at approval:  
                
$m 2011–12 2012–13 2013-14 
Planned 
expenditure 29 54* 24** 
Actual 
expenditure 20 14*  
Difference -9 -41*  
Source: 2013-14 Defence PBS 
Prime Contractor: United States Government through Foreign Military Sales cases. 
 
This project will introduce into service a number of new weapons and countermeasures under the 
Australian Super Hornet program. These weapons will significantly enhance the Air Force’s ability to 
conduct air, land and maritime strike operations. This project is running concurrently with AIR 5349 
Phase 1 to deliver the Bridging Air Combat Capability. [A] 
 
During 2013-14, the United States Navy (USN) will conduct further integration testing of the Joint 
Stand Off Weapon (JSOW) on Super Hornets. JSOW deliveries are planned for 2013-14. The United 
States Air Force (USAF) has re-scheduled the delivery of Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile for 
future years. This project continues to work with the USAF to manage the new schedule. 
 
The key risk for this project is schedule. Both the USAF and USN are under budgetary pressure and 
have identified early indications of schedule slip in their domestic programs and production contracts.
          
Source: 2013-14 PBS 
 
 
A 
The most significant components of this phase is the delivery of the JSOWC-1  standoff weapon, 
which will increase the effective strike radius of the Super Hornets as well as allowing the 
engagement of defended targets (including surface vessels) from greater range and additional 
stocks of AMRAAM air-to-air missiles.  
ASPI 
comment 
 
Minister at approval: Stephen Smith  
Acquisition strategy: FMS purchase 
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Growler Airborne Electronic Attack Capability—AIR 5349 Phase 3 
First mention in DCP: 2013  Approved expenditure (July 2013) 2721 
Initial planned first pass: n/a  Cumulative expenditure to 30 June 2013 37 
Actual date of first pass: 2013  Budget estimate 2013-14 90 
Delay to first pass: n/a    
Initial planned second pass: n/a  Initial planned IOC:  
Actual date of second pass: 2013  IOC at time of approval:  
Delay to second pass: n/a  Current IOC:  
   Delay to IOC:  
Approved expenditure (May 2013) 2721    
Real cost increases (scope): 0  Initial project cost estimate: 2721 
Real cost increases (transfer): 0  Actual cost at time of approval:   2721 
Real cost increases (e.g. cost overrun): 0  Cost increases prior to/at approval: - 
                
$m 2012–13 2013-14 
Planned 
expenditure 37 90 
Actual 
expenditure 
  
Difference   
Source: 2013-14 Defence PBS 
Prime Contractor: United States Government through Foreign Military Sales cases. 
 
The Government announced in 2012 its commitment to a future fleet of 12 EA-18G Growler electronic 
attack aircraft for Australia. [A] As part of the 2013 White Paper announcement, the Government has 
decided to acquire 12 new-build Growler aircraft which will ensure that the original bridging capability 
of 24 Super Hornets remains intact while allowing for timely introduction of Growler. [B] This phase 
will be subsumed into the acquisition project.     Source: 2013-14 PBS 
 
 
A 
The EA-18G Growler is an electronic warfare variant of the Super Hornet that has the ability to 
disrupt or jam a range of military electronics systems, including radars and communications 
systems. 
B 
See the entry for Phase 1 previous. The first tranche of 24 aircraft included 12 fitted for but not 
with the electronic attack systems of the Growler. These will now remain in their delivery 
configuration rather than being upgraded to G status. 
ASPI 
comment 
The total approved cost of the air combat bridging capability Phases 1, 2 and 3 is $6.28 billion for 
acquisition alone. As well, the RAAF will now have to run three sophisticated combat aircraft 
platforms for the entire 2020s, which will greatly add to through-life costs. The rationale for a 
single type combat air force and the savings that would result was a compelling one, and the 
significant delays in the delivery of the F-35 have resulted in significant additional expenditure to 
maintain a continuous capability. 
Minister at approval: Stephen Smith  
Acquisition strategy: FMS purchase 
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New Air Defence Command and Control Systems (AIR 5333) 
First mention in DCP: 2001  Approved expenditure (July 2013) 274 
Initial planned first pass: n/a  Cumulative expenditure to 30 June 2012 246 
Actual date of first pass: n/a  Budget estimate 2012-13 - 
Delay to first pass: n/a    
Initial planned second pass: pre-2000  Initial planned IOC: n/a 
Actual date of second pass: Nov 1992  IOC at time of contract: Dec 
2007 
Delay to second pass: n/a  Current IOC: Mid 
2011 
   Delay to IOC: 41 
months 
Approved expenditure (Jul 2011) 274    
Real cost increases (scope): 117  Initial project cost estimate: 150-200 
Real cost increases (transfer): 23  Actual cost at time of approval:   165 
Real cost increases (e.g. cost overrun): 0  Cost increases prior to/at approval: 0 
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expenditure 38 51 32 32 27 27 34 30 2 - 
Actual 
expenditure 24 27 10 9 63 19 34 16  
 
Difference -14 -24 -22 -23 36 -8 0  -14   
Source: Defence Annual Reports, except for *2011-12 Defence PAES and **2012-13 Defence PBS 
Prime contractor: Boeing Australia Ltd 
 
AIR 5333 (Project Vigilare) has provided replacement Air Defence Command and Control Systems for 
the Northern and Eastern Regional Operations Centres. [A] The Minister for Defence announced at 
the Avalon Airshow on 26 February 2013, that the Vigilare Command and Control System has 
achieved Final Operational Capability. Project closure is planned to be achieved in December 2013.  
Source: 2013-14 PBS 
 
A 
The long and often troubled history of Project 5333 was told in the 2008–09 Cost of Defence 
publication. It was on the Projects of Concern list from 2008 to June 2011. 
ASPI 
comments 
The project was beset with delays from the start and today all parties involved have acknowledged 
that they initially underestimated the effort required to complete the project; the ramp-up of 
Commonwealth and contractor staff was slow; delivery of some Government Furnished aspects of 
the project was slow, and sub-contractors were delayed by the slow flow-down of requirements 
from the prime contractor. 
 
It must be said, however, that the result ultimately was the delivery of a capability that plays an 
important role in the overall air combat and command and control capability. 
 
Minister at approval: Robert Ray  
 
 
Acquisition strategy:  Commercial sale 
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Battlefield Airlift - Caribou Replacement—AIR 8000 Phase 2 
 
First mention in DCP: 1990s  Approved expenditure (July 2013) 1168 
Initial planned first pass:   Cumulative expenditure to 30 June 2013 276 
Actual date of first pass:   Budget estimate 2012-13 162 
Delay to first pass:     
Initial planned second pass: 2006–07*  Initial planned IOC: 2010–12* 
Actual date of second pass: May 2012  IOC at time of contract: Post 2014 
Delay to second pass: 50+ months  Current IOC:  
   Delay to IOC:  
Approved expenditure (July 2011)     
Real cost increases (scope):   Initial project cost estimate: $0.75–1.0 billion 
Real cost increases (transfer):   Actual cost at time of approval:   $1.4 billion 
Real cost increases (e.g. cost 
overrun): 
  Cost increases prior to/at approval: > $400 million 
*From 2004 DCP              
$m 2012–13 2013–14 
 Planned 
expenditure  162 
Actual 
expenditure   
Difference   
Source: Defence 2013-14 PBS 
 
Prime Contractor: L-3 Communications through the United States Foreign Military Sales process with 
the United States Air Force. 
 
This project is acquiring a fleet of 10 United States-military configuration C-27J aircraft as a military 
off-the-shelf procurement through the United States Foreign Military Sales process, with only minor 
changes required to meet Australian airspace regulations. [A] 
 
During 2013-14, this project plans to procure aircraft spares and support equipment, establish an 
interim United States based training system and undertake airworthiness certification activities in 
preparation for first aircraft acceptance and the commencement of flight training by mid-2014. 
 
The key risk for this acquisition project is completion of Australian airworthiness certification 
requirements prior to first aircraft acceptance and commencement of flight training in the United 
States from mid-2014. [B] 
  Source: Defence PBS 2013–14 
 
A 
For the background on this decision and the rationale for a battlefield airlifter in the ADF's order of 
battle, see the March 2012 ASPI publication Delivering the Goods: the ADF's future battlefield 
airlifter. 
B The USAF has decided to dispense with its C-27J fleet as part of budget rationalisation measures. 
ASPI 
comment 
While the rationale for such a type in the force structure is a strong one and the C-27J has several 
advantages over its rival competitor, the cost of this acquisition is significantly higher than ASPI 
estimated, and the cost-benefit case is not obvious. 
Minister at approval: Stephen Smith 
Acquisition strategy:  FMS purchase 
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Air to Air Refuelling Capability (AIR 5402)   
First mention in DCP: 2001  Approved expenditure (July 2013) 1,800 
Initial planned first pass: n/a  Cumulative expenditure to 30 June 2012 1,583 
Actual date of first pass: n/a  Budget estimate 2013-14 61 
Delay to first pass: nil    
Initial planned second pass: 2002-03  Initial planned IOC: 2006 
Actual date of second pass: July 2003  IOC at time of approval: late 2009 
Delay to second pass: 0.5 months  Current IOC: > May 2013 
   Delay to IOC: > 41 months 
Approved expenditure (July 2011) 1,866    
Real cost increases (scope): nil  Initial project cost estimate: 1500 to 
2000 
Real cost increases (transfer): -136  Actual cost at time of approval:   2,077  
Real cost increases (e.g. cost overrun): -154  Cost increases prior to/at approval: >$77 
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Planned 
expenditure   214 110 167 198 260 425 493 235 174* 61** 
Actual 
expenditure 189 188 194 116 61 315 178 276 138 119*  
Difference   -26 84 -51 -137 55 -247 -217  -97 -55*  
Source: Defence Annual Reports, except for *2012-13 Defence PAES and **2013-14 Defence PBS 
Prime Contractor: EADS CASA (Trading as Airbus Military - Spain) 
 
This project is delivering five new generation Airbus A330 Multi-Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) aircraft 
(known as the KC-30A in RAAF service) and the associated through-life support infrastructure for the 
fleet. [A] During 2013-14, this project will complete the review of test reports and documentation for 
the military avionics and Aerial Refuelling Boom systems; complete refurbishment and re-delivery of 
the first (prototype) aircraft following completion of testing in Spain; and deliver upgrades to the 
simulation training devices in line with modifications to the aircraft fleet. [B] 
The key risk for this project remains the schedule for completion of testing and documentation for 
acceptance and introduction into service of the boom refuelling system. 
 
This project continues to be managed as a Project of Concern. [C]  Source: Defence PBS 2013–14 
 
A 
The new aircraft replace the capability previously provided by five Boeing 707 aircraft. 
Unfortunately, the repeated deferrals of the replacement project in the 1990s coupled with delays 
with the project after approval have led to a substantial capability gap. The final B707 was 
withdrawn from service in mid-2008. 
B 
Certification of the type for air-to-air refuelling has taken considerably longer than was planned. 
The modifications referred to are presumably redesign work and software changes were required 
when an early 2011 in flight incident between the tanker aircraft and a Portuguese Air Force F-16 
resulted in the refuelling boom separating from the aircraft. The type had previously received 
certification in Spain in late 2010. 
C AIR 5402 was first placed on the Projects of Concern list in October 2010. 
ASPI 
comment 
This is an example of the sort of delays that occur when being a lead customer for a new design. To 
be fair, that wasn't the plan—the Royal Air Force was originally planning an earlier in-service date, 
but financial problems caused the RAAF to move to the front of the queue. Nonetheless, the 
capability gap of this important 'force multiplier' is now five years and counting. 
Minister at approval: Robert Hill  
Acquisition strategy:  Commercial acquisition from EADS (Airbus) 
Embargoed from publication/broadcast until release 30 May 2013, 2pm.
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Joint Strike Fighter Aircraft (AIR 6000 Phase 2A/2B) 
First mention in DCP: 2001  Approved expenditure (July 2013) 2,561 
Initial planned first pass: n/a  Cumulative expenditure to 30 June 2013 240 
Actual date of first pass:   Budget estimate 2013-14  
Delay to first pass: n/a    
Initial planned second pass: 2006-07   Initial planned IOC: 2014 
Actual date of second pass: April 2010  IOC at time of contract: 2016 
Delay to second pass: 34 months  Current IOC:   
   Delay to IOC: 4+ years 
Approved expenditure (Jul 2011) 2,664    
Real cost increases (scope): 0  Initial project cost estimate (total): > $10.5 
b 
Real cost increases (transfer): 0  Actual cost at time of approval:   TBD 
Real cost increases (e.g. cost overrun): 0  Cost increases prior to/at approval: n/a 
 
                
$m 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 
Planned 
expenditure  43 65 103* 231** 
Actual 
expenditure  71 58 111* 
 
Difference  28 -7 +8*  
Source: Defence Annual Reports, except for *2012-13Defence PAES and **2013-14 Defence PBS 
 
Prime Contractor: Lockheed Martin is contracted to the United States Government for the 
development and production of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Australia is procuring the aircraft 
through a government-to-government agreement. [A] 
 
This project will deliver 14 Conventional Take Off and Landing F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft 
and associated support systems. 
 
During 2013-14, the production of Australia’s first two F-35 JSF Aircraft will progress significantly 
down the production line. [B] 
 
The key risk for this project is the effective establishment of a reprogramming capability sufficient to 
support initial operations. [C]     Source: PBS 2013–14 
 
A 
Australia is a formal member of the international partnership contributing to the systems 
development and demonstration phase of the F-35. This membership results in a waiver of R&D cost 
amortisation in any future purchase, unlike an FMS purchase which has a surcharge. 
B 
The two aircraft will not be exclusively for Australian use at first, but will be part of a common pool 
to be used by the participating nations. They will later be transferred to RAAF ownership and flown 
to Australia to become part of the ADF fleet. 
C It's unclear what this means. At the very least, there are continuing—although decreasing—risks inherent in the concurrent development and production program in the United States. 
ASPI 
comment 
Things are looking healthier in the F-35 program than they have for some time. Costs are trending 
downwards and US orders have been cut less in the current budget cycle than in previous years. 
There are still risks to be negotiated, but there are signs that the program management within the 
Pentagon is tighter than hitherto. 
 
Minister at approval: Stephen Smith  
 
 
Acquisition strategy: Purchase from the United States as part of international partnership. 
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 Multirole Helicopter (AIR 9000 Phases 2, 4 and 6) 
First mention in DCP: 2001  Approved expenditure (July 2013) 3,625 
Initial planned first pass: n/a  Cumulative expenditure to 30 June 2012 2,203 
Actual date of first pass: n/a  Budget estimate 2012-13 204 
Delay to first pass: n/a    
Initial planned second pass: 2001-02  Initial planned IOC: 2007 
Actual date of second pass: April 2004  IOC at time of contract: July 2010 (RAN) 
Delay to second pass: 22 months  Current IOC: 2012–13 
   Delay to IOC: > 24 months 
Approved expenditure (Jul 2011) 3,628    
Real cost increases (scope): 2,597  Initial project cost estimate: 350-
400  
Real cost increases (transfer): -239  Actual cost at time of approval:   957 
Real cost increases (e.g. cost overrun):   Cost increases prior to/at approval: >557 
                
$m 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 
Planned 
expenditure   138 183 432 273 429 424 393 260* 204** 
Actual 
expenditure 107 120 329 262 307 451 262 260 156* 
 
Difference   -18 146 -170 34 22 -162 -133 -104*  
Source: Defence Annual Reports, except for *2012-13 Defence PAES and **2013-14 Defence PBS 
Prime Contractor: Australian Aerospace [A] 
This project is acquiring 46 MRH90 helicopters for Army and Navy. Phase 2 represents 12 Army 
MRH90 (additional Squadron to support air mobile lift capability) to which has been added Phase 4, 
the replacement of the Army’s Black Hawks, and Phase 6, the replacement of the Navy’s Sea Kings, for 
a total of 46 helicopters. During 2013-14, this project plans to accept a further seven aircraft in the 
mature configuration, progress the retro-fit program for the early configuration aircraft, accept the 
second full-flight mission simulator and support the achievement of the Initial Operational Capability 
milestone for Navy (the first embarked aircraft at sea). 
 
The key risks for this project over 2013-14 will be the timely resolution of the outstanding technical 
and supportability issues and the generation of the necessary flying rates to meet Navy and Army 
requirements. [C] This project is being managed as a Project of Concern. Source: 2013-14 PBS 
 
A Australian Aerospace is wholly owned by Eurocopter, a part of the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS) 
B 
According to a Ministerial statement in May 2013, 'The MRH90 program is three years late and has 
experienced a number of technical and commercial challenges and is currently on the Government’s 
Projects of Concern list'. The ANAO reports that DMO has high confidence that only 40% of the 
planned capability will be delivered, medium confidence in another 40% and low confidence in the 
remaining 20%. (Source: ANAO 2012–13 Major Projects Report, p88) 
C 
Army and Navy have had to make up the shortfall in flying hours by a greater rate of effort in their 
existing fleets, resulting in an overall shortfall in flying hours in the last reporting period. 
ASPI 
comment 
Despite the helicopter not having achieved service status anywhere prior to contract signature, the 
complexity of this acquisition was initially underestimated and categorised as 'Australianised Military 
Off-the-shelf', only to be later elevated to 'developmental' status. This project has been plagued by 
difficulties, but seems to have made some progress recently. The most recent press release noted 
that 'the MRH90 program will be considered for removal from the Projects of Concern list by the end 
of 2013'.  
Minister at approval: Robert Hill  
 
Acquisition strategy: Commercial acquisition from Australian Aerospace. 
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Future Naval Aviation Combat System Helicopter (AIR 9000 Phase 8) 
First mention in DCP:   Approved expenditure (July 2013) 2933 
Initial planned first pass:   Cumulative expenditure to 30 June 2012 459 
Actual date of first pass:   Budget estimate 2012-13 412 
Delay to first pass:     
Initial planned second pass:   Initial planned IOC:  
Actual date of second pass:   IOC at time of contract:  
Delay to second pass:   Current IOC:  
   Delay to IOC:  
Approved expenditure (Jul 2011)     
Real cost increases (scope):   Initial project cost estimate:  
Real cost increases (transfer):   Actual cost at time of approval:    
Real cost increases (e.g. cost overrun):   Cost increases prior to/at approval:  
                
$m 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 
Planned 
expenditure   145* 412** 
Actual 
expenditure   207* 
 
Difference   +62*  
Source: Defence Annual Reports, except for *2012-13 Defence PAES and **2013-14 Defence PBS 
Prime Contractor: Foreign Military Sales case with the United States Navy. 
 
The 24 MH-60R Seahawk ‘Romeo’ helicopters to be acquired by AIR 9000 Phase 8 will replace the 
capability of the current 16 S-70B-2 Seahawk ‘Classic’ helicopters. [A] 
 
The acquisition of the Romeos will enable Navy to provide eight helicopters concurrently embarked in 
Anzac class Frigates and the new Hobart class Air Warfare Destroyers. The remainder will be based at 
HMAS Albatross in Nowra, New South Wales, conducting training and maintenance. 
 
During 2013-14, the first four aircraft will be accepted in the United States and the initial introduction 
into service training for aircrew and maintainers will be completed, Australian certification activities 
will be completed, and construction of the dedicated Seahawk Romeo facilities at HMAS Albatross 
and HMAS Stirling will commence. 
 
The key risk for this project remains coordinating the facilities construction schedule with the delivery 
of key support elements, such as the flight simulator, ahead of the first seven aircraft and trained 
personnel returning from the United States at the end of 2014. [B]  Source: 2013-14 PBS 
 
A 
This off-the-shelf purchase makes a lot of sense in terms of acquiring a proven system (compared, 
for example to the MRH described earlier in this chapter) and in terms of interoperability with the 
USN. But it's very much at odds with the earlier Defence master plan of consolidating the ADF 
helicopter fleets into a smaller number of types. Assuming the embarked MRH becomes 
operational, Navy will have two totally distinct supply chains and different training environments 
to manage. 
B 
There is some 'Australianisation' required before IOC will be achieved. This includes modification of 
the deck handling equipment on the helicopters to make them compatible with the RAN's surface 
combatants and changes to way in which acoustic data is managed. 
ASPI 
comment 
It will be instructive to compare this acquisition to the purchase of the MRH. In terms of capability 
delivered per dollar and amount of effort, the Romeo will likely come out well ahead. 
 
Minister at approval: Robert Hill  
 
Acquisition strategy: Commercial acquisition from Australian Aerospace. 
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Amphibious Deployment and Sustainment – LHD (JP 2048 Phase 4A/4B) 
First mention in DCP: 2001  Approved expenditure (July 2013) 3,071 
Initial planned first pass: n/a  Cumulative expenditure to 30 June 2013 2,394 
Actual date of first pass:  Jan 2004  Budget estimate 2013-14 203 
Delay to first pass: n/a    
Initial planned second pass: 2005-06  Initial planned IOC: 2010 
Actual date of second pass: June 2007  IOC at time of contract: June 2015 
Delay to second pass: ?  Current IOC:  December 2014 
   Delay to IOC: -6 months 
Approved expenditure (Jul 2011) 3052    
Real cost increases (scope): 5  Initial project cost estimate: 700-900  
Real cost increases (transfer): 9  Actual cost at time of approval:   2,953 
Real cost increases (e.g. cost overrun): 0  Cost increases prior to/at approval: >2,053 
                
$m 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 
Planned 
expenditure    1 132 615 553 707 158* 203** 
Actual 
expenditure   24 220 136 631 558 606 210* 
 
Difference    219 4 16 5 -101 +52  
Source: Defence Annual Reports, except for *2011-12 Defence PAES and **2012-13 Defence PBS   
Prime Contractor: BAE Systems Australia Defence 
 
This project is scheduled to deliver two Canberra class Landing Heavy Dock (LHD) vessels and 
associated LHD support system comprising configuration information training, spares, documentation, 
and test equipment. [A] 
 
During 2013-14, this project is expected to deliver ALHD01 (HMAS Canberra) to the Royal Australian 
Navy in early 2014 and the hull of ALHD02 is planned to arrive in Australia in early 2014. [B] The key 
risks for this project are associated with the complex system integration and the availability of 
appropriately qualified staff. [C]    Source: PBS 2013–14 
 
The hull of the first arrived in Melbourne in October 2012. BAE Systems completed the lifting of the 
Superstructure blocks onto the hull in December 2012, with full consolidation to be complete by 
March 2013. Installation and integration of the communication and combat systems has now begun. 
The hull of the second ship was launched in Spain in July 2012. Source: PAES 2012-13 
 
A 
While the LHDs are based on an existing Spanish BPE design, there are Australian-unique changes, 
including the incorporation of an existing SAAB Combat System, and the development and 
integration of the internal and external communication systems.                                          
Source: ANAO Major projects report 2010–11 
B The hull of the first vessel was launched from Navantia's slipway in February 2011 and was formally named HMAS Canberra by the Prime Minister in February 2013. 
C 
According to ANAO's reporting of the project risk matrix, many of the risks have been re-evaluated to 
'moderate'. The combat system functionality appears to be the largest remaining risk. 
ASPI 
comment 
For vessels of this size and complexity, this project seems to be proceeding very well. In fact, for BAE, 
the lack of schedule slippage looks set to ensure a significant tailing off of work in the yard in the 
near future. 
 
Minister at approval: Brendan Nelson  
 
 
Acquisition strategy: Commercial acquisition. 
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Lightweight Torpedo Replacement (JP 2070 Phase 2) 
First mention in DCP: 2001  Approved expenditure (July 2013) 334 
Initial planned first pass: n/a  Cumulative expenditure to 30 June 2013 276 
Actual date of first pass: n/a  Budget estimate 2013-14 26 
Delay to first pass: n/a    
Initial planned second pass: 2001-02   Initial planned IOC: 2010 
Actual date of second pass: July 2001  IOC at time of contract:  
Delay to second pass: nil  Current IOC:   
   Delay to IOC:   
Approved expenditure (Jul 2011)     
Real cost increases (scope): 0  Initial project cost estimate: 250-350 
Real cost increases (transfer): 0  Actual cost at time of approval:   288 
Real cost increases (e.g. cost overrun): 0  Cost increases prior to/at approval: nil 
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Planned 
expenditure  42 55 75 37 45    46 19 33* 26 
Actual 
expenditure 3 38 43 29 29 19 34 18.2 7 8 21 26*  
Difference  -4 -12 -46 -8 -26    -38 2 -7*  
Source: Defence Annual Reports, except for *2011-12 Defence PAES and **2012-13 Defence PBS 
 
Prime Contractor: EuroTorp, Thales 
 
This project will deliver MU90 Anti-Submarine Lightweight Torpedoes, integrated with the Anzac and 
Adelaide class frigates. [A] JP 2070 Phase 2 was removed from the Project of Concern list in December 
2012 along with JP 2070 Phase 3. [B] 
 
During 2013-14, this project will complete transition activities sufficiently to close this project. The key 
risk for this project is retaining sufficient staff to successfully complete transition activities and close 
this project.  
         Source: 2013-14 PBS 
 
 
A 
The initial goal of JP 2070 was to fit the MU-90 lightweight torpedo to a range of ADF surface and air 
platforms, including embarked Seahawk helicopters and the P-3 maritime patrol aircraft. Integration 
problems led to the aircraft being de-scoped. 
B JP 2070 was added to the Project of Concerns list in January 2008. 
ASPI 
comment 
While things now seem to be going better than previously, this project has delivered much less than 
originally planned. As well, with delivery of the new naval combat helicopters with USN standard Mk 
54 lightweight torpedoes expected from 2014, the Navy will have to manage two different 
lightweight torpedoes and their associated supply chains and support mechanisms, including 
onboard the frigates. The RAAF's future P-8 Poseidon aircraft will also come with the Mk 54 
integrated. 
 
Minister at approval: Peter Reith  
 
 
Acquisition strategy: Commercial acquisition. 
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Upgrade of M-113 Armoured Vehicles (LAND 106) 
First mention in DCP: 2001  Approved expenditure (July 2013) 885 
Initial planned first pass: n/a  Cumulative expenditure to 30 June 2013 768 
Actual date of first pass: n/a  Budget estimate 2013-14  
Delay to first pass: n/a    
Initial planned second pass: pre 2001  Initial planned IOC: Nov 2005 
Actual date of second pass: Nov 1993  IOC at time of approval:  
Delay to second pass: n/a  Current IOC:  Dec 2007 [A] 
   Delay to IOC:  > 24 months 
Approved expenditure (Jul 2011)     
Real cost increases (scope): 441  Initial project cost estimate: 450-
600 
Real cost increases (transfer): 250  Actual cost at time of approval:   729 
Real cost increases (e.g. cost overrun): -2  Cost increases prior to/at approval: >129 
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expenditure 7 26 34 78 118 116 100 115 97 100 26*  
Actual 
expenditure 58 30 44 13 13 109 144 149 88 70 23*  
Difference 51 4 10 -65 -105 -7 44 34 -9  -30 -3*  
Source: Defence Annual Reports, except for *2012-13 Defence PAES and **2013-14 Defence PBS 
 
Prime Contractor: BAE Systems Australia Defence 
 
This project will deliver 431 M113 AS4 vehicles in seven variants; personnel, fitters, recovery, 
command, ambulance, logistics and mortar. 
 
The project is upgrading the Army’s M113 A1 vehicles to improve protection, lethality, mobility and 
habitability. The final contracted delivery date for all 431 vehicles is December 2012, but the 
contractor is currently delivering ahead of this schedule. 
 
During 2011-12, 129 upgraded vehicles were delivered, with 389 of 431 vehicles delivered. Production 
of appliqué armour packs was completed. The project also delivered the second tranche of repair 
parts to support the in-service fleet.    Source DAR 2011–12 
 
 
ASPI 
comment 
This project has been often delayed and has experienced scope changes, technical 
problems and communication problems over much of its long progress—all of which 
might be forgivable if the outcome was good. However, as the ANAO notes (Audit report 
Upgrade of the M113 Fleet of Armoured Vehicles, May 2012): 
 
'… the upgraded M113 does represent an improvement on the older, unextended 
vehicle. However, a vehicle that was considered fit-for purpose when the minor upgrade 
was first proposed 20 years ago now lags behind armoured infantry vehicles in use with 
other armed forces, and is vulnerable in many current threat environments, leaving 
Defence with an acknowledged capability gap'. 
Minister at approval: Robert Ray  
Acquisition strategy: Commercial development/acquisition 
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Bushmaster Protected Mobility Vehicle (LAND 116 Phase 3) 
First mention in DCP: n/a  Approved expenditure (July 
2013) 
1,033 
Initial planned first pass: n/a  Cumulative expenditure to 30 
June 2013 
771 
Actual date of first pass: n/a  Budget estimate 2013-14 - 
Delay to first pass: n/a    
Initial planned second pass: n/a  Initial planned IOC: n/a 
Actual date of second pass: Nov 1998  IOC at time of approval: n/a 
Delay to second pass: n/a  Current IOC: Dec 2004 
   Delay to IOC: n/a 
Approved expenditure (Jul 2011) 930    
Real cost increases (scope): 515  Initial project cost estimate: n/a 
Real cost increases (transfer): 0  Actual cost at time of approval:   295 
Real cost increases (e.g. cost overrun): 0  Cost increases prior to/at 
approval: 
n/a 
 
$m 
20
03
-0
4 
20
04
-0
5 
20
05
-0
6 
20
06
-0
7 
20
07
-0
8 
20
08
-0
9 
20
09
-1
0 
20
10
-1
1 
20
11
-1
2 
20
12
-1
3 
20
13
-1
4 
Planned 
expenditure  31 47 63 40       67 58*  
Actual 
expenditure  9 49 44 44 26.6 24 41 87 57* 
 
Difference  -22 +2 -19 +4       +20 -1*  
Source: Defence Annual Reports, except for *2012-13 Defence PAES and **2013-14 Defence PBS 
Prime Contractor: Thales Australia. 
This project, referred to as Project Bushranger, will deliver approximately 1050 vehicles across its five 
Production Periods, in seven variants (troop, command, mortar, assault pioneer, direct fire weapon, 
ambulance and air defence). [A] The vehicles will provide protected land mobility to Army combat 
units and Air Force Airfield Defence Guards. [A] Delivery of 293 Production Period 3 (Project LAND 
121) vehicles was completed in February 2012. Production of the Production Period 4 (101 attrition 
vehicles) will be completed in mid-2013.  
 
During 2013-14, this project will continue to deliver up to 214 Production Period 5 vehicles, which 
commenced in April 2013 and [will] conclude in mid-2016. [B] Source: 2013-14 PBS 
 
A 
In August 2011, an upgrade to the Bushmaster vehicles was completed to provide soldiers with 
better protection against Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). The upgrades included installation of 
new seating and flooring in the cabin to provide additional protection for commanders, drivers and 
troops. 
B 
There have been several tranches of deliveries. As we noted last year, production of an additional 
101 Production Period 4 vehicles commenced in February 2012 and will be completed in mid-2013. 
In March 2013 the government announced the subsequent production of another 214. 
ASPI 
comment 
Credit where it's due. Despite significant development problems, the Bushmaster has been a vehicle 
in the right place at the right time for Army. However, with the Afghanistan deployment about to 
wind down and project LAND 400 projected to cost more than $10 billion for protected mobility for 
land forces, it's questionable whether the latest tranche of 214 vehicles represents a prudent 
acquisition.  
Minister at approval: John Moore  
Acquisition strategy: Commercial development/acquisition 
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Artillery Replacement 155mm Howitzer (LAND 17 Phase 1A) 
First mention in DCP: 2001  Approved expenditure (July 2013) 324 
Initial planned first pass: n/a  Cumulative expenditure to 30 June 2013 122 
Actual date of first pass: n/a  Budget estimate 2013-14 28 
Delay to first pass: n/a    
Initial planned second pass: 2005-06  Initial planned IOC: 2008-10 
Actual date of second pass: Nov 2009  IOC at time of contract: Dec 2011 
Delay to second pass: 39 months  Current IOC: Dec 2011 
   Delay to IOC: – 
Approved expenditure (Jul 2011)     
Real cost increases (scope): 0  Initial project cost estimate: 150-200 
Real cost increases (transfer): 0  Actual cost at time of approval:   348 
Real cost increases (e.g. cost overrun): 0  Cost increases prior to/at approval: >148 
                
$m 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 
Planned 
expenditure   2       76 111 29* 28** 
Actual 
expenditure   0.5       79 33 15* 
 
Difference   -1.5       3  -78 -14*  
Source: Defence Annual Reports, except for *2011-12 Defence PAES and **2012-13 Defence PBS 
 
Prime Contractor: Through several United States Government Foreign Military Sales cases. 
 
This project will deliver approximately 35 M777A2 lightweight towed howitzers, a command and 
control battle management system based on the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System 
software, and course correcting fuses. This project has introduced into service the towed howitzers, 
and the final version of the battle management system. [A] 
 
During 2013-14, this project will progress integration activities and is on track to achieve Final 
Materiel Release. [B] The acquisition of the course correcting fuse is dependent upon the capability 
achieving United States Government Materiel Release, which is anticipated to occur in late 2012-13. 
 
The key risk for this project is achieving complete integration and interoperability within the ADF Joint 
Fires Digital Command and Control environment. [C]    Source: 2013-14 PBS 
 
 
A LAND 17 Phase 1C was to acquire self-propelled howitzers but was cancelled as part of the budget savings measures. 
B 
Army is reportedly delighted with the performance of the new guns, as the move into the world of 
digital systems, GPS positional information and inertial guidance greatly reduces the time required to 
set up the guns and largely removes the necessity for 'mandraulic' tasks such as plotting grid 
references. 
C 
The joint fires digital command and control environment is a major technical challenge. As is usual 
with military C4ISR projects, the integration of disparate legacy systems and data formats to produce 
a robust network is not a straightforward task. 
ASPI 
comment 
With the cancellation in the budget of the self-propelled howitzers intended to be acquired under 
Phase 1C, the Army will have the M777A2 as its principal indirect fire-support weapon for some time 
to come. While not offering the same tactical flexibility by virtue of requiring a tow, the lightweight 
nature of the guns means that the ability to airlift artillery support will be much enhanced. 
 
Minister at approval: John Faulkner  
 
Acquisition strategy: Foreign Military Sale from United States. 
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Standard Missile Replacement (SEA 1390 Phase 4B) 
First mention in DCP: 2001  Approved expenditure (July 2013) 400 
Initial planned first pass: n/a  Cumulative expenditure to 30 June 2013 335 
Actual date of first pass:    Budget estimate 2013-14 24 
Delay to first pass: n/a    
Initial planned second pass: 2003-04  Initial planned IOC: 2008-10 
Actual date of second pass: Sept 2004  IOC at time of approval: May 2003 
Delay to second pass: 3 months  Current IOC: August 2010 
   Delay to IOC: 79 months 
Approved expenditure (Jul 2011)     
Real cost increases (scope): 0  Initial project cost estimate: 450-
600 
Real cost increases (transfer): 0  Actual cost at time of approval:   553 
Real cost increases (e.g. cost overrun): -2  Cost increases prior to/at approval: 0 
                
$m 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2012-13 
Planned 
expenditure 
 80 96 78 79 58 49 90 19* 24** 
Actual 
expenditure 
 38 66 77 58 33 22 12 28*  
Difference  -42 -30 -1 -21 -25 -27  -78 +9  
Source: Defence Annual Reports, except for *2012-13 Defence PAES and **2013-14 Defence PBS 
Prime Contractor: US Department of Defense under an FMS arrangement and various commercial 
contracts; Lockheed Martin-US, AAI Corporation, BAE Systems-US and Thales Australia. 
 
This project upgrades four Adelaide class frigates [A] with the SM-2 Surface-to-Air Mid Course 
Guidance mode missile capability. It will also acquire the weapons, and provide missile technician 
training. 
 
During 2013-14, this project will seek consideration for the granting of Operational Release from the 
Chief of Navy, finalise the Foreign Military Sales case and prepare for formal project closure. 
 
The key risk for this project is not achieving Operational Release. This is considered low risk as Naval 
Operational Test and Evaluation has been completed. [B]     
         Source: 2013–14 PBS 
 
A Initially this project was to upgrade six FFGs, but the retirement of two has resulted in the reduction of scope to four ship sets (with very little back in the way of reduced overall cost). 
B Barring something unforseen, this will be the last appearance of this much-delayed project in ASPI's annual review. 
ASPI 
comment 
The overall FFG upgrade project is a good illustration of the pitfalls inherent in midlife upgrades. 
With a significant overrun in schedule and (effectively) a 50% cost overrun, if the FFGs retire as 
planned between 2016 and 2022, the return on investment will be much less than was initially 
anticipated. 
 
Minister at approval: Robert Hill  
 
 
Acquisition strategy: Foreign Military Sale from United States and commercial contracts. 
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Future Submarine (SEA 1000 Phases 1A and 2) 
First mention in DCP: 2009  Approved expenditure (July 2013) 214 
Initial planned first pass: 09/10–10/11  Cumulative expenditure to 30 June 2013 35 
Actual date of first pass: TBD  Budget estimate 2012-13 58 
Delay to first pass:     
Initial planned second pass:   Initial planned IOC:  
Actual date of second pass:   IOC at time of approval:  
Delay to second pass:   Current IOC:  
   Delay to IOC:  
Approved expenditure (2009) n/a    
Real cost increases (scope): n/a  Initial project cost estimate: > 1,500* 
Real cost increases (transfer): n/a  Actual cost at time of approval:    
Real cost increases (e.g. cost overrun): n/a  Cost increases prior to/at approval:  
               *SEA 1000 total cost 
$m 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 
Planned 
expenditure 
  58** 
Actual 
expenditure  35**  
Difference    
Source:  **2013-14 Defence PBS 
 
This project will deliver Australia’s Future Submarine Capability. 
 
During 2013-14, this project will prepare for Government consideration in 2014-15, the Future 
Submarine Top Level Requirement statement, selection of submarine builder and systems integrator, 
and selection of a reduced number of design concepts for further development and basing 
considerations. [A][B] 
 
The key risk for this project is the mobilisation of resources across Government, Industry and 
academia to undertake Australia’s largest ever Defence program. [C]   
Source: 2013-14 PBS 
 
A 
Phases 1 and 2 of Project SEA 1000 were approved in 2012, with the description 'Future Submarine 
Design and Construction (Initial Consideration and Studies)'. 
B 
Initially, SEA 1000 studies included requests for information to three builders of off-the-shelf 
submarines: DCNS (France), HDW (Germany) and Navantia (Spain). 
C 
This comment is so broad as to be almost meaningless. There is substantial project risk, including 
schedule, technical and project management issues of the highest order. It seems inevitable that the 
Collins class will have to deliver another eight-year duty cycle in order to allow enough time for this 
project to deliver a replacement. 
 
To address some of the engineering issues, Defence has entered into a contract with Babcock for a 
study into the establishment of a land based propulsion systems test facility, which will inform 
engineering development of the future submarines.   
 
Workforce management issues are addressed (not very convincingly) in the Future Submarine 
Industry Skilling Plan released in conjunction with the 2013 Defence White Paper.  
ASPI 
comment 
 
A very long way to go, but at last some funding is available for data collection. 
 
Minister at approval: Stephen Smith  
Acquisition strategy: TBD 
Embargoed from publication/broadcast until release 30 May 2013, 2pm.
232 
 
Anzac Ship Anti-Ship Missile Defence (SEA 1448 Phase 2B) 
First mention in DCP: 2001  Approved expenditure (July 2013) 676 
Initial planned first pass: n/a  Cumulative expenditure to 30 June 2013 407 
Actual date of first pass:   Budget estimate 2012-13 73 
Delay to first pass: n/a    
Initial planned second pass: 2004-05  Initial planned IOC: 2008-10 
Actual date of second pass: Nov 2005  IOC at time of approval: Dec 2009 
Delay to second pass: 4 months  Current IOC: Nov 2013 
   Delay to IOC: 47 months 
Approved expenditure (Jul 2011)     
Real cost increases (scope): 0  Initial project cost estimate: 75-100 
Real cost increases (transfer): 149  Actual cost at time of approval:   249 
Real cost increases (e.g. cost overrun): 0  Cost increases prior to/at approval: >149 
                
$m 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 
Planned 
expenditure 81   131 76 59 52* 73** 
Actual 
expenditure 53 56.1 94 58 69 67*  
Difference -28   -37 -18 +10  +15*  
Source: Defence Annual Reports, except for *2012-13 Defence PAES and **2013-14 Defence PBS 
Prime Contractor: CEA Technologies Proprietary Limited and the Anzac Ship Integrated Material, 
Support Program Alliance (comprising the DMO, Saab Technologies Australia and BAE Systems). [A] 
 
This project will deliver a phased array radar system to the Anzac class frigate for target 
indication/tracking, mid-course guidance and target illumination for the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile, 
and a new dual navigation radar system to replace the existing navigation radar suite. 
 
During 2013-14, this project will deliver the final stage 2 component of the ASMD program, consisting 
of a software upgrade to both the phased array radar and combat management system. [B] This will 
deliver unequalled capability, making the Anzac class frigate the most capable ship in its class. During 
2013-14, both HMAS Perth and HMAS Arunta will be upgraded and delivered to Navy with the full 
ASMD capability. 
 
The key risk for this project is that the final suite of weapon firings does not prove the weapon 
system’s design capabilities and/or achieve sea acceptance. [C]  Source: 2013-14 PBS 
 
A 
The CEA radar was not the initial materiel solution anticipated for this project, which had at least one 
'false start'. The CEAFAR radar fitted to HMAS Perth has reportedly performed well in sea trials, but 
this remains a developmental project. 
B 
ANAO notes that this project was provided budget supplementation for real cost/scope increases 
due to government approval of ships 2-8. (2012-13 Major Projects report) 
C The ANAO notes that it was agreed by Navy, CDG and DMO that IOC will not be achieved until the Phased Array Radar had been proven against supersonic targets. 
ASPI 
comment 
A successful delivery of this project will represent a step up in fleet air defence capability compared 
to the current ability resident in the FFGs. The future AWDs will be a further advance. Rigorous final 
trials are a critical milestone for this project, as the radar is the result of a developmental program—
albeit one that looks set to be a success. 
Minister at approval: Robert Hill  
Acquisition strategy: Alliance contract and commercial acquisition 
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Air Warfare Destroyer Build (SEA 4000 Phase 3) 
First mention in DCP: 2001  Approved expenditure (July 2013) 7,859 
Initial planned first pass: n/a  Cumulative expenditure to 30 June 2013 4,458 
Actual date of first pass: May 2005  Budget estimate 2013-14 625 
Delay to first pass: n/a    
Initial planned second pass: 2005-06  Initial planned IOC: 2013 
Actual date of second pass: June 2007  IOC at time of approval: July 2016 
Delay to second pass: 11 months  Current IOC: July 2017 
   Delay to IOC: 12 months 
Approved expenditure (Jul 2012)     
Real cost increases (scope): 0  Initial project cost estimate: 3,500-
4,500 
Real cost increases (transfer): 0  Actual cost at time of approval:   7,207+ 
Real cost increases (e.g. cost overrun): 0  Cost increases prior to/at approval: >2,707 
                
$m 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 
Planned 
expenditure 315 600 1137 1146 841 622* 625** 
Actual 
expenditure 441 734 918 944 802 621* 
 
Difference 126 134 -219 -202  -39 -1*  
Source: Defence Annual Reports, except for *2011-12 Defence PAES and **2012-13 Defence PBS 
Prime Contractor: The Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD) program is being delivered under an alliance-
based contracting arrangement between ASC AWD Shipbuilder Pty Ltd, Raytheon Australia Pty Ltd 
and the Government, represented by the DMO. [A] 
 
This project will deliver three Hobart class AWDs and their support system to the Navy, providing a 
significant increase in defence capabilities, from area air-defence and escort duties, right through to 
peacetime national tasking and diplomatic missions. 
 
During 2013-14, this project will achieve a number of key milestones, including the completion of 
block consolidation and integration for Ship 01, Hobart, and the keel-laying for Ship 02, Brisbane. The 
AWD Alliance will continue to receive deliveries of combat system equipment for the future 
destroyers and blocks will continue to arrive in Adelaide for Ship 02 and Ship 03. [B] 
 
The key challenge for this project is to maintain an efficient, sustainable workforce that is successful 
in progressing the consolidation and integration of the AWDs, leading into through-life support 
activities for the destroyers and future initiatives to protect the naval shipbuilding industry capability 
ahead of the future submarine program.  [C]   Source: 2013-14 PBS 
 
A 
See chapter 7 of the 2012-13 Cost of Defence brief for a review of the alliance arrangements and 
observations of the potential impact of the alliance arrangement on the progression of this 
project. 
B 
The allocation of block construction across the participating shipyards is detailed in a Ministerial 
Press release of 9 March 2012: Forgacs: 44 blocks, ASC: 25 blocks, BAE Systems: 11 blocks and 
Navantia: 10 blocks. The block consolidation of Ship 01 is progressing well, but there are still 
many systems integration steps in the future. 
C This comment presumably refers to some of the proposals in the Future Submarine Industry Skilling Plan (see Chapter7 of the 2012-13 Cost of Defence brief). 
ASPI 
comment 
This complex project has already seen the schedule relaxed and work reallocated between the 
participating shipyards, as well as allocating work to Navantia in Spain. No real cost increase was 
announced at the time, but it's our judgement that there has been some trade-offs between 
profit and risk exposure for at least one of the alliance partners. 
Minister at approval: Brendan Nelson  
Acquisition strategy: Alliance contract 
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Chapter 9 – Australia’s Foreign Aid  
Australia’s foreign aid is administered by the Australian Agency for International 
Development (AusAID). The declared fundamental aim of Australia’s aid program is to ‘help 
people overcome poverty’. Nonetheless, it would be naïve to think that Australia’s aid 
program does not also work to further our broader national interests. 
Australia’s strategic interests are an important subset of its national interests. In this 
chapter, we examine the foreign aid program with a focus on how it furthers our strategic 
interests. Extensive details of aid initiatives in specific countries are available on the AusAID 
website www.ausaid.gov.au. Also, the Ministerial Statement on International Development 
Assistance released with the 2013-14 Budget is clear, comprehensive and readable.  
How much does Australia spend on foreign aid? 
In 2013-14 Australian foreign aid will amount to $5.7 billion, corresponding to 0.37% of 
Gross National Income (GNI). This is a nominal boost of $518 million on last year, and 8.0% 
annual growth in real terms (using the non-farm GDP deflator). After a pause in 2009-10 due 
to the GFC when growth was limited to 2.1%, foreign aid has been increased strongly for 
four years in a row.  
This year’s increase completes a long period of robust growth in the aid budget. Since 2000-
01 foreign aid has increased in real terms by an average of 6.6% per annum. But things have 
not always been so favourable as Figure 9.1 shows.  
 Figure 9.1: Australian spending on foreign aid 1971-72 to 2013-14 
Source: 2013-14 Ministerial Statement on Australia’s International Development Assistance Program 
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In much the same way that defence spending is measured as a share of GDP, foreign aid 
spending is often measured as a share of GNI. Viewed in this manner, the falling priority 
accorded to aid from the 1970s to the 1990s is very clear in Figure 9.2.  
Figure 9.2: Australian foreign aid as a share of GNI 1971-72 to 2013-14 
 
Source: 2013-14 Ministerial Statement on Australia’s International Development Assistance Program 
No doubt many factors contributed to a higher priority for foreign aid this century. From a 
strategic perspective, the eroding conditions in the fragile states on our periphery would be 
reason enough to do more.  
In international terms, Australian foreign aid spending is unimpressive. In 2011, the last year 
for which comparative data is available, Australia ranked 12th out of 22 OECD countries for 
aid as a share of GNI, see Figure 9.3. Not only do we fall below the average for industrialised 
nations, but our 0.37% of GNI is barely more than half of the agreed United Nations target of 
0.7%.  
Until the 2012 budget, the government had promised to increase Australia’s foreign aid to 
0.5% of GNI by 2015-16. However, last year that goal was deferred to 2016-17, and this year 
was deferred to 2017-18. Nonetheless, Australia’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) as 
a share of GNI will grow from 0.35% in 2012-13 to 0.37% 2013-14.   
To meet the delayed target date, ODA is now planned to increase to around 0.39% of GNI in 
2014-15, 0.41% in 2015-16, and 0.45% in 2016-17. Assuming that real GNI grows at 2.5% per 
annum, the shortfall compared with pre-2012 plans will amount to $4.5 billion over six 
years.  
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Figure 9.3: Comparison of Official Development Assistance from OECD nations 
 
Source: 2013 OECD Factbook  
 
How is the money spent?  
At the risk of oversimplifying Australia’s complex foreign aid effort, Figure 9.4 sets out the 
gross categories of aid and how they have changed since 2010. In that year new 
categorisations of aid spending were introduced, represented in terms of ‘strategic goals’. As 
an overall breakdown of ODA, the categories include 19% spent on ‘saving lives’, 22% on 
‘promoting opportunities for all’, 19% on sustainable economic development, 16% on 
effective governance, 17% on humanitarian and disaster response, and 7% on cross-cutting 
activities. 
Figure 9.4: The composition of Australian foreign aid by Strategic Goals 2010-2013 
 
Source: AusAID annual reports and budget papers 
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Where does the money go? 
The annual aid budget as administered by AusAID is composed of a country-specific program 
and a global program, see Figure 9.5. The latter includes payments to various development 
banks and UN and Commonwealth agencies, including emergency aid through the World 
Food Program. Because of multi-year payments, the global program can vary greatly from 
one year to the next (accrual accounting smooths the payments in reporting). 
Figure 9.5: AusAID — Global and Country Programs 
 
Source: AusAID annual reports and budget papers – does not include spending by other departments or departmental spending 
Australian country-specific aid is mostly focused on Asia and Pacific Island states, although 
locations further afield are increasingly benefiting. Figure 9.6 shows the size of country-
specific aid by region since 1998. 
 
Figure 9.6: AusAID country programs— spending by region 1998-2013 
Source: AusAID annual reports and budget papers 
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In the past, Australian aid tended to be overwhelmingly focused on countries close to 
Australia. This priority is still apparent in Figure 9.6 where the category of ‘immediate region’ 
includes the island states of the Pacific, PNG and East Timor. Though not shown, most of the 
aid to East Asia goes to Southeast Asia and to Indonesia in particular.  
Nonetheless, recent increases have broadened the spread of funding to more distant 
locations as shown in Figure 9.6. In part, this reflects substantial new aid to Africa, Pakistan, 
Iraq and Afghanistan.  
Table 9.1 lists Australia’s total ODA by value for 2013-14 (including apportionment from 
global programs where possible and including non AusAID programs). An additional 
$2.2 billion is provided through core contributions to multilateral organisations. This 
country-specific data provides an interesting picture of Australia’s aid priorities.   
Table 9.1: Australian aid — spending by partner country 2013-14 
Country 
Australian Aid 
2013-14 
$(million) 
Country 
Australian Aid 
2013-14 
$ (million) 
Indonesia  646.8 Samoa  45.8 
PNG 507.2 Sri Lanka  45.5 
Africa  355.1 Nepal  38 
Sub-Saharan Africa 335.1 Tonga  32.2 
Solomon Islands  187.9 Middle East, North Africa 30.9 
Afghanistan  180.4 Nauru  29.9 
Vietnam  159.1 Kiribati  29.7 
Philippines  141 Latin America 24.8 
East Timor  125.7 North Pacific 18.7 
Bangladesh  111.4 Mongolia  16.5 
Cambodia  97.2 Iraq  15.9 
Pakistan  87.9 Bhutan 14.2 
Myanmar 82.8 Caribbean 13.3 
Vanuatu  65.4 Tuvalu  13 
Laos  62.4 Maldives  9.3 
Palestinian Territories 60.6 Niue  7.8 
Fiji 58.2 Cook Islands  6.8 
Source: 2013-14 Ministerial Statement on Australia’s International Development Assistance Program 
How does aid further Australia’s national interests? 
Aside from making us feel better about ourselves, foreign aid furthers our national interests 
in two ways. First, bilateral aid to countries establishes a quid pro quo that facilitates access 
to, and influence with, foreign governments. Second, aid can bolster the institutions, 
infrastructure and human capital necessary for economic development and political stability. 
The rationale for the first category is self-evident; the second furthers our national interest 
by improving the stability of countries important to our security.  
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Much of Australian aid is of the first sort. Until recently, for example, we gave a small 
amount of aid to China each year, which had no significant impact on its 1.3 billion people or 
its economic development. Other aid, like that to Solomon Islands, is directly focused on 
achieving tangible improvements in governance, human security and economic 
development.  
An informative picture emerges by examining the ratio of Australian aid to a recipient 
country’s GDP. High ratios indicate a real effort to make a difference in a country; small 
ratios reflect largely diplomatic gestures that will hopefully be repaid through access and 
influence. Table 9.2 lists Australian aid recipients in ascending order of the ratio of Australian 
aid to national GDP. The figures for smaller nations are unreliable. Not surprisingly, Pacific 
Islands head the list followed by other countries from the immediate region. Note that some 
smaller Pacific countries have been omitted because economic data was not available. For 
comparison, the latest GDP per capita in PPP dollars has been included as a measure of the 
relative level of poverty in recipient countries. Clearly, Australian aid is only loosely directed 
on the basis of need. 
Table 9.2: Australian aid as a share of GDP  
Country 
Ratio of 
Australian 
aid to 
GDP 
(PPP) 
2013-14 
Australian 
Aid 
(A$m) 
2012 
per 
capita 
(US$) 
Country 
Ratio of 
Australian 
aid to 
GDP 
(PPP) 
2013-14 
Australian 
Aid 
(A$m) 
2012 
per 
capita 
(US$) 
Niue  78.0% 7.8 5,800 Nepal  0.2% 38 1,300 
Tuvalu  35.1% 13 3,300 Myanmar 0.1% 82.8 1,400 
Kiribati  17.8% 29.7 5,900 Mongolia  0.1% 16.5 5,400 
Solomon Islands  17.1% 187.9 3,400 Vietnam  0.1% 159.1 3,500 
East Timor  11.9% 125.7 9,500 Bangladesh  0.1% 111.4 2,000 
Vanuatu  7.9% 65.4 4,900 Sri Lanka  0.1% 45.5 6,100 
Samoa  6.7% 45.8 6,200 Indonesia  0.1% 646.8 5,000 
Tonga  6.5% 32.2 7,500 Philippines  0.0% 141 4,300 
Cook Islands  3.7% 6.8 9,100 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
0.0% 335.1 2,580 
PNG 2.9% 507.2 2,700 Iraq  0.0% 15.9 4,600 
Fiji 1.4% 58.2 4,800 Pakistan  0.0% 87.9 2,900 
Afghanistan  0.9% 180.4 1,000 
Middle East, 
North Africa 
0.0% 30.9 11,112 
Bhutan 0.8% 14.2 6,500 
Latin 
American & 
Caribbean 
0.0% 38.2 12,818 
Cambodia  0.6% 97.2 2,400     
Sources: 2013-14 Ministerial Statement on Australia’s International Development Assistance Program, CIA Factbook, IMF World 
Economic Outlook April 2013, and various (possibly unreliable) sources for smaller pacific nations.  
The ratio of aid to GDP at which aid becomes an entirely diplomatic gesture is impossible to 
define, though it is hard to argue that figures below 0.5% of GDP reflect a serious effort to 
have a significant impact—except perhaps in a limited area like governance.    
Conversely, it is clear that Australia is trying to make a real difference in those countries 
where aid approaches or exceeds 5% of GDP. As Table 9.2 shows, this category is entirely 
within our immediate region.  
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Australia’s military cooperation program 
Allied to Australia’s international aid effort, is the $84 million a year Defence Cooperation 
Program run by the Department of Defence. According to the 2008-09 PBS, the Defence 
Cooperation Program supports the government’s strategic objectives by:  
x contributing to regional security 
x working with allies, regional partners and others to shape the global and regional 
environment in a way favourable to Australia and the ADF 
x consolidating acceptance of Australia as an obvious and legitimate participant in 
deliberations on issues that affect regional security  
x encouraging and assisting with the development of defence self-reliance of regional 
countries.  
In practice, the Defence Cooperation Program provides assistance to regional security forces 
through military advisors, training initiatives, bilateral exercises, capacity building, and 
equipment and infrastructure projects. A long-standing part of the Defence Cooperation 
Program is the Pacific Patrol Boat Program that provided 22 Patrol Boats along with ongoing 
training and technical support to 12 Pacific Island countries. These vessels allow the 
countries involved in the Program to independently police their maritime territories.  
Figure 9.7 sets out the spending on the Defence Cooperation Program over the past twenty-
odd years. For ease of display, individual country spending has been aggregated into 
convenient categories. Country specific data for 2012-13 and 2013-14 appears in Table 9.3.  
Figure 9.7: Defence Cooperation Program—1987 to 2013 
 Source: Defence Budget Papers and Annual Reports 
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Table 9.3: Defence Cooperation Program—2012-13 and 2013-14 
Country 
2012-13 
($’000) 
2013-14 
($’000) 
Country 
2012-13 
($’000) 
2013-14 
($’000) 
South Pacific   Southeast Asia   
East Timor 4,385 3,740 Singapore 71 82 
Vanuatu 964 986 Philippines 3,546 3,229 
Solomon Islands 924 924 Thailand 2,903 2,913 
Tonga 2,044 3,841 Malaysia 3,723 3,721 
Samoa 169 108 Indonesia 3,569 3,730 
Cook Islands 114 134 Vietnam 1,903 1,904 
Fiji   Cambodia and Laos 1,230 1,277 
Marshall Islands 269 190 Brunei 12 21 
Micronesia 238 161 Myanmar  172 
Tuvalu 294 243 Sub-total 16,957 17,049 
Kiribati 351 171 Other regional activities 6,469 7,121 
Palau 214 235 
Defence International 
Training Centre 
5,334 5,498 
DCP Housing 1,720 5,500 Total 77,954 93,886 
Pacific Patrol Boats 18,051 20,889    
Sub-total 29,737 37,122    
Papua New Guinea 19,457 27,096    
Source: 2013-14 PBS 
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About The Australian Strategic Policy Institute 
The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) is an independent, non-partisan policy 
institute. It has been set up by the government to provide fresh ideas on Australia’s defence 
and strategic policy choices. ASPI is charged with the task of informing the public on strategic 
and defence issues, generating new ideas for government, and fostering strategic expertise 
in Australia. It aims to help Australians understand the critical strategic choices which our 
country will face over the coming years, and will help government make better-informed 
decisions. 
For more information, visit ASPI’s web site at www.aspi.org.au. 
ASPI’s Research Program 
Each year ASPI will publish a number of policy reports on key issues facing Australian 
strategic and defence decision makers. These reports will draw on work by external 
contributors. 
Strategy: ASPI will publish up to 6 longer studies on issues of critical importance to Australia 
and our region. 
Strategic Insights: A series of shorter studies on topical subjects that arise in public debate. 
Special Reports: Generally written by ASPI experts, SPECIAL REPORTS are intended to 
deepen understanding on critical questions facing key strategic decision-makers and, where 
appropriate, provide policy recommendations. In some instances, material of a more 
technical nature may appear in this series, where it adds to the understanding of the issue at 
hand. 
Specialist Publications: ASPI also produces valuable reference tools, such as The Cost of 
Defence and the Australian Defence Almanac. 
Strategic Policy Forums: These are online roundtable discussions undertaken when a subject 
of critical importance requires debate.  They bring together a range of experts to discuss the 
main policy alternatives, the results of which provide policy makers and the broader public 
with accurate and authoritative information about crucial strategic policy choices. 
Policy Analysis: Generally written by ASPI experts, POLICY ANALYSIS is provided online to 
give readers timely, insightful opinion pieces on current strategic issues, with clear policy 
recommendations when appropriate. 
Commissioned Work: ASPI will undertake commissioned research for clients including the 
Australian Government, state governments, foreign governments and industry. 
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ASPI’s Programs 
There are four ASPI programs. They produce publications and hold events including lectures, 
conferences and seminars around Australia, as well as dialogues on strategic issues with key 
regional countries. The programs are as follows. 
Strategy and International Program: This program covers ASPI’s work on Australia’s 
international security environment, the development of our higher strategic policy, our 
approach to new security challenges, and the management of our international defence 
relationships. 
Operations and Capability Program: This program covers ASPI’s work on the operational 
needs of the Australian Defence Force, the development of our defence capabilities, and the 
impact of new technology on our armed forces. 
Budget and Management Program: This program covers the full range of questions 
concerning the delivery of capability, from financial issues and personnel management to 
acquisition and contracting out—issues that are central to the government’s policy 
responsibilities. 
National Security Program: This program covers ASPI's work on Australia's national security 
priorities, emerging issues, related strategies, and the development of national security 
arrangements. 
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Glossary 
ADF Australian Defence Force 
AES Additional Estimates Statements 
AEW&C Airborne Early Warning & Control  
ANAO Australian National Audit Office 
APS Australian Public Service 
CDF Chief of the Defence Force 
CIOG Chief Information Officer Group 
CSP Commercial Support Program 
CUC Capital Use Charge 
DAR Defence Annual Report 
DCP Defence Capability Plan 
DFRB Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits 
DHA Defence Housing Authority 
DMO Defence Materiel Organisation 
DRP Defence Reform Program 
DSG Defence Support Group 
DSTO Defence Science and Technology Organisation 
EWSP Electronic Warfare Self Protection 
FADT Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade 
FBT Fringe Benefits Tax 
FMA Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 
GDP  
GNI 
Gross Domestic Product 
Gross National Income 
GST Goods and services tax 
NPOC 
OPA 
Net Personnel and Operating Costs 
Official Public Account 
PAES Portfolio Additional Estimates Statements 
PBS Portfolio Budget Statement 
SES Senior Executive Service 
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